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No. 8, 1 August 1978

Complete translation of the monthly theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published in Peking. Passages between slantlines printed in boldface type.

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ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY

Peking RED FLAG in Chinese No 8, 1 Aug 78 pp 2-23

[Political work report submitted by the Political Department of the Rear Detachment to the senior cadre meeting of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP Central Committee in 1944]

[Text] Editor's note: At a time when we warmly celebrate the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Chinese PLA, we publish in this issue the report "On the Question of Political Work in the Army" submitted to the meeting of senior cadres of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP Central Committee by the Political Department of the Rear Detachment in 1944.

This report was written under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao and with the participation of Comrade Chou En-lai and other comrades. Most of it was written by Chairman Mao himself. It is another historic document on political work in our army following the resolution of the Kutien meeting. It eliminated the influence of Wang Ming's line on political work, carried forward the fine traditions and further enhanced the prestige and status of political work in our army. The basic principles of this report are applicable not only to the army but to the whole party. Today the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua is leading the entire party, army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country in the new Long March. In this new historical condition, a restudy of this important historic document is of tremendous practical significance in continuing and carrying forward the fine traditions of political work, eliminating the pernicious influence of Lin Piao and the "gang of four," strengthening political-ideological work in all fields of endeavor

and insuring the fulfillment of the general task for the new period.

Politics is the commander, the soul in everything. Political work is the lifeblood of all work. Chairman Hua has pointed out: "In the new period of development in China's socialist revolution and construction, political-ideological work should not be weakened but strengthened." How do we strengthen it? The most fundamental task is to restore and carry forward the fine traditions of the system of political work which Chairman Mao formulated for us. In other words, we should follow Chairman Mao's consistent teachings and the basic concepts and principles in political work expounded in this document, proceed from reality, seek truth from facts and pay attention to achieving practical results. Party organizations of all localities, units and departments and political organs at all levels should earnestly sum up their experience in political work in the light of this important document, comprehensively and accurately study Chairman Mao's theories and instructions on political work, inherit them as a whole in a systematic way and apply and develop them under the new historical condition so as to insure the role of political work as a leading factor and guarantee work performance.

This important document points out with complete confidence that "the potential uprightness, enthusiasm, creativity and initiative of the cadres and the masses, once tapped, will become an inexhaustible resource, like the ever-flowing Yangtze and Yellow rivers rushing down thousands of miles. If we use this yardstick to measure our shortcomings, they seem like mere sunspots. Our party, army and people are like the sun which will illuminate the whole world." Reading this passage today, we indeed feel enlightened and encouraged: Comrades, let us work hard so that the sun can illuminate the whole world.

I. Summation of Experiences of the Troops in the Border Region Over the Past Year

It has been more than a year since the Northwest Bureau convened the meeting of high-level cadres and military and political cadres in the winter of 1942. The year 1943 was a year of great progress for the troops in the border region. Within 1 year we solved an important question of principle among the troops in the border region concerning tendencies toward warlordism and dogmatism. We set up a centralized leading system which is headed by the Northwest Bureau and comprises

the border region's party, government, military and the people, who are in total unanimity ideologically, politically and organizationally, and we fostered the leadership style of maintaining close ties with the masses and seeking truth from facts.

When the high-level cadre meeting of 1942 was in session, comrades of the party Central Committee and the Northwest Bureau pointed out: The 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army are people's armies. They are armies with fine revolutionary traditions and have been among the best armies in the country during the national war of resistance to Japanese aggression. The 8th Route Army in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region has fundamentally fulfilled the tasks assigned to it by the party and the higher authorities and has followed the guidance of the party and the higher authorities. But they also pointed out that, for various reasons, certain tendencies have arisen among our troops--principally the tendencies toward warlordism and dogmatism--and that the degree of seriousness of these maladies varies. They also pointed out that the current tasks include taking concerted actions to correct these trends and encourage good behavior and change bad behavior so that the troops' combat effectiveness can be further enhanced; so they can more successfully carry out the political tasks assigned them by the party and the higher authorities; so they can take part in fighting, production and mass work more effectively and attain the goal of achieving unity, defeating the enemy and overthrowing Japanese imperialism. Over the past year we have been implementing this directive and have essentially fulfilled the tasks pertaining to it.

After 1 year's work, marked progress has been achieved in improving relations between the military and the party, between the military and the government, between the military and the people, between officers and men, between high- and low-ranking cadres and between military and political work, and in promoting friendly relations among the troops. Those were the areas in which the tendencies toward warlordism and dogmatism had once appeared. Regarding the military-party relationship (what we mean by the military-party relationship is that our army must be totally, absolutely and unconditionally under the political guidance of the Communist Party and its leading organizations, and that it must never assert its "independence"), we have not only established a unified leadership in the border region--with the Northwest Bureau being the center of the entire border region and the prefectural party committees being the centers of various districts--and have at the same time maintained the relations between the higher and the lower authorities in various places, but more importantly, we have achieved consistency in policies, ideology and action. Regarding relations between the military and the government and between the military and the people, after the movement to support the government and cherish the people and the movement to support the army, and particularly after the self-criticism and confession movement carried out in the military since December 1943, all

undesirable manifestations between the military and the party, between the military and the government and between the military and the people have been exposed. This has completely changed the ideology of cadres and fighters. If they had been unkind to the masses, they were urged to improve their relations with the people, return what they had borrowed from the people and pay for what they had damaged. If the military was in the wrong in a dispute with the masses, the military was urged to apologize to the masses. On the other hand, the military has engaged in a large-scale production movement to produce what it needs, to increase its supplies and to lessen the burden of the masses. The military has also provided a large amount of manpower to help the masses with production, and this has greatly improved relations between the military and the government and between the military and the people. Within the armed forces, relations have been greatly improved between officers and men, between the higher and lower echelons, between military and political work, and among various units. At confession meetings of various companies, soldiers are urged to expose all kinds of undesirable tendencies, dissatisfaction existing between officers and men, and problems related to their living conditions and thinking. This has stimulated their enthusiasm and initiative, promoted a cordial and fraternal atmosphere, eliminated all sorts of unhealthy phenomena, reduced discontent, and united the armed forces. Although certain shortcomings still exist and have not been completely eliminated in all areas, the situation today apparently differs greatly from that which existed 1 year ago. In short, the tendencies toward warlordism and dogmatism--which are mainly characterized by the armed forces' isolation from the masses and which exist in the armed forces in one way or another--have been roundly denounced and basically overcome.

With this improvement in the situation, a great change has taken place in the morale of the armed forces. The pessimistic feelings and misdeeds which existed in the armed forces before have generally vanished and been replaced by a new mood. Our armed forces today are vigorous, brimming with enthusiasm to fight, to produce and to study. Their enthusiasm and vigor began to surge last spring and continues to surge ahead. Immediately following last year's land reclamation, weeding and autumn harvest, there was a training and consolidation period and a combat mobilization in July. There has been intensive, widespread and long-lasting enthusiasm and vigor. The armed forces today are highly aggressive. In production, in supporting the government and cherishing the people, and in winter training and consolidation, many moving deeds have been performed, large numbers of labor heroes and model trainees have appeared, and many model squads, platoons and companies have appeared. The armed forces' sense of organization and discipline has heightened. Following their retrenchment and reorganization, the phenomenon of being topheavy, so that there were more officers than men, has been changed, the situation in which some officers were estranged from their men has been combated, and the number of violations of discipline has also greatly decreased.

In the course of this great movement the leadership style in certain aspects has changed considerably, and the ill winds of warlordism and dogmatism have been denounced. What has been fostered is the style of maintaining close ties with the masses and of seeking truth from facts.

Therefore, we regard last year as a year in which our armed forces' leadership style achieved great progress. Because of this progress we made truly great achievements last year, including rectifying the three styles [the style of study, style of party relations and style of writing], training better troops and instituting simpler administration, supporting the government better and cherishing the people, strengthening the movement for production, guarding against spies and recording gains in winter training and consolidation. All these great achievements would not have been possible without improvements in leadership style.

The armed forces of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region have special characteristics in that they are units that remain in the rear area. They guard hundreds of li of rivers which the enemy dares not cross in order to launch an offensive. They dare not cross because of the heroic fighting of the frontline troops. With the exception of this difference, they and the armed forces on the front are virtually the same in all respects. A particular case in point is: The progress achieved by the armed forces in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region on the question of leadership style should be emulated by all units of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army. How was such progress achieved?

This improvement in leadership style is a complex process involving army-party, army-government and army-people relations; relations within the army's general leadership; officer-men relations; relations between higher and lower levels; relations between military and political work; and friendly relations among different army units. The relationships between officers and men and higher and lower levels concern relations between senior cadres and cadres in general, cadres and soldiers, and party members and nonparty members. Last year, if we had not made a number of improvements in all areas or had made them in a palliative, piecemeal manner; if we had not first grasped relations within the army's general leadership--that is, grasping relations among senior leading cadres and helping them to clarify their thinking, change their style and unconditionally obey party guidance--as a precondition for encouraging the cadres in general and influencing the masses of soldiers, but had only looked for solutions from the lower levels and the soldiers; if our comrades who had real faults in their leadership had been full of misgivings and worries about their personal gain or loss when examining these faults and had not admitted their own mistakes, then great progress would not have been possible or achieved so soon. Last year's experience has proved that by acting in this spirit and using this method we will be able to make great achievements and rapid progress. Otherwise, our achievements will not be great, and our progress will be slow.

Last year's experience has proved that the ideological transformation of cadres is extremely important and difficult. The ideological progress of cadres holds the key to progress in all work. Only when there is progress in cadres' thinking can real progress in work be made. If we try to achieve progress in work without making progress in thinking, then this achievement inevitably will be only superficial and formal. With a given material basis, ideology controls and transforms everything. This truth was fully confirmed by last year's experience. If we want to transform certain erroneous leadership styles into correct leadership styles, if we want units which are generally deviating toward warlordism and dogmatism to change their workstyle and advance by leaps and bounds, if we want to transform backward elements into activists, a liberal atmosphere into a principled atmosphere, poor officer-men and army-people relations into good relations, and so forth, then we must achieve progress in thinking before progress in action can be made. We can almost say that ideological progress means progress in work and in the spirit of the masses. Wherever ideological transformation is thoroughly carried out, progress in work, in the spirit of the masses and in workstyle will also be thorough.

Last year's experience has helped us understand that the ideological transformation of those who have erred should be done in steps: First, expose their mistakes; second, examine their mistakes; and third, correct their mistakes. Without the first two steps, it will be impossible to carry out the last step. In all units with shortcomings the first step is the most important. Without taking this first step, or if it is not taken fully--that is, if we fail to expose the essence of the mistakes and fail to seriously criticize what is clearly wrong--it will be impossible to caution the cadres and arouse their enthusiasm to examine and criticize mistakes. As for those who have made mistakes, unless their mistakes are exposed, it will be impossible to know what attitude they should take toward their own mistakes, and it will be impossible to have them make self-examinations. Even if they do make self-examinations, they will more than likely be superficial, passive, and without determination; therefore, it is unlikely that they will correct their mistakes. Last year the units in various parts of the border region examined the mistakes in their localities and officer-men and army-people relations, held confession meetings and struggled against the deviation toward warlordism and the attitude of total apathy toward this deviation, that is, a so-called liberal attitude. If the work was unsuccessful the first time, it was repeated a second and third time until it finally succeeded. Some units were not successful in this work, because they did not thoroughly or properly expose mistakes.

But the kind of exposure of mistakes we are talking about is principled and specifically targeted--not a careless, random denunciation. Our principle is to educate and transform cadres and soldiers, not discredit and abuse them. As long as comrades who have made mistakes boldly expose and sincerely examine them and are determined to correct them, we should

not use methods of excessive struggle, punishment and dealing blows. We have implemented this principle throughout the rectification campaign. Except for a small number of really bad elements, we have not taken disciplinary action against any comrade who has faults. Those who cannot be transformed for the time being are slowly undergoing transformation in rectification squads and cadre teams. By so doing we have obtained results. The vast majority of those who have faults have been transformed. Many have become very good. Some cadres who lacked an amicable attitude, failed to diligently educate the soldiers, were unconcerned about soldiers' needs and the people's well-being and lacked integrity and public spirit have now changed and improved. As the cadres have improved, so have the soldiers. Lazy soldiers have become good people, deserters no longer try to desert, the dissatisfied are satisfied, violators of discipline now abide by discipline, and idlers are now diligent. In short, both officers and men have taken on a new look. Here I shall cite one of the border region units as an illustration of the correctness of this party policy.

The following is the work report of this unit:

"The ideological transformation can be seen by the increased number of activists and the decreased number of backward elements in the unit. When the unit was reorganized in March last year, there were only 77 party activists and 31 nonparty activists. By December last year, party activists had increased to 162 and nonparty activists to 95. When the unit was reorganized, there were 55 backward party elements and 82 backward nonparty elements. By December last year, backward party elements had dropped to 8 and backward nonparty elements to 15." We can see that the change was tremendous.

The situation in which some cadres were corrupt and wasteful, engaged in private business, sought only personal comfort and paid no attention to the soldiers' well-being has been overcome. For example, in 1941 when we used basic methods of punishment, more than 10 cadres were dismissed due to mistakes in corruption and waste, including 2 battalion commanders, 2 battalion political instructors, 2 company commanders, 2 company political instructors, a medical team leader and a work-among-the-masses cadre. But in 1942 similar undesirable cases not only failed to decrease but actually increased. If we had continued to use basic punishment methods, more people would have had to be replaced, with no guarantee that the situation would change for the better. So in 1943 we followed instructions from higher authorities, abolished basic punishment methods and adopted the method of ideological reform, without replacing one person. Through rectification and self-examination, confession meetings, production work and training, all those who had erred in the past were transformed in this great movement. Among these people, not one repeated the same serious mistakes throughout the year.

The above-mentioned unit had been the worst in work and discipline among units in the border region. It had set a very poor example. But because it exposed its mistakes, unfolded self-criticism among the masses, changed its leadership style, set correct and positive tasks and implemented the policy of curing the sickness to save the patient, it was quickly transformed. As for the majority of units whose work foundations are good or relatively good, once they begin to seriously straighten things out according to the correct policy, they will progress even faster.

It is obvious that success in work and in maintenance of discipline has its foundation in correct leadership and the consciousness of the masses. If conditions for correct leadership are lacking, as Lenin put it, "the attempt to strengthen discipline will unavoidably turn into empty talk and false appearance." When conditions for correct leadership are attained, then it is necessary to stress the consciousness of the masses. This was completely borne out by last year's experience. In dealing with negative behavior among the cadres and masses in the past, many leading organs failed to examine the leadership, change leadership style, pay attention to people's thinking, reform people ideologically, encourage those who made mistakes to make self-examinations and become concerned about the people; they only used basic punishment methods. This was all wrong. Therefore, the only completely correct line is to proceed from the viewpoint of cherishing and helping those who have made mistakes (including cadres and soldiers), expose their specific mistakes, encourage them to examine their own mistakes and try, with all earnestness and good intentions, to help them voluntarily correct their mistakes.

In this regard, the weapons of criticism and self-criticism have roles to play, and neither should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. But criticism is aimed at inspiring self-criticism. In a sense, criticism is the means for bringing about self-criticism--the goal. For some time in the past, in the rectification campaign for ideological reform in the army, the targets of struggle were the deviation toward warlordism and the liberal attitude toward this deviation; these were the mistakes we talked about exposing. Other issues were just linked to these targets (if they could and needed to be linked) and were not given special emphasis. We should not attempt to correct all undesirable things at the same time, but should concentrate our efforts on criticizing the most important ones; the rest can more readily be solved. With regard to a given target in a struggle, when this target is linked with individuals, we should only choose typical examples and not practice egalitarianism. This method of typical criticism and typical education is the most effective, educational and correct method. The egalitarian method of criticism and education is the most ineffective, noneducational and incorrect method.

In our army's practice last year, we promoted the idea of unified leadership, support of the government and cherishing of the people, production, self-support, improvement of military techniques and defense against

spies. During this ideological education and practice we criticized not only the deviation toward warlordism but also dogmatism. In doing their work our army and political cadres have now been able to free themselves from the shackles of dogmatism and cast away the undesirable styles of divorcing themselves from the actual situation and indulging in empty talk, stressing appearances and ignoring substance, and uniting with a few and alienating many. They have learned to analyze the concrete situation in handling problems and use the method of selecting and grasping typical examples. They have come to realize that it is necessary to pay attention not only to appearances but, more importantly, to substance. They have come to realize that it is necessary to take care of not just a few but, more importantly, the majority. In conducting education they have learned to use the method of enlightenment, guidance, examination and self-examination; to publicize the styles of the Chang Chih-kuo and Men Shan-te movements. In this way our education work has been liberated from the shackles of dogmatism, formalism, egalitarianism and isolationism and from abstract concepts divorced from reality.

Our experience in the past year has led us to realize that deviations toward warlordism and dogmatism, as reflected in the workstyles of some leading groups, are certain to result in separation from the masses. Dogmatism, in particular, tends to divorce itself from concrete practice. It influences people to be obsessed with the shouting of abstract slogans and with the practice of formalism. Last year's great achievements in all fields of work stem from our success in overcoming the deviation toward warlordism, thoroughly eliminating the dogmatic method of leadership and replacing it with the correct leadership method as provided by the party Central Committee. This correct method of leadership mainly stresses that "leading cadres must assume responsibility and play active roles in every activity; leading groups must keep in close touch with the masses; and a general call must be accompanied by specific guidance." Before any movement or project is launched, the principal leading cadres at all levels who form the leadership core should first be informed about it; then the mass line must be adopted, ideological educational methods must be applied and the news media must be mobilized to acquaint the cadres and broad masses with it. Only then can the movement or project be launched. During mobilization, every brigade and regiment can make general plans (general calls) on the basis of their specific conditions. Then more specific plans (guidance) can be drawn up for every battalion, company, platoon, squad or even each individual, plans which must be based on the plans of brigades and regiments and on the specific conditions of all other units. When these plans are put into practice, they can be reviewed and revised as required by practice if the established goals prove to be either too high or too low (specific guidance). During mobilization, comrades in charge of political work and in charge of military operations are encouraged to work together to implement the plans under the party's unified leadership and under the unified command of the most prestigious leading cadre of every army unit. This method will prevent them from going their own ways.

Last year the implementation of many large-scale projects was part of a revolutionary emulation campaign. But an emulation campaign should not be launched if the masses feel that the time is not ripe. When enthusiasm has grown and the time is ripe for such a campaign, a call must be issued immediately and all manpower must be organized to carry it out. Judgment of whether or not the time is ripe should be made on the basis of whether or not all activists are adequately prepared mentally and whether or not the middle elements, who often comprise the majority, and the backward elements are generally ready to carry out this emulation campaign. Otherwise, the emulation campaign will become a task for a few prominent persons. In other words, only a few instead of the majority will be concerned with carrying it out. Last year the call for an emulation campaign to begin a production movement failed because some army units either did not launch it at the right time or launched it too early, and because they only considered the enthusiasm of a few activists instead of including the middle and backward elements. This emulation campaign was later reorganized to secure the cooperation of the middle and backward elements. In this way the campaign ended successfully. In those units which took care of not only middle but also backward elements in their production and military training movements, the masses invariably showed growing enthusiasm in the emulation drive. In those units the drive became increasingly broader in scale and was carried through to the end, and the masses completed their own projects without supervision by the leadership. It should be understood that middle elements lag behind active elements and backward elements lag behind middle elements as far as their awareness is concerned. It is the leadership's task to unite with active elements, induce middle elements and encourage backward elements. Our sole purpose in uniting with active elements is to induce middle elements and encourage backward elements to advance together with them. Otherwise, active elements would not play their proper role, and our work to organize them would be useless. For this reason, in making propaganda and arousing and organizing the masses in any kind of movement the main question is one of taking care of middle and backward elements. In scheduling the entire movement we must take account of the degree of awareness of middle elements or even backward elements, use a form of organization and work method acceptable to both and suit the schedule to their progress. For example, in developing production movements in our army units we organized the Chang Chih-kuo movement, the Hao Shu-tsai movement, the Hu Ching-shan movement, the Chao Chan-kuei movement (not the Chao Chan-kuei in the staff and worker movement), the Wu Sheng-hua movement, the Feng Chen-seng movement and the Feng Kuo-yu movement. All of these movements were fine and extremely necessary, because the concerned advanced fighters and junior and low-level cadres in the army units had emerged in the production movement or the consolidation and training movement, were familiar to and personally seen by the masses of fighters in their respective units, and thus could easily induce middle elements and encourage backward ones and were in a better position to be understood by the latter two and to stimulate their initiative to advance. All this stemmed from the fact that the masses view a question from their

personal experience rather than from slogans. If our stimulation omits specific persons and concrete deeds, we cannot make the masses understand it, nor can we arouse their initiative. However, when encouraging middle and backward elements to catch up with advanced elements, we must not forget the characteristics of middle and backward elements. In productive labor, for instance, it is necessary to divide the labor forces into A, B and C classes according to physical conditions and, to a certain degree, on a voluntary basis. Getting involved in a task with suitable substance and labor intensity is more readily welcomed by the masses than working under absolute orders on an egalitarian basis. If we fail to see the different effects of the two, we are divorcing ourselves from the masses.

In transforming backward elements, the main method used should be that of converting them with patience. Pure punishment should be banned. Even in dealing with deserters, pure punishment cannot solve the problem. What we should do is convert them through education, and in no way should deserters be shot to death. Here the best method is for the leaders to have cordial talks with them from the viewpoint of cherishing them. These talks, if combined with self-examination and self-education, will give a much better result. Pure punishment and even beating and scolding are methods which depart from the masses and serve no purpose at all. In our army it is imperative to do away with scolding and corporal punishment and resolutely carry out the resolution of the 1929 Kutien meeting of the Red Army. We must engage in earnest, well-intentioned education and conversion from the viewpoint of insuring that cherishing the deserters and curing the sickness to save the patient replaces the method of pure punishment, including scolding and corporal punishment. Apart from banning scolding and corporal punishment, it is imperative to reduce other forms of punishment, even though necessary, reasonable and indispensable under the actual circumstances. In other words, no punishment should be given unless it is absolutely necessary.

I am not giving a full account of the many experiences acquired in the past year. For example, precious experiences have been obtained in rectifying the three styles, supporting the army and cherishing the people and promoting the production, military training and counter-espionage movements, which I am not mentioning here in detail. What I have pointed out are but some common and major experiences. Also, I do not mean that the tendencies toward warlordism and dogmatism in our army have been entirely and fundamentally overcome. What we have done is to subject the tendency toward warlordism in our army to scathing criticism, and its obvious adverse effects upon relations between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, between officers and men, between higher- and lower-level cadres and between political work and military work, as well as upon the friendly relations among various army units, have basically been eliminated. However, this does not mean that all these relations have been totally rectified. Much work remains to be done to improve and consolidate

these relations more satisfactorily and turn them into well founded and unshakable ones. As for the dogmatic workstyle of indulging in empty talk, becoming divorced from reality, attaching importance to formality and belittling substance, and uniting with a few and becoming divorced from the majority, this has also been subjected to criticism over the past year. However, this workstyle has not yet been totally overcome, and, in particular, we have yet to review the question from a historical point of view. I am not going to review the question of history in the whole army. Emphasis will be placed on comparing and analyzing the dogmatic workstyle and the workstyle of seeking truth from facts in political work and on comparing and analyzing achievements and shortcomings in political work. The dogmatic tendency in military work will not be discussed at this time.

II. Carrying Forward the Achievements and Correcting Shortcomings in Political Work

The Chinese Communist Party has established and developed revolutionary political work in the army ever since it took part in and led China's national democratic revolution and ever since it joined and led the revolutionary army fighting in this revolution. The basic principle of this political work is to educate the army in the outlines of the national democratic revolution and the spirit of the people's revolution. This is designed to insure internal unity in the revolutionary army, achieve unity among the revolutionary army, the revolutionary people and the revolutionary government, subject the revolutionary army entirely to the political leadership of the revolutionary political party, augment army combat strength, and work toward disintegrating enemy troops and uniting friendly troops so as to attain the final goal of uniting among ourselves, defeating the enemy, liberating the nation and emancipating the people. This is why our army differs from other troops in principle, and it is also what we mean by insisting that the revolutionary political work guided by the Communist Party is the lifeline for the revolutionary army. The entire task of the revolutionary army is nothing but an integration of this revolutionary political work with revolutionary military work. The political work guided by the communists in the national revolutionary army during the Northern Expeditionary War was done in this manner, as was the political work guided by our party in the former Red Army and the present 8th Route Army and New 4th Army in the civil war and the war of resistance against Japan. The military and political work by the communists in the revolutionary army during the three aforementioned periods yielded good results. For the first time an army in full support of the people's interests has emerged in Chinese history. Without the leadership of the Communist Party in our army and without the revolutionary military and political work guided by the Communist Party, the situation would be inconceivable. In the absence of party leadership, any military and political work in complete accord with the people's interests would be impossible. And no army lacking such military and political work can act entirely in the people's

interests. This is the basic reason the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army have fought hard in such a valiant and tenacious manner, advanced from strength to strength and kept on fighting in spite of all setbacks in the war of resistance against Japan. This revolutionary political work not only has been done by the army's political personnel but has been shared by many military and other personnel. Similarly, many political personnel have also participated in military work. This occurred in the civil war and has been so in the war of resistance against Japan.

So far as the civil war is concerned, the development of our army was divided into three stages--the early stage, its founding; the middle stage, its growth; and the later stage, its frustrations and successes. The Political Department also went through the same stages. During the early and middle stages of the civil war it made many contributions in the political field in the struggle against the enemy and in improving relations between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between officers and men, between the army and the people, between higher- and lower-level units, between military operations and political work and between various army units. In short, it contributed a great deal to the cause of uniting and defeating the enemy. Even today a part of our army's fine tradition can be attributed to the Political Department.

During the early stage of the war of resistance against Japan our army units scored great, impressive successes. Under the party's leadership, the entire 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army developed the guerrilla warfare against Japan, expanded the anti-Japanese armed forces, rallied the broad masses around the two armies, recovered large expanses of lost territory and established many anti-Japanese democratic base areas. They successfully repelled attacks by a large number of enemies of the Chinese nation, thereby helping the frontline KMT troops halt the enemy's strategic offensive. In this way they prevented the Chinese nation from disintegrating under the Japanese imperialist attack. This was really a fine job performed in a correct manner. During the middle stage of the war of resistance against Japan, and especially in recent years, the entire army has continued to carry out the party's line and specific policies. As a result, it has proved itself capable of resisting 58 percent of the Japanese aggressor army in China and 90 percent of its puppet troops, smashed countless atrocious "mopping-up operations" launched by the enemy army and its puppet troops, retook China's territories lost to the enemy, and withstood indescribable hardships and difficulties due to a lack of government assistance and shortages of weapons and ammunition, food, clothing and medicine. The army has persevered in holding a most important and vital anti-Japanese line on the Chinese mainland on behalf of the Chinese nation and its allies. This is also a fine job done in a correct manner.

In short, our entire army has made great achievements in both the civil war and the war of resistance against Japan. Equally great have been the achievements by the army Political Department. Like those personnel in charge of military operations and logistical support, personnel devoted to political work in the army are also to be commended for their glorious contributions to the Chinese people.

However, shortcomings did and do exist in our political work. Here we are discussing only political work. We must examine and overcome these shortcomings in a spirit of self-criticism. Only in this way can we further improve our work, unite, defeat the enemy and overthrow Japanese imperialism.

For example, whenever we mention traditions in political work, certain comrades often have vague ideas about them, thinking them to be all good or fine. They lack a critical attitude toward past traditions and work-styles. As a result, they are bound to regard certain things that are bad or unsuitable to our army now as universally acceptable and a further development of its so-called fine traditions while ignoring or rejecting many truly good experiences and traditions accumulated throughout the history of political work.

In the later stage of the civil war our political work once developed in the following manner: On the positive side, the policy of opposing the people's enemy was implemented and many achievements made. These achievements were mainly in the struggle against the enemy, such as in encouraging officers and men to fight valiantly and winning over prisoners of war. Certain achievements were also realized in insuring the army's internal unity and in uniting the people. For example, it was successful in encouraging people to join the army, in having the army maintain better discipline, in having political and cultural education work performed in the army, and in doing a lot of good work among the civilians. (These achievements occurred primarily in the central soviet area and in several other regional armies. However, in certain other army units, due to the mistakes committed by individual comrades in political leadership and work, no such achievements were realized; on the contrary, the original achievements were destroyed.) On the negative side, an incorrect work-style took shape--a dogmatic style in political work. (This dogmatic workstyle also existed in military work, particularly in military education work, which we will not deal with here.) The most typical manifestations of this dogmatism in our work were characterized by indulging in empty talk, divorcing oneself from reality, attaching importance to formality while belittling substance, and uniting with a few while ignoring the majority. To a certain degree the reason some comrades committed errors lies in the method of subjectivism and dogmatism they employed. On many occasions they handled things merely on the basis of wishful thinking while disregarding the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution and the army at that time, mechanically introduced foreign experiences, placed improper emphasis on the regularization of the army

and mutilated its history of struggle. These comrades liked to stress what they called the leading role of the proletariat in words and in form. In practice, however, they abandoned the proletarian ideology (that is, Marxism-Leninism) to ideologically remold and educate those people of peasant and petit bourgeois stock. They paid very little attention to and put very little stress on the basic concepts which our army should conscientiously promote and put into practice--the true unity between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, between officers and men, between higher and lower levels, between military and political work, among various army units, and so forth. They did not seriously and conscientiously take these basic concepts as the basic content and orientation of political work and attach due importance to them. On the other hand, they resorted to a formalistic approach and paid attention to and stressed many things which did not warrant that attention and stress.

This practice inevitably has resulted in the following phenomena: The task of winning over the masses has been somewhat deemphasized. The army's three great tasks and its three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention have been presented in different contexts or considered unnecessary. The work of achieving unity within the army has also slackened somewhat, and the efforts to forge close ties between the party and the government and between the party and the people have also let up. No vigorous effort has been made to criticize such practices as the army's lack of respect for the party and the government, its beating and abusing of the people and infringing on their interests, and the beating and abusing of soldiers by officers. The friendly relations between various army units have deteriorated, and the mountain-stronghold mentality and departmentalism have steadily grown and spread. As a result, it has become commonplace for one army unit not to help another and for a model unit not to help backward units. This in turn encourages many comrades in the main units (including comrades doing military, political or logistical work) to adopt an arrogant attitude, regard themselves as infallible, look down on everyone and conduct such despicable practices as boasting of achievements while covering up shortcomings, preferring flattery to criticism, being afraid of criticism by others as well as by themselves, and even being insubordinate to leading organs of the party and the army. Some of these phenomena were corrected during the war of resistance as soon as they appeared, some were corrected only after they had become serious and some have remained to this day.

With respect to inner-party life, a policy was widely adopted during the latter part of the civil war which gave rise to excessive struggle while giving little consideration to the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient." Such abnormal phenomena also occurred within the army's inner-party life, with the result that many comrades were erroneously attacked. This practice was corrected during the war of resistance, but its influence has not been eliminated, and there still are instances of comrades being subjected to unwarranted attacks.

With regard to the relationship between military and political work, it has basically been one of unity, but there have been instances where coordination was lacking. In the latter part of the civil war undue emphasis was placed on the political commissar system and the position and power of political work, and in practice the difference in party spirit between the military and political workers was unduly stressed. In addition, there were insufficient efforts to promote cooperation between the military and the political workers. All these things contributed to the lack of coordination between military and political work. However, we must not blame the political workers alone for this, for in certain instances the military workers were also responsible.

Early in the war of resistance the political commissar system was abolished and political work played down in order to accommodate the Kuomintang. This was wrong. We later corrected this situation, restored the political commissar system and raised the level of political work. This was absolutely correct. Political work should have its appropriate place and its role duly stressed in every revolutionary army unit, or the unit's work will suffer. Appropriate stress on the role of political work is absolutely necessary, particularly for those units where political work is weak. It is incorrect to excessively emphasize the role of political work, but it is also incorrect not to put the necessary emphasis on it and assign it its proper place.

The orientation of the entire army is also the orientation of political work. Accordingly, the task of political work can only be decided upon in accordance with our army's fundamental tasks (struggling against imperialism and feudalism, preparing against war, promoting production and mass work, and so forth) and its current specific assignments (such as struggling against the "mopping-up" and "nibbling" campaigns, unfolding the production campaign and the training and consolidation movement, guarding against espionage, rectifying the three workstyles, unifying leadership, struggling for better troops and a simpler administration, supporting the government and cherishing the people, improving the relationship between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people, between the officers and men, between the higher and lower levels and among various units, and other specific assignments set forth in light of current needs). It is not permitted to have so-called independent political work tasks outside our army's basic task and its current specific assignments. Political work aims at educating the army with the revolutionary spirit to insure that the army accomplishes its tasks ideologically, politically and organizationally. It is incorrect to stress the special and independent nature of political work and separate its task from that of the entire army. To do so will result in different goals for political and military work and cause political work to ignore reality and become devoid of content. All forms of organization, work patterns and work methods are developed according to the situation and task at hand. They depend on a certain situation and task and vary as the situation and task change. This is

also true for the forms of organization, work patterns and work methods in political work. Therefore, in doing political work, if we seek to discuss forms of organization, work patterns and work methods without taking the specific task of the army into consideration, separate them from the army's specific task and regard them as something absolute, they inevitably will become dogmatic and formalistic. In the past some comrades did not understand this question very well, and if they still do not understand it, they must be corrected.

It must be pointed out that not all the troops had these shortcomings during the civil war and the war of resistance against Japanese aggression. Some of them were serious, while others were not. Some of them were major shortcomings, while others were minor ones. All of them were different. Just like the outstanding achievements and the fine traditions of various troops, they differ and they have their own special features. Our troops are revolutionary troops. They have some shortcomings, just as healthy people sometimes become sick. They recover very quickly.

It must be pointed out: We must not think that all of these shortcomings have developed under the influence of dogmatism. The peculiar environment of the Chinese revolution (the large number of petit bourgeoisie and the other is the rural base areas divided up by the enemy over a protracted period) was the objective reason for its development. The existence of dogmatic thinking; the failure to eliminate such thinking and the fact that our educational work was insufficient were the subjective reasons for its development. These shortcomings were gradually corrected after the rectification of the three workstyles in 1942 and the implementation of all types of reforms. In some units where the rectification campaign was penetratingly carried out, such shortcomings were minimized.

It must be pointed out: The dogmatic trend in the army was closely connected with the dogmatic trend which prevailed among party leaders in the late stage of the civil war. If there had not been such a dogmatic trend among the party leaders at that time, the army certainly would not have generated a serious dogmatic trend of its own.

It must also be pointed out: When we review our shortcomings and mistakes in work, we must not insistently seek to identify the individual comrades responsible for such mistakes and shortcomings. We must pay attention to summing up our past experience to guide our future work. We should also realize that our work with regard to the army and the army's political work is always advancing. The ideological awareness of our comrades in military, political and logistical work is also continually developing. Some of the comrades who erred have made progress, are making progress or can be helped to make progress as soon as their mistakes are pointed out. In dealing with these comrades, we must adhere to the principle of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient, as formulated by the central

authorities. We must unite with all comrades engaged in military, political and logistical work and closely work together, with no distinction between "them" and "us."

However, our comrades must be made to understand that if we do not proceed from the realities of the Chinese revolution and the specific task of the Chinese revolutionary army, and if we commit mistakes or are guilty of subjectivism, we will not be able to educate our army with a high revolutionary spirit; to consolidate the normal relations between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between the army and the people and between the officers and men; to correct the abnormal relations between the higher and lower levels in the army, between military work and political work in the army, between one military unit and another and between the army and the local authorities; and to overcome the unhealthy trends of warlordism, departmentalism and the mountain-stronghold mentality. On the other hand, if we truly understand Marxist-Leninist methodology and are good at proceeding from the realities of the Chinese revolution and the specific task of the Chinese revolutionary army, at conducting investigation and study and at maintaining close ties with the masses, we will be able to achieve all our tasks in our political work (and our military and logistical work) and attain our goal of realizing unity among ourselves and defeating the enemy. Our experience in the Chinese revolution and in the three periods of the northern expedition, the civil war and the war of resistance against Japanese aggression all substantiate this conclusion.

Experience gained in protracted revolutionary struggles has shown that our army's task is not simply a task of fighting the enemy. This was clearly set forth in the Kutien meeting resolution of the 4th Red Army. Due to our army's special circumstances, we laid down three main tasks for the army during the civil war period--fighting, fund raising and mass work. Naturally, fighting was given first place. During wartime, all other things are subordinate to the war effort. But if we gave up the latter two tasks we would not be able to adapt to the circumstances. During the early and middle periods of the civil war our army worked hard and gloriously carried out the above-mentioned three main tasks. In other words, before the establishment of the revolutionary base areas the army helped the local party and political organs establish the base areas and, after the establishment of the base areas, helped the local party and political organs consolidate the base areas. These tasks remain unchanged during the war of resistance against Japan. As we all know, but for the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army assisting the local people and the local party and political organs in north and central China in establishing the various anti-Japanese democratic base areas, how could we possibly wage such a protracted and arduous war against so powerful a national enemy (58 percent of all the enemy forces invading China and 90 percent of all the puppet forces are confronting the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army)? However, during the war of resistance against Japan the method of raising funds has changed. We set the task for the army to

engage in production in order to improve the living conditions of the troops and reduce the burden on the people in the base areas. Thus, the current tasks of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army have become fighting, production and mass work. If these three tasks are reduced to a fighting task alone, then we will not be able to adapt to our special circumstances.

In order to unite, defeat the enemy and carry out the army's three main tasks, the past spirit of the army in observing the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention must be revived, and the relations between the army and the party, between the army and the government, between officers and men, between the army and civilians, between higher and lower levels, between military work and political work and between the various sections of the army must be energetically improved and established on a solid basis. All units of the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army must unconditionally obey the political leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the organs representing it. Only in this way can our army avoid going astray and achieve the goal of uniting the soldiers and civilians of the whole country to overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Within the revolutionary army there must be unity, cooperation and mutual assistance, not departmentalism, with each section going its own way, or mutual contempt and interference. Under the party's unified leadership, in all revolutionary army units, military, political and logistics comrades should stress achieving proficiency in their own fields of work and should point out that failure to pay attention to one's own work means following an incorrect tendency. At the same time military and logistics comrades should be encouraged to learn and take part in political work, and political work comrades should learn military and logistics work and, when necessary, be prepared to take part in it or even change their present positions in order to do so. On the relations between military, logistics and political work, the stress is on mutual cooperation. To be sure, their work is different in content, and that is why they are listed as different activities. But all this work is for the same purpose, that is, uniting and defeating the enemy. And to carry out the work requires harmonious cooperation. Therefore, anything that can strengthen this cooperation should be praised, while anything that hinders it should be criticized and denounced.

Under the general principle of uniting and defeating the enemy, controversy within the revolutionary army should be principled controversy over ideological tendencies and policies and principles, a controversy in which correct principles overcome incorrect ones. It should be conducted only because it serves to consolidate party leadership and the relations between officers and men, between the army and civilians and other relations. This can help raise the combat efficiency of the army and meet the aim of uniting ourselves to defeat the enemy. All debates should be conducted under unified party leadership. Any controversy or opposition

that is more or less inconsistent with this standpoint is unprincipled and should not be allowed to occur.

The principle of respecting cadres of worker-peasant and intellectual origins and both veteran and new cadres within our army should be stressed and efforts simultaneously made to enable these cadres to cooperate well. We should help people understand the strong points of worker-peasant cadres. There are large numbers of cadres of worker-peasant origin in our army. In the course of the development of the army they have become part of the backbone force playing a principal or leading role in our army, and this is precisely a strong point and special characteristic of our army (this is also true in party, government and mass work). The overwhelming majority of them are loyal and reliable, are particularly able to endure difficulties and hardships and are heroic in battle. It is incorrect to look down on cadres of worker-peasant origin. At the same time the people should be made to understand the strong points of revolutionary intellectuals. Without the participation of large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals, our army cannot achieve the aim of uniting ourselves to defeat the enemy. The overwhelming majority of them are also loyal and reliable. Their shortcomings can be overcome through tempering (especially through tempering in practical work). The idea of looking down on intellectuals is also incorrect (also true in party, government, mass, cultural and educational work). Cadres of worker-peasant and intellectual origins all have shortcomings and therefore should not become complacent. They should learn from each other's strong points and rid themselves of their shortcomings.

Veteran cadres are the main backbone of the army, without whom there could not be such a staunch army. Therefore, we should respect veteran cadres. It is incorrect to look down on veteran cadres. However, at the same time we should also respect new cadres, because they are the new blood of our army, without whom it could not develop or grow. It is also incorrect to look down on new cadres. New and veteran cadres should respect and help each other. Veteran cadres, in particular, should always and everywhere demonstrate an attitude of welcome and respect for new cadres so as to draw new cadres from all fields to strengthen our forces against Japan.

Among the cadres transferred from local work to work in the army are both veteran and new cadres and cadres of both worker-peasant and intellectual origins. This is a major source for expanding the ranks of our army cadres. We should respect and welcome them and amiably work together with them. When they first arrive, it is only natural that they will not be accustomed to and experienced in the work. We should be good at helping them.

There are incorrect viewpoints in our army on the relations between cadres of worker-peasant origin and those of intellectual origin, between veteran and new cadres and between original military cadres and newly

arrived cadres from the localities. The factional viewpoints on these questions should be corrected.

In the political education of the army there should be a distinction and unity between encouraging hatred for the enemy and winning over enemy captives. Without the former it is impossible to raise our morale so as to press ahead irresistibly, annihilate the enemy and achieve results. Without the latter it is impossible to demoralize the enemy officers and men. Both the commanders and fighters of our army should understand that all forces must be concentrated in battle on overwhelming the enemy troops and compelling them to surrender. If they refuse to lay down their arms, we must resolutely wipe them out or capture them. This is the revolutionary spirit of our army, which presses ahead irresistibly, wiping out the enemy and achieving results. This revolutionary spirit is an extremely valuable historical tradition of the army, to be fostered and carried forward. However, after the battle the policy toward captives should be changed. Then the attitude should be one of persuasion, and we should win them over through ideological education, material treatment and political attitude and translate our propaganda before and during the battle into facts so as to disintegrate the enemy troops. Making use of old Chinese sayings, if the former attitude can be described as the "tyrannical way" (revolutionary tyrannical way), then the latter attitude can be called the "kingly way" (revolutionary kingly way). It is wrong to apply the former attitude to the latter situation. It is precisely our historical tradition to distinguish between and carry forward these two attitudes simultaneously. We should all the more carry forward this tradition.

If we treat the enemy in the "tyrannical way," we should treat comrades, soldiers, the people and friends in the "kingly way." We strike at and wipe out the former and respect and persuade the latter. If we do not learn to distinguish between the two and at times mistakenly use the attitude toward the enemy against our comrades, soldiers, the people and friends, we are committing extremely serious mistakes. It is precisely our historical tradition to strictly distinguish between these two attitudes. From now on we should also carry forward this tradition.

The proportion of time spent on military education and political education should be worked out according to the concrete situation of the troops. The main attention shifts from one aspect to the other according to the concrete needs at a given time. For example, when troops are particularly short in political education, we should spend more time and energy on it. This is absolutely necessary. Generally speaking, however, military education should occupy more time than political and cultural education. Military training time should not be encroached upon by unnecessary and trivial meetings and reports. Many political education activities and political work meetings can be held at various intervals and on other occasions. The allocation of time must not be misconstrued as downgrading the importance of political work. On the

contrary, we hold that political work is the lifeline of our army and that without it our army will not be a truly revolutionary army. People must understand that serious political work is of extremely great significance and that any idea of looking down on it is wrong. But in some units today, political education, cultural education and other political work activities take up too much time, and military training time is reduced. This should be corrected.

In working out the proportion of time spent on political and cultural education in the army, political education should come first and cultural education second so as to enhance the troops' political feeling, understanding and quality. However, the cultural level of the revolutionary army should be raised. We must not have the mistaken idea that we need only politics and not culture. We can and should make use of various intervals and opportunities to carry out literacy drives and other cultural activities. In the circumstances of the rear units in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, there are more possibilities for cultural education, and we should make greater efforts to conduct cultural education.

Ours is a people's army thoroughly committed to supporting the people's interests, with workers and peasants as its basic elements. But we certainly do not refuse to allow people to join our army who are of landlord, rich peasant or capitalist class origins but are sincerely willing to devote themselves to the war of resistance against Japan and sincerely willing to obey the leadership of the Communist Party. These people are likely to have shortcomings, even serious ones, and it is wrong to do nothing about them, but their shortcomings can be overcome. Instead of excluding or discriminating against them, we welcome and respect them, fight together with them and, in the course of the struggle, help them overcome their shortcomings step by step.

In dealing with loafers (riffraff) in the army, as in dealing with loafers in the localities, we should adopt a policy of transforming and converting them. It is wrong to do nothing about the loafers' habits, and it is also wrong to simply reject and get rid of them. The overwhelming majority of the loafers can be educated and transformed into good people, provided we make no mistakes in our policy and method.

In dealing with the secret societies and bandits, we also should adopt a policy of converting and reforming them step by step in a systematic way, not a policy of simply excluding and dealing blows at them. If we have done everything possible to win them over and certain secret societies and bandits still firmly side with the enemy and oppose us, then and only then may we take certain measures to deal blows at them. But after dealing blows at them we should follow up by winning them over.

All the political work and other work during the period of the war of resistance against Japan that is of positive significance should be

continued and developed. This includes various types of political work in waging the struggle against the enemy and puppets, political work to win over enemy and puppet captives, political work of armed work teams, political work to attract the masses of people to join the army, political work to organize the people's militia and the guerrilla forces, political work to rally the masses of intellectuals into the army, political work to rally the landlord and capitalist classes to fight the war of resistance against Japan together with us, political work to unite the minority nationalities and other work that has produced results.

If there are wrong ideological trends with regard to these questions in our army, we should correct them.

There are several defects in the political work (also in the military work) of our army which were not clearly explained previously and need to be explained here. These defects do not exist--or do not exist to the same degree--in all units. The units in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region have carried out many reforms in the past year. But these defects are so obvious and eye-catching that we have to bring them up and analyze them in order to bring them to the attention of our comrades and thoroughly overcome them.

What are the defects? The first is formalism. Often some comrades draft their work plans like stereotyped articles that can be used anywhere, anytime. All they know is a set of old formulas. They do not change as the situation changes. This is a kind of formalism.

In our political education (sometimes in military education as well), what we teach is not exactly what the fighters need. For example, some comrades like to talk to the fighters about the international situation and the situation at home but are unwilling to talk about the local situation and the situation of our army and companies. Therefore, instead of discussing what they are most knowledgeable about and what is most welcome to the fighters, they indoctrinate the fighters with large amounts of abstract concepts. Some comrades frequently urge the fighters to obey regulations, set examples and be brave and firm but are unwilling to tell the fighters about the moving and heroic deeds of living exemplary persons, as if these things are worthless while the abstract concepts are priceless. In these circumstances the content of education has become dogmatic, and so have the methods of teaching, learning and taking examinations. To "fulfill the plan," those who teach keep on teaching in this way regardless of whether what they are teaching is understood or not, and those who learn consider going to class a burden or an assignment to fulfill. They study as a mere routine and never know how to link themselves with what they have learned and or how to discover their errors. During a test they only pay attention to their scores and not to how much they have really learned. Such phenomena exist in many units. In these units this phenomenon exists in education both for the fighters and for party members, and it also exists in political as well as cultural

education. This formalistic style of emphasizing the form and not the content has become a serious shortcoming in our education. Although this situation has greatly improved in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region since 1943, the question of the cadres' ideology has not been completely resolved.

The formalistic shortcoming can also be found in the work of some party branches. When some comrades go to inspect and discuss the work of a party branch, or when a party branch secretary plans his work, the first thing they do is hold a meeting and listen to some reports. They call this "establishing a meeting system" and "establishing a reporting system." When such meetings and reports are successful, they consider their work "exemplary"; otherwise it is not. They almost consider meetings and reports the center of their work, or their entire work. As a result, every party branch and all party members are busily engaged in holding meetings, and everybody becomes disgusted with such meetings. Why? Because such meetings are dull, dry and void of substance. The fighters, too, are disgusted with such reports, because most of them are meant to find fault with the fighters in an unconstructive way, reporting the so-called "absurdities" among the fighters. Therefore, the masses do not like the reports, and those so-called meetings and reports have alienated the party branch from the party members and the party members from the masses. Such party branches can never do their job properly because of their formalistic way of doing things.

It would be a very harmful kind of formalism if the same kind of political work--and not the kind of political work with varied content and forms--were carried out in the armed forces regardless of the special functions (the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, medical, transportation and so forth) and special characteristics of each task (combat, training, production, mass work and so forth). The political work of these units is lifeless because of the existence of this kind of formalism.

A similar situation can be found in the system of writing reports and filling out forms in some units. For example, when a higher-level organization mechanically instructs the lower-level units (particularly the battalions and companies) to turn in so many reports and fill in so many forms, these lower-level units must work relentlessly to turn in what they are instructed. But it is a sheer waste of time and energy, since the content is usually repetitious and few are of any use at all. Moreover, after these reports and forms have been turned in, the higher-level unit will more than likely put them aside and never analyze and use them. As a result, these reports and forms end up as wastepaper. This is another kind of formalism.

Many forms of organization in our armed forces do not conform to practical needs. For example, some political work organizations are divided into many departments and sections and utilize many people, with the

result that the more people they use, the less work they do. Most of the people are busily engaged in some trivial, formalistic matters, and there is very little work involving real leadership. Similarly, the political work network, the 10-man corps, youth contingents, political fighters and the like in the companies have also become decorative and almost useless.

In short, all impractical and formalistic styles of work and forms of organization belong to this category. This is the first shortcoming.

The second shortcoming is egalitarianism. What we want to point out here is that some of our comrades do not know how to grasp the central issue in planning their work, do not know how to use typical cases in inspecting their work and do not know where to begin in solving problems. As a result, they prepare all kinds of plans which include practically everything, including things that have already become routine or are insignificant as well as those that are important. Such hodgepodes and haphazard "work plans" completely lack significance. Comrades of some of our units do not realize that only one central task is required by the current situation within a certain period and that this central task should be supplemented by essential work. Instead, they launch a great many tasks at the same time and intend to achieve successful results in all of them. Consequently, none of these tasks is thoroughly completed and no satisfactory results are achieved. In inspecting their work, some of our comrades visit all the companies and inspect all the things related to political work. But what is the result? They are still unable to discover and analyze the problems and still do not know what has gone wrong and how to properly solve the problems. Therefore, what is known as "summing up the work experience" has become an empty phrase. All this is serious egalitarianism. The egalitarian method of work aims at doing everything properly, but nothing turns out satisfactorily. Like formalism, the nature of the egalitarian method of work is subjective, because it proceeds from a subjective point of view instead of the practical needs of work.

The third shortcoming is the attention given to making general demands and not to organizing things and issuing concrete guidance. In other words, some people are merely pointlessly shouting. We have seen that the demands made by some comrades are improper. They fail to understand the nature of the work in their units and fail to take the masses' feelings into consideration. What they demand is not really what their units actually need. We have also come to realize that even if their demands are correct, some comrades behave irresponsibly toward their units. Shortly after their first demand they will make another one. Therefore, the work revolves around those demands in their units and will always remain at that stage. Frequently a great deal of work ends up in nothing definite. This is an attitude of regarding work as a joke and an indication of a total lack of seriousness in work. Such an attitude will only cause a loss of prestige for political work and leading organizations and will never achieve any good results. To overcome this we must adhere to

this principle: "The leading cadres themselves must assume responsibility and personally participate in work, the leading backbone elements must work with the masses, and general demands must be combined with concrete guidance." When a demand has been issued, measures must be taken to implement it, and, in the course of its implementation, a breakthrough must be made at a certain point and the experience gained from this breakthrough used to guide the work in other areas. If there is no concrete guidance, the so-called general demand will end up without achieving anything.

The fourth shortcoming is the isolationism of some comrades. This does not mean that they are isolated by other people; it means that they are isolating themselves from other people. First of all, these comrades do not regard political work as mass work. Instead of doing things according to the masses' viewpoint, taking the mass line and organizing the masses to work, they confine political work within a small circle in which only a few political workers are busily working while the broad masses are doing nothing. Much work can be done in coordination with the comrades in charge of military work, but instead of seeking their help, they let their work go on without achieving any results. The same holds true with regard to mobilization of the masses. Instead of taking the masses' needs and feelings into consideration in their units, they pay no attention to them. As a result, the issue concerning the art of leading the masses, the issue of how to unite the activists, consolidate the middle elements and push the backward elements forward, the issue of promoting ties between the party and the nonpartisan masses, and the issue of coordinating propaganda and organizational work and so forth have either been regarded as unimportant or totally ignored. In these circumstances our political work has been reduced to simple generalities. In these circumstances our political work has become the "work" of a few people who have isolated themselves from the masses. In solving problems some comrades do not rely on ability, nor do they rely on the opinions and experience of their colleagues, their subordinates and the masses. Instead, they rely on their positions and administrative measures. Whenever they mess things up and are at the end of their rope, they resort to repressive means. This method of divorcing themselves from the masses is isolationism.

To sum up, the formalistic style, the egalitarian style, the style of making aimless demands and the isolationist style are all by nature the subjective and dogmatic styles of the petit bourgeoisie. These workstyles are not the styles of the communists, nor are they the styles of the revolutionary armed forces. They are incompatible with the styles of the party and the revolutionary armed forces. When they exist in our political work they weaken its revolutionary nature. If these workstyles cannot be rectified, our political tasks cannot be effectively accomplished even if the party line and the direction of our political work are correct. Our political work has had very fine traditions. The Kutien conference resolution is a concrete manifestation of such traditions. In the past,

whenever such traditions were inherited and fostered, our work would give full expression to its revolutionary nature and creativity, and if such traditions were not inherited and fostered, our work would become inflexible, dull, lifeless and impotent. Many lively examples can now be found in the armed forces of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and in the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army. During the protracted war of resistance, many combat heroes, labor heroes and model workers have come to the fore. There is no formalism, egalitarianism, aimless shouting or isolationism among them; they seek truth from facts and maintain close ties with the masses. We must learn from them, commend them and launch a movement in every unit to emulate the combat heroes, labor heroes and model workers. The enthusiasm and creativity of the cadres and masses is inexhaustible. As long as we properly point out the tasks to them, enlighten them and encourage them, they will work energetically, further their achievements and rectify their shortcomings. Even those comrades who made mistakes before will correct them in this mass movement. Experience has proven that once the integrity, zeal, creativity and enthusiasm of the masses is tapped, it will be inexhaustible and continue to flow like the rolling Yangtze River, and when we look back at our previous mistakes, they will merely look like dark spots on the sun. Our party, our armed forces and our people are the sun for illuminating the whole world.

III. Some Regulations on Organization Forms and Working Systems

Judging from the previously mentioned summation of the work done during the past year by the army units in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and the incomplete summation of the history of the entire army, we feel that efforts must be made to partially revise the existing organizational forms and systems of our political work, and new ideas must be introduced into them in order to meet the present needs of our army. I am not yet prepared to discuss the entire range of problems concerning organizational forms and systems of political work. I will only cover a few of them, as I want to leave others for future discussion. We must note that some of our present organizational forms and working systems are good and therefore must be preserved. The revision I just mentioned applies to those that have proved to be unfeasible through long experience. Some of the organizational forms and working systems exist in name only, while others that were useful in the past are now no longer applicable to the changing situation.

Generally speaking, all organizational forms and working systems can be classified into permanent and temporary. The permanent should be preserved while the temporary can be adapted to the needs of specific work or revised to meet the requirements of the changing situation and new projects. While carrying out tasks we must create new organizational forms and establish new working systems. We should never hesitate to break with obsolete systems. To do so we must abide by the following principle: Any organizational forms and working systems which can be

applied to organize and encourage the broad masses of fighters to enthusiastically fulfill certain tasks should be immediately put into effect. If certain organizational forms and working systems cannot be used for this purpose, they should not be adopted. Even those already in use should be discarded and replaced with new ones. For example, conferences of combat and labor heroes and model students and confession meetings for company-level soldiers have emerged from wars, the training and consolidation campaign, the production movement and the campaign to support the government and cherish the people. All these are good organizational forms and therefore should be brought into full play.

On the basis of the aforementioned principle, we can suggest the following:

1. Regulations governing the holding of company-level conferences and report meetings should be changed. In the past too many meetings were held by the army units. One company met 40 to 50 times a month. These meaningless meetings only waste people's time and energy. Today we have conferences on administration, party affairs, political work and meetings of party members and nonparty members and cadres. In the future all similar meetings should be merged into a single conference if they are attended by the same persons and if their topics do not involve state secrets. The holding of separate meetings must be justified. Every meeting should have its purpose clearly stated: for example, to provide a forum for reviewing work in detail and an opportunity for educating comrades and resolving problems. All other meetings without specific purposes should be canceled. During the report meetings, attention must be paid to saving time. No inflexible decisions should be made regarding the number of meetings. Meetings originally scheduled for party members to report to their group leaders and for fighters to report to their squad leaders should be canceled, because fighters hate to make such reports.

2. Company networks have been set up to deal with spies and deserters. However, experience shows that spies cannot be dealt with effectively by relying on a few informants and fixed networks. The work of preventing desertions and winning over and securing waverers is the responsibility of the party branch and should also be shared by all party members and revolutionary fighters. It is an ordinary political task rather than counterespionage work. To deal with deserters it is essential to primarily adopt the policy of winning over, educating and converting them and to solve the problem in such a manner as to improve the relations between officers and men, mend the management system and enhance the material life of the companies. When deserters are brought back, they should be reassured with a welcome, and any actions aimed at despising, ridiculing, beating or scolding them are prohibited. In the past many company networks adopted counterespionage measures in dealing with attempted deserters. This was wrong and defeated the intent of winning them over. Therefore, the fixed company networks are no longer needed

and should be abolished. When necessary, and only then, temporary reconnaissance personnel can be assigned, but they must be released upon completion of their duties.

3. The 10-man group set up in companies has been effective to a certain extent in dealing with desertions and protecting army units. However, as it overemphasizes passive preventive work, it often ignores the active efforts of winning people over politically. Furthermore, this organization can only play an effective role in companies where the majority of soldiers are new recruits or where desertions are currently taking place. Therefore, the 10-man group is not needed in ordinary companies where these conditions do not exist. A temporary 10-man group may be set up only when needed and under specific conditions.

4. In companies where young people make up the majority, importance should be attached to educating the youths. In the past the youth corps organization played an effective role in educating the youths. However, this organization has failed to pay attention to arousing the young people's enthusiasm and encouraging them to work alongside the adults. The result is that the young people have often divorced themselves from the adults and tried to play a prominent role themselves. Furthermore, organized activities and special education for the young have often been overemphasized. In view of the similarity of organized activities and education for the youths and adults alike in the companies, the work of the youth corps has become useless due to a lack of content and efficiency. Hereafter, no fixed youth corps organization and discipline are needed, nor fixed special education, conference activities and reporting systems for the young people. On the contrary, it is necessary to hold certain unscheduled youth conferences under the guidance of company or unit headquarters in order to instill enthusiasm in the youths and encourage them to join the adult ranks in effectively carrying out their common work.

5. Due to the lack of an established work program, the political fighters in companies should be abolished.

6. After the abolition of the fixed form of company networks, 10-man groups, youth corps and political fighters in companies, all anti-desertion, counterespionage and youth work should be placed under the centralized leadership of the company party branch and subjected to proper concrete rules to be formulated according to actual needs. Company party branches should make use of the servicemen's clubs in carrying out their own work, and much mass work should be done through such clubs. In the past certain army units regarded such clubs as organizations solely engaged in cultural and entertainment activities. As a result, club activities showed a lack of substance. In the future club activities should be enriched and expanded.

7. As the great production campaign has rendered the company's economic work more important than before, greater importance should be attached to the organization and functions of the company's economic committee. This committee should be elected, with officers also eligible to be elected committee members but not to exceed more than one-third of the total. Its duties and powers are to organize, plan and supervise the company's production and consumption work, prevent corruption and waste, and perform all other tasks necessary for the material welfare of all the company's members, and particularly of the fighters. The company's economic committee should be separated from and independent of the company's party branch, while the latter should pay constant attention to the former's work.

8. The coexistent status of the party branch work and the company's political work is changed. In addition to accepting the leadership of the general party branch, the party branch should accept the leadership of the company's political instructor, who is concurrently the secretary of the company party branch. On purely party affairs (such as admitting, expelling and punishing party members and handling intraparty disputes), the party branch should adhere to the principle of the minority being subordinate to the majority and no one-man monopolization of all work. On all-company affairs and political work, the party branch should constantly achieve a unity of views with the company commander and respect his opinions.

9. According to the party Central Committee's decision, January is the month of supporting the government and cherishing the people. In this month the movement to support the government and cherish the people should be unfolded. All army companies should conduct profound education in supporting the government and cherishing the people during this period. The establishment and complete implementation of this system will greatly improve the relations between the army and the government, between the army and the people and between the army units and the localities. The entire army should attach great importance to this practice.

10. The self-reflection and confession movement should be launched from one to three times a year with education as the chief purpose. Each company should select one to three appropriate opportunities, of 3 to 5 days' duration each time, to hold companywide self-reflection and confession meetings. In accordance with the principle "blame not the speaker but be warned by his words," and fully in the spirit of friendship and mutual assistance among comrades, all cadres and fighters are encouraged to conduct self-reflections and confessions on all matters--their hidden grudges, the beatings and abuses in the company, their inclination to desert, the collusion and sabotage of traitors, the shortage of supplies, encroachments on the people's interests, disrespect for the party and the government and disrespect for superiors, and shortcomings in educational and economic work. All of this data will then be compiled by the company

party branch or the executive officer. This will then be reported to the higher level while discussions are simultaneously held on effective measures for improvement in all aspects. In many units this method has proved to be the best one for arousing the masses' enthusiasm, enhancing the will to fight, enhancing the prestige of the leadership, improving the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, eliminating desertions, uncovering traitors and improving work in all fields. The higher leading organs should organize these meetings well and make advance preparations, especially in the mental and spiritual aspects, so that these meetings are natural and not forced, educational and not punitive, animated and not lukewarm, and turn out to be truly mass educational meetings for promoting close unity between the cadres and fighters. If two or three such meetings are held in a year, one of them can be held in the month of supporting the government and cherishing the people.

11. Meetings of combat heroes, labor heroes or model workers in other fields should be held annually, with the subregion, brigade, regiment or battalion as the unit (when a meeting of combat heroes, labor heroes and model workers in other fields is held, it may be called a meeting of heroes). Heroes and model workers should be selected seriously and elected in a democratic way and must be truly admired by the broad masses. After heroes and model workers are selected and attend such a meeting, attention should be paid to training them. Most of these heroes and model workers should be selected from among the fighters and service personnel. However, a considerable number of them should also be selected from among the lower- and middle-echelon cadres. At such a meeting, those with outstanding achievements should be given moral encouragement and material rewards and publicized in the newspapers in order to call on the masses to learn from them.

12. It is necessary to reinstitute the system of holding party congresses as stipulated in the resolution of the Kutien meeting. The party congress should be held annually, with the subregion, brigade or regiment as the unit, and delegates to the congress should be elected.

13. It is necessary to reinstitute the system of holding joint meetings of the secretariat and the propaganda department as stipulated in the resolution of the Kutien meeting. The joint meeting should be held annually, with the subregion, brigade or regiment as the unit.

14. All members of each battalion should be mustered once a month to listen to a pep talk. All members of a brigade or a regiment should be mustered whenever possible to listen to such a talk. Attention should be paid to such musters, and pep talks should be regarded as a major means of raising the morale of the fighters and achieving unity of will in the whole army. Both responsible military and political workers should attend such talks. In giving such a talk, one should give the listeners encouragement rather than criticize them. (A pep talk should be given to a company in the same spirit.)

15. The purpose of submitting tables and reports is to show the development of work in an army unit so that the higher authorities can understand the unit's problems and give it proper guidance. From now on we should do away with all stereotyped reports which lack substance and which neither analyze the development of work nor pinpoint problems. We should encourage people to write reports which vividly reflect the development of work, pinpoint achievements and explain why such achievements were possible. We should encourage people to write reports which pinpoint contradictions, difficulties or problems, point out why such contradictions, difficulties or problems have occurred, and present ideas on resolving these contradictions, overcoming the difficulties or solving the problems. We should submit fewer weekly, monthly and annual reports and submit more reports describing the beginning and end of events or the development of such events. All complicated and impractical tables and charts should be abolished. It is necessary to encourage people to submit simple, concise and practical tables and charts.

16. The principle for assigning office workers is that they should be competent and small in number. In some offices it is necessary to change the undesirable way of "handling official matters" which fails to keep the masses in mind, and to examine leadership ideologically and politically.

Following the accumulation of experience over a long period of time, I wrote this report, which has been discussed by comrades at this meeting and to which ideas have been added. In addition, military and political comrades from the frontline have also offered many ideas. I wrote this report under the guidance of comrades in the CCP Central Committee and its Northwest Bureau. If those present consider the report proper, we should decide to act accordingly. Work achievements can be realized very soon, provided all cadres in the army, including those at the high, middle and low levels, have broken their ideological barriers. In the spirit of the rectification movement, we firmly believe that the whole army will make a leap forward, and we will surely be able to accomplish the sacred task of becoming united, defeating the enemy and liberating the nation and the people.

SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEPARTMENTS OF FINANCE AND TRADE ON
LEARNING FROM TACHING AND TACHAI

Peking RED FLAG in Chinese No 8, 1 Aug 78 pp 24-32

[Speech by Hua Kuo-feng on 7 July 1978]

[Text] Comrades, the current National Conference of Departments of Finance and Trade on Learning From Taching and Tachai is drawing to a successful close. The speech made by Comrade Hsien-nien and the report delivered by Comrade Chiu-li are very important and very good. You have studied and discussed them, exchanged experience of departments of finance and trade in learning from Taching and Tachai and increased your enthusiasm to learn from, catch up with and overtake the advanced. The atmosphere at the conference is lively, with everyone emancipating his mind, freely expressing opinions, working in a democratic way, pooling ideas and heightening understanding and confidence. The conference is bound to help tremendously in stimulating the socialist enthusiasm of workers in finance and trade, raising the quality of this work, encouraging high-speed development of the national economy and speeding up the building of a modern, powerful socialist China.

After our party smashed the antiparty clique--the "gang of four" of Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan--the Central Committee made the strategic decision to grasp the key link of class struggle and bring about great order across the land, convened the 11th National CCP Congress and the Fifth National People's Congress, and laid down the line and the general task for the party and the people of the whole country in the new period. We also called conferences on agriculture, industry and science and other important meetings. Now we are holding this financial and trade conference. In accordance with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and in the light of the new conditions, we have formulated fundamental principles for various fields of work and formulated the outline of the 1976-1985 Ten-Year Plan for the development of the national economy and the outline of the national plan for the development of science and technology, so as to fulfill the general task for the new period. Application of these principles and outlines

is bound to bring about before long a new upsurge of socialist economic and cultural construction in our country.

Since the beginning of this year we have been continuing our triumphant advance and scoring new successes in all areas on the basis of the initial achievements of the first year in grasping the key link of class struggle and bringing about great order across the land. For the country as a whole, the work of screening the factional setup of the "gang of four" has in the main come to a victorious close. There is a change for the better, too, in the few localities and units that are lagging. Criticism of the gang's counterrevolutionary revisionist line and reactionary ideological system is going deeper. Under the leadership of the party Central Committee, political stability and unity have been consolidated and developed, and democracy has been restored and broadened both inside the party and among the people in general. The cadres, workers, peasants and intellectuals are in high spirits as they join in the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment. They are not afraid to speak out and to criticize. Their enthusiasm for socialism has been further aroused. Our industrial, agricultural and financial and trade undertakings have been developing at fairly high speed. We have also made significant progress in science, education and culture. In short, the situation is very good.

Take the economic situation. Preliminary statistics for the first half of this year show a 24-percent increase in industrial production over the corresponding 1977 period, of which steel rose 67 percent, petroleum went up 11 percent, coal rose 19 percent, and electricity showed a 17-percent increase. Output of 16 major products of light industry, including cotton yarn, paper and sugar, increased by wide margins in the first 6 months of this year. Communications and transport did very well. Rail freight volume in the January-June period rose 22 percent above the same 1977 period. In agriculture, quite a number of localities were hit by severe natural disasters last winter and this spring, but the summer-harvested crops yielded over 5 million tons more than last year because of the vigorous mass movement to learn from Tachai and the gradual carrying out of the party's economic policies for the countryside. Purchases and sales in town and country are brisk, and stocks have increased. Total sales of consumer goods in the first 3 months of this year were larger than the best quarter of any previous year. Sales in the second quarter of this year continued to rise. January-June state revenue topped the plan by a significant margin.

It can be seen from these facts that, since the smashing of the "gang of four" more than a year ago, we have rescued the national economy, which was on the brink of collapse, and have set it on a path of steady increases and healthy growth. Such rehabilitation and development in the national economy are manifested in not one area or department or a few areas or departments but in all areas and departments. The great political revolution to expose and criticize the "gang of four" advances the

growth of production, and a political situation of stability and unity leads to economic prosperity. This is quite in line with the objective laws of development. People throughout the country are overjoyed at the victories on the economic front, and they are fully confident of new victories.

But there is not the least reason for complacency. The present progress, we should note, is in the nature of recovery. In the last few years the "gang of four" wrought havoc with our socialist economy. The aftermath of this continued to show itself in some departments in the first quarter of last year. Compared with that period, the rates of increase listed above naturally seem high. We should note especially that our goal is to carry through the four modernizations, catch up with advanced world levels and surpass them, both economically and technically. We must compare our achievements with advanced levels in other countries. In so doing we shall see that our levels are still very low. For years the "gang of four," waving the banner of "revolution" and brandishing big sticks, forbade people to learn from the advanced experience of other countries, and many of our comrades are scarcely aware of what has been going on abroad. Some comrades tend to take a dangerous attitude of conceit and complacency, conservatism and parochial arrogance when they make even the slightest progress. If this attitude is not decisively changed, we shall lack the will and the vision to forge ahead steadily and shall be incapable of careful study of advanced experience either at home or abroad, let alone of catching up with the advanced levels of other countries.

We are now lagging behind not only in technology but in managerial skills, too. After the founding of new China we accumulated certain experience in economic management but still had many weak points to eliminate. But disruption by the "gang of four" pushed us back far below our original level; many essential rules and regulations were abolished, socialist planned economy was undermined, and a state of what can be called semi-anarchy was created. Now the "gang of four" have been overthrown, but their pernicious influence has still not been thoroughly eliminated. Many cardinal issues of right and wrong in economic work have still not been straightened out among many cadres and other people, and problems in management caused by the gang have piled up. Take industry, for example. A large part of the productive capacity of present enterprises has not yet been fully utilized, and the potential is great. Low productivity, poor quality of products, high production costs, low profits and slow turnover of funds--these can be found in most enterprises. A number of enterprises are still running at a loss. Many new enterprises fail for a long time to become a productive force, and the yields on the investment are very poor. There are also quite a number of problems in the handling of both domestic and foreign trade; roundabout transport, the tying up and spoilage of commodities and losses caused by management are very serious. Only when we are fully aware of the problems created by our low standards of management and inept managerial work can we sum up

experience and lessons in earnest, study and master advanced science and technology and advanced scientific methods of management. Otherwise, we will continue to waste time, manpower and funds and cannot fulfill the grand task we have set out to accomplish within this century. The whole party must recognize the gravity of this problem.

Openly pinpointing the problems and shortcomings in our work will not weaken our confidence and initiative. On the contrary, it shows that we are full of confidence and that we are determined to display our initiative more effectively on the basis of recognizing objective realities. Fundamentally, our socialist political system and economic system are far superior to the capitalist. This is beyond question. But many aspects of our superstructure and relations of production are still not perfect; there remain weaknesses in many links of our political system and our economic system. These are incompatible with the goal of the four modernizations. They shackle the productive forces and hinder their development. Ineptitude in management is, in the final analysis, a matter of this nature. In continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we should have the courage to face up to and expose those things in our concrete policies, rules and regulations, working methods and ideological concepts that are not in harmony with the goal of the four modernizations, and have the gumption to transform those aspects of the superstructure and the relations of production that are not in harmony with the productive forces. This should be done firmly and in an appropriate manner. In this way we shall be able to bring into full play the advantages of the socialist system, constantly sum up our experience, go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing, draw on the advanced science and technology and scientific managerial methods of other countries and, through hard struggle in not too long a historical period, catch up with and surpass the economic and technical levels of the most advanced capitalist countries.

Comrades, in order for our financial and trade work to take a big step forward from the present level, we find it necessary to reiterate the principle "develop the economy and insure supplies." Chairman Mao raised this principle in 1942 when he pointed out: "The general policy guiding our economic and financial work is to develop the economy and insure supplies"; "while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance. Without a well-based economy it is impossible to solve financial difficulties, and without a growing economy it is impossible to attain financial sufficiency." In 1947 he again pointed out: "All places must plan on a long-term basis, work hard at production, practice economy and correctly solve the financial problem on the basis of production and economy. The first principle here is to develop production and insure supply." Practice for over 30 years has proved that this is an entirely correct principle that we must continue to carry out. The content of this principle has been steadily enriched and developed with changes in historical conditions. Developing the economy at present requires a big growth of modern industry,

agriculture, communications and transport, a commensurate expansion of domestic and foreign trade, banking and other services, and increases in state revenue on this basis. Insuring supplies in the present period means providing the material supplies and funds required for modernized production and expanded reproduction. It also means providing for a step-by-step improvement in the people's material well-being and cultural life and guaranteeing the country's essential military and administrative expenditures. Here "to develop the economy and insure supplies" has two meanings. First, the development of the economy is the prerequisite for insuring supplies. Without economic growth, supplies cannot be insured; the higher the level of economic development, the higher the level of supplies to the state and the people. Second, insuring supplies is the purpose of developing the economy. Our fundamental purpose in developing the socialist economy and constantly expanding reproduction is to provide for the material well-being and cultural life of our people and make our due contribution to humanity.

Carrying out the principle of developing the economy and insuring supplies is the correct orientation for fully effective financial and trade work. In a penetrating note written in 1959 on a report by Comrade Li Hsien-nien, Chairman Mao stated: "The suggestion about promoting industry, agriculture and commerce simultaneously is very good. It must be done. If commerce is belittled and not made a commander, industry and agriculture won't be developed." The relation between developing the economy and insuring supplies is in essence an interrelation among the four links in the general process of production--production, exchange, distribution and consumption. None of these links can be dispensed with. Production is the decisive factor in this general process, but exchange, distribution and consumption also have a great bearing on production. While a growth in commerce results from the growth of industrial and agricultural production, it is also a powerful stimulus for industrial and agricultural growth. Similarly, finance and banking, important instruments for the allocation of funds, are naturally based on economic work. But such questions as whether fund accumulations are ample, allocations and loans are rational, turnover is fast, and management and supervision of the use of funds are correct--these determine to a large degree whether the economy can be developed with greater, faster, better and more economical results. Comrade Hsien-nien, in his opening address at this conference, compared financial and trade work with the circulatory system of the human body. This is a very good explanation of its extremely important role and position in all economic work. Party committees at all levels must make financial and trade work an important item on their agenda. Any slighting or neglect of financial and trade work is incorrect.

We must also note that, in the new period, the rapid growth of our socialist economic and cultural construction and the gradual realization of the four modernizations are bound to place new and higher demands on financial and trade work. With the rapid advances in industrial and agricultural production, the total amount of commodities in society will greatly

increase; this, plus the growth of the division of labor and coordination among various specialties, inevitably will expand the scope of exchange and call for stricter and closer social economic accounting and supervision. We shall have more and more contacts with the world market and constantly widen technical and material interchanges at home and abroad. Raising the people's living standards and socializing housework will require a steady growth in the service trades. Commerce and services are important social professions, on a par with industry and agriculture. This point will become ever more obvious. When one fully understands this trend in the social economy, one will not think that there is no future in a job in finance and trade or that the service trades are inferior to others. Financial and trade work, including the service trades, are part of the great cause of serving the people. They are indispensable, offer a great future and are glorious and praiseworthy.

Comrades! We must do financial and trade work well in the Taching and Tachai style. That means that in financial and trade work we must implement the principle of developing the economy and insuring supplies in an all-round way and uphold the Marxist political approach, production approach and mass approach, under the guidance of the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. These three approaches fully embody the fine traditions of financial and trade work set up by Chairman Mao for our party, embody our party's fundamental experience in leading this work during the half century since the revolutionary base areas were set up, and embody the essential need to do financial and trade work in the Taching and Tachai style.

Since the founding of new China, financial and trade workers, under the leadership of the party, have adhered to these three approaches and have kept to the socialist orientation in their work. They have made tremendous contributions to socialist revolution and construction, receiving warm support from people throughout the country and praise from friends abroad. In recent years, however, Lin Piao and the "gang of four" smeared and attacked without letup these three approaches and seriously damaged the ranks of financial and trade workers ideologically, politically, organizationally and in workstyle. As a result, the three approaches became vague and blurred in the minds of many of our comrades, and many young workers who have come into financial and trade departments recently were never educated in these approaches. In order to improve our socialist financial and trade work, strengthen the rectification and building of the force of financial and trade workers ideologically and politically, and carry out the general task for the new period, we maintain that through this conference these three approaches should be stressed and widely publicized among all comrades in financial and trade work, so that everyone will bear them firmly in mind and restore and carry forward our fine traditions in this work.

By the political approach we mean that all financial and trade workers must be clear about the great political significance of their work. They

must consciously keep to the socialist orientation in their work and firmly carry out the party's line, principles and policies so that work in all departments of finance and trade serves the general task of the new period.

At present and for some time to come the task of paramount importance in finance and trade is to carry through to the end the struggle against the "gang of four," thoroughly exposing and criticizing their criminal sabotage of the socialist economy and socialist finances and trade and eliminating their pernicious influence. It is imperative to deal resolute blows at criminal acts of embezzlement, theft and speculation and crush attacks by capitalist forces in town and country. Abuse of power and position, feathering one's nest at the expense of the public interest, and deception, "back-door" practices and other unhealthy tendencies must be opposed. Socialist public ownership and socialist public property must be protected and the socialist position in finance and trade consolidated.

Since our financial and trade work serves as a link between production and consumption and among all production departments, all specific tasks in this area are bound to have a close bearing on socialist construction and the vital interests of the people and on the correct handling of many social contradictions in our socialist society. The financial and trade departments, therefore, must persistently put proletarian politics in command of all work and overcome all deviations from proletarian politics. Ideological and political work must be done in the course of economic and professional work, so that it becomes the real guarantee for success in that work. Party committees at all levels must give strong and effective assistance to all financial and trade workers to steadily heighten their socialist consciousness in order to prevent and resist the corrosion and influence of bourgeois ideas and practices, and they must strive to build a mighty contingent of financial and trade workers who are both Red and expert, serve the people wholeheartedly and keep improving their skills.

By the production approach we mean that all work in finance and trade must proceed from production and serve its needs.

Financial and trade workers must not approach their job in isolation, limiting themselves to the narrow confines of purchase and sale, receipt and payment, deposit and loan. They must direct their attention to production, become acquainted with its processes, solve problems arising in it and promote its growth. Financial and trade departments must share good and bad with industrial and agricultural production departments, think in terms of production and do what it urgently requires. Only by really supporting, organizing and expanding production can financial and trade work become more and more lively and acquire an increasingly strong material basis and a growing sphere of operations. Financial and trade departments know most clearly and reflect most sensitively whether the

varieties, specifications, quantity and quality of products meet the needs of production and daily life, whether prices are reasonable and whether buying and selling are taking place at the right time. Commercial departments should communicate in good time such information and the new needs of production and daily life to the departments in charge and production units concerned and help them organize production in the light of actual needs. They should show a sense of responsibility in making suggestions to production units and enthusiastically helping them improve commodities that are not up to state standards and the needs of the people. If these production units fail to make any improvement within a set time, state financial and economic discipline should be strictly enforced to make them responsible for all losses arising, so as to end the irrational situation of a short supply of goods society needs while there is mass production and overstocking of unwanted goods. Financial and banking departments should also adopt effective measures to help production units handle and use their funds well, improve management and achieve good economic results. All acts that violate financial and economic discipline and cause a waste of state funds must be resolutely stopped whatever the pretext, and, if necessary, there should be economic sanctions or even legal steps. Financial and trade departments should carefully study all rules and regulations relating to prices, taxes, credits and management that are detrimental to the growth of production and should reform them.

On the law of value, Chairman Mao said: "This law is a great school. Only by applying it can we educate our tens of millions of cadres and hundreds of millions of people and build our socialism and communism. Otherwise it would all be impossible." In a planned socialist economy the correct use of the law of value is of great importance for promoting socialist production. In this respect our financial and trade work can play a major role through buying and selling commodities, through the allocation of funds and through such economic levers as pricing, taxing and providing loans. If we do not turn the law of value to good account, or if we violate it, our economic work will not be able to proceed correctly and effectively or achieve full results with minimum expenditure, and we will be punished by this objective law in terms of the inevitable serious waste and losses and disruption of socialist production. Our use of the law of value to promote production on the basis of a planned socialist economy was attacked as capitalist by the "gang of four." They also attacked running socialist enterprises at a profit as "putting profits in command," creating the reactionary view that it was glorious to run an enterprise at a loss but shameful to show a profit. Consequently, many of our enterprises and cadres for a long time did not dare talk about making a profit; the system of enterprise management and financial regulations were thrown to the winds; economic accounting was abandoned and economic results were considered of no importance, while some enterprises even ran at a loss for long periods. All this seriously hampered the application of the principle of developing the economy and insuring supplies. In the struggle to eliminate the pernicious influence of Lin

Piao and the "gang of four," we must carry out widespread education throughout the party and among all economic, financial and trade workers on the need to strengthen economic accounting, pay attention to economic results, increase profits and exercise strict financial supervision, so as to stimulate production greatly and accumulate more funds for socialist construction.

One point to make here, in particular, is that some provinces and autonomous regions are at present not self-sufficient in grain and non-staple foodstuffs and are short of vegetables, edible oil, meat and eggs; they are not self-sufficient in some of the prime manufactured daily necessities and even bring in from elsewhere such commodities as pots and pans, bricks and tiles, ink and paste. This is a big problem, and it is high time for a radical improvement. The party Central Committee requires that all provinces and autonomous regions that are not self-sufficient in grain and foodstuffs and all prefectures, cities and counties which have the conditions for self-sufficiency but have still not reached that goal map out realistic plans and achieve complete self-sufficiency within a few years. At the same time they should work energetically for higher labor productivity in agriculture and a bigger commodity section of the total farm produce. At the same time all provinces and autonomous regions which have the necessary conditions for self-sufficiency in the most essential manufactured daily necessities but have not yet achieved it must strive with all their might for this goal or at least raise their level of self-sufficiency. In this respect there is plenty of room for our financial and trade departments to give active support to production departments and to bring their own role and capacity into full play. Let us recognize, comrades, that our provinces are generally equal in size and population to a European country. Some European countries which used to depend on imports of farm produce and animal products have achieved self-sufficiency and even become exporting countries since World War II. Why can't some of our provinces do what capitalist countries can do? Chairman Mao put it well when he said: "A country with the dictatorship of the proletariat can certainly insure that the people have vegetables, cooking oil, pork, fish, beef, lamb, chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits and eggs to eat. We should have the pluck and the determination to accomplish this socialist task of great political and economic significance. We should also have the confidence that we can do it." If a province or a prefecture is for a long time unable to achieve what its resources and conditions allow and is unable to become self-sufficient, the leading comrades there and the responsible comrades in the industrial, agricultural, financial and trade departments should feel ashamed and be ill at ease when they eat and sleep. Furthermore, all provinces and prefectures should, apart from meeting local needs, strive to satisfy the needs of the country's domestic market and exports. They should, according to their own conditions, produce whatever they can on a large scale and make bigger contributions to the state.

By the mass approach we mean truly serving the interests of the people, following the mass line in our work and willingly accepting supervision by the masses.

The laborer is the most fundamental, most revolutionary factor in the productive forces. The financial and trade departments through their work take care of the needs of the people in productive labor and daily life, of the supply and maintenance of the means of production and daily necessities, and of food, clothing, shelter, consumption, travel, etc. for the people. These are important conditions for high-speed development of industrial and agricultural production as well as a vivid manifestation of the superiority of the socialist system. Our financial and trade work used to have fine traditions in this respect. Way back in the agrarian revolutionary war, Chairman Mao patiently instructed us to "pay close attention to the well-being of the masses" and to be concerned with their problems with fuel, rice, cooking oil, salt, shelter and clothing. But the "gang of four" spread such nonsense as "good service will give rise to revisionism," having a very bad influence over some financial and trade departments and service workers. These departments and people had a poor attitude and gave inferior service in the bad style of "bureaucratic traders," harming the interests of the masses and undermining the close ties between the party and the people. In some places, commercial departments even asked factories to halt production for some days and send their workers to the countryside to cut and transport cabbage! Should this bad style, which turned our commercial departments into bureaucratic offices, be tolerated? Isn't this the exact opposite of the revolutionary attitude of wholehearted devotion to the interests of the masses shown by the advanced financial and trade workers commended at this conference?

The mass line is the party's fundamental line, and participation by the masses in management is a basic setup under socialism. Financial and trade work is in wide and direct contact with the masses. It is all the more necessary for the financial and trade departments and units to carry out the mass line and democratic management. They should activate and rely on not only their own people but also those whom they serve, so that they do their work well with the help and supervision of the masses. The grassroots units of the financial and trade departments should regularly call meetings of the workers or their representatives. Rural supply and marketing and credit cooperatives should call regular meetings of representatives of the poor and lower-middle peasants, at least once a year. Urban shops and service trades should also call meetings of representatives of neighborhood dwellers from time to time. At these meetings, leaders of these grassroots units should report on their work, listen to the opinions of the masses, conscientiously study their suggestions and criticism and improve their own work accordingly. Those leaders and personnel of financial and trade units who have a poor attitude in serving, refuse to listen to the opinions of the masses from inside and outside their units, or even engage in embezzlement and malpractice and

violate law and discipline should be educated by serious criticism and, in grave cases, should be dealt with by law. As for those who work well and are appreciated by the masses, they should be commended and rewarded.

The Central Committee is deeply convinced that with party education, workers of the financial and trade departments throughout the country can certainly foster in their work the correct political approach, production approach and mass approach, wholeheartedly serve the people, restore and carry forward our fine traditions, be good fighters in the service arm of the new Long March, and fulfill the glorious task of promoting high-speed development of the national economy.

Comrades! Building our country into a great, modern and powerful socialist state is a very hard job. We must apply ourselves in study. We should study works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao, learn from the people, learn from the practical experience our country has accumulated in socialist revolution and socialist construction over the past 28 years, and learn everything that is advanced from other countries. Theory, politics, economics, management, science and technology all need to be studied and the general educational level raised. A sustained study campaign should be launched for the whole party and all the people.

Long ago, on the eve of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao taught us: "The serious task of economic construction lies before us. We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we don't know well." "We must learn to do economic work from all who know how (no matter who they are). We must esteem them as teachers, learning from them respectfully and conscientiously. We must not pretend to know when we do not know. We must not put on bureaucratic airs. If we dig into a subject for several months, for a year or 2, for 3 or 5 years, we shall eventually master it."

Chairman Mao in 1958 proposed that comrades on the Central Committee and on party committees of the provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, prefectures and counties read Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" and other works. He urged them to read these books in relation to China's socialist economic revolution and economic construction so as to keep a sober head, which would help them guide our great economic work.

In his talk at the 1962 enlarged working conference convened by the party Central Committee, Chairman Mao said: "Getting to know the laws governing the building of socialism necessarily involves a process"; "for us the socialist economy is in many respects a still unknown realm of necessity"; "in the forthcoming period we should accumulate experience and study hard, and in the course of practice gradually deepen our understanding and become clearer on the laws of socialist construction."

We are now faced with the great and arduous task of achieving socialist modernization, and we must restudy some things we learned in the past and start from the beginning to learn many new things we have not touched on. Our cadres at all levels must, with an urgent sense of revolutionary responsibility and with high enthusiasm and firm resolve, conscientiously study the theory of socialist economic construction advanced by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao and delve diligently into various branches of new knowledge on the road of economic construction. Through study and practice we will understand the economic laws of socialism better, more consciously apply objective economic laws, improve our management of economic work, and raise our level in modern science and technology.

Some comrades still do not recognize well enough the importance of studying, mastering and applying the economic laws of socialism. They have gone so far as to imagine that it is possible to put politics in command while neglecting objective economic laws and that acknowledgment of economic laws means negating politics in command; this view is entirely wrong. We must put proletarian politics in command of our economic work and must do things according to objective economic laws, these two aspects being a unity. Leading cadres at all levels in the party should strive to bring politics and economics together and raise the quality of their economic management. This is of key significance for the rapid development of the national economy and calls for particularly close attention.

Comrades! We have been victorious in achieving in 1 year initial success in grasping the key link of class struggle and bringing about great order across the land. The present task is to be victorious in achieving marked success within 3 years and to lay a solid foundation for fulfilling the Ten-Year Plan. Time is limited, the problems are many and the tasks are urgent. However, with the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, the leadership of the party Central Committee, the close unity of the whole party, the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout the country, favorable conditions at home and abroad, and cadres and masses on all fronts working hard and studying diligently, we can certainly overcome every difficulty and reach our goals step by step. All comrades in finance and trade and in all other economic work, let us hold high the great banner of Chairman Mao, march on valiantly, carry forward the general principle of developing the national economy and insuring supplies and strive to fulfill the general task for the new period and make China a modern, powerful socialist country.

SPEECH AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEPARTMENTS
OF FINANCE AND TRADE ON LEARNING FROM TACHING AND TACHAI

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[Speech by Li Hsien-nien on 20 June 1978]

[Text] Comrades: The National Conference of Departments of Finance and Trade on Learning From Taching and Tachai, convened by the party Central Committee, has now opened. It is my fervent hope that the conference will be crowned with complete success.

The conference is the largest gathering held on finance and trade since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Representatives of advanced collectives, model and advanced workers and leading cadres of financial and trade departments at all levels who are present at the conference, as well as thousands upon thousands of advanced workers and leading cadres who are not attending, have united and encouraged all financial and trade workers throughout the country to work hard to fulfill all the glorious tasks assigned them by the party and the state in the various periods since liberation. You and all financial and trade workers have made significant contributions to the victories of the socialist revolution and construction and are a worthy and important component of the Chinese working class. The work that you and all financial and trade workers do is indispensable to socialist construction, and the people of the whole country should respect it. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, I would like to express high respects and sincere thanks to you, and through you, to the more than 12 million workers on the financial and trade front throughout the country!

This conference was called by decision of the party Central Committee headed by our wise leader Chairman Hua. This fact indicates that it is imperative to strengthen financial and trade work rapidly and energetically so as to implement the line of the 11th party congress and carry out the general task for the new period still better. Financial and trade cadres and workers long hoped that such a conference would be

convoked to discuss how financial and trade work can promote the high-speed development of the national economy and accelerate the four modernizations and take appropriate decisions.

The present domestic political situation is fine. Great victories have been won in the struggle to expose and criticize the "gang of four." The struggle is now continuing to go deeper. In the light of the new historical conditions, the party Central Committee formulated the line of the 11th party congress and defined the general task for the new period, and this has received warm support from people throughout the country. Specific lines and policies guiding the various types of work are being formulated and improved step by step. The people see ever more clearly what are Chairman Mao's theory, line, principles and policies and how they should comprehensively and accurately study and grasp Mao Tsetung Thought as a whole. I recently made a tour of two provinces and saw everywhere that the masses dare to speak, cadres dare to tackle problems in work, workers and peasants are full of enthusiasm and intellectuals have ease of mind. All are working with might and main to contribute more to socialism. This political atmosphere of stability and unity and liveliness stimulates the rapid restoration and development of the national economy. Things are going well in industry, agriculture, science and education, finance and trade. The international situation is also very favorable for us. The people and most countries in the world hope that we grow strong. So long as we, as our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao taught us, strive to mobilize all positive factors, inside and outside the party, internal and external, direct and indirect, we will be able to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country and place China's economy in the world's first ranks by the end of the century so as to make a greater contribution to humanity.

Looking at the question from the Marxist point of view, the people themselves in all countries determine what their future will be. Chairman Mao taught us long ago: "On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts." Victory in the Chinese revolution in the past was won under the guidance of this policy of Chairman Mao's. We must resolutely and unswervingly adhere to this policy in our future struggles to build a modern, powerful socialist country. China has a population of 800 million. If we were not to base ourselves on our work within the country and rely on our own efforts to develop production to solve problems, from feeding and clothing the people to achieving the four modernizations, if we were not to rely on our own continuously expanded reproduction to create increasing amounts of social wealth, accumulate more funds and master more up-to-date techniques, could we then imagine some saviors would descend to solve these problems for us? The principle of self-reliance means mobilizing our 800 million people to develop production, science and culture. We must without doubt work to develop our foreign trade and have effective exchanges with foreign countries so as to assimilate everything good from elsewhere as far as possible. Our

purpose, however, remains that of enabling our people to adopt, as quickly as possible, the most advanced technologies and methods to develop production and increase our self-reliance.

Chairman Hua wrote this inscription for the conference: "Develop the economy and insure supplies, and do a good job of finance and trade in the spirit of Taching and Tachai to help develop industry and agriculture quickly and wholeheartedly serve the daily needs of the people." This inscription has further indicated the orientation for our financial and trade work. We should follow this instruction, make the conference a success and do our future financial and trade work well.

How should the financial and trade departments work well in the spirit of Taching and Tachai, support industrial and agricultural production, serve the daily needs of the people and make greater contributions to fulfilling the general task for the new period? Comrade Yu Chiu-li will deliver a detailed report to the conference. Now, I'll limit myself to the following four questions: An adequate appraisal of the significance of financial and trade work, effective grasp of class struggle, improvement of management, and strengthening of party leadership in financial and trade work.

The first question: The significance of financial and trade work.

Industry and agriculture, as we all know, are the basis of financial and trade work. Therefore, the financial and trade departments, while resolving problems in their work, should not limit themselves to finance and trade but should firmly implement Chairman Mao's teaching, "develop the economy and insure supplies," and direct their attention to production, supporting, getting involved in and promoting its development. All our work should proceed from the needs of production and serve them. Only when production is greatly expanded can financial and trade work grow. This does not by any means, however, signify that financial and trade work, including the interflow of products, allocation of funds, foreign trade and service work for the laboring people in the process of production and consumption, has only a passive and subordinate role to play in the general process of social production. Production determines exchange and distribution, which in turn have an important and dynamic function that is indispensable to production. This is clear, especially under the socialist system. If we have industry and agriculture without commerce to conduct the exchange of the large amount of commodities they produce, namely, exchange between manufactured goods and farm produce and exchange of goods within industry itself, the workers would have nothing to eat, many light industrial departments would not get raw material from agriculture, the peasants would have no clothes to wear and would be deprived of other manufactured goods for production and daily life, and the workers would not benefit from the products made by other workers that they need in production and daily life. If we do not have financial and bank work which directs the allocation of funds, the profits made by various

enterprises cannot become state revenue; the state would have no funds for expanding reproduction, and the workers and staff of the whole country would have nowhere to turn for their wages. Could our production develop under such circumstances? It would be impossible to keep going, let alone develop. This shows the indispensability of financial and trade work in the whole process of building socialism. In a certain sense we can compare financial and trade work to the circulation system of the body. Just as a person cannot survive without the circulation of blood, so our socialist economy cannot for a moment operate without financial and trade work and without the interflow of commodities and the allocation of funds. When exchange and allocation are organized well, production can be organized according to state plan and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results; otherwise, production cannot possibly proceed smoothly in a planned manner, and there would be waste. If we were to go on like this, we would not be able to achieve the four modernizations by the end of the century. We must drive this point home to financial and trade workers and to all people working on the economic front.

Some of our comrades fail to understand the importance of financial and trade work in the general process of social production. They do not know how to make full and correct use of the law of socialist commodity production and of the law of value to serve the large-scale planned socialist economy. This is because they have not, up till now, freed themselves from the habits of a smallholder. Before China's socialist transformation of agriculture, the overwhelming majority of the peasants were involved in small-scale production that was semi-self-contained or for the most part self-contained, and commodity production was underdeveloped. After the socialist transformation was completed, small-scale production by individual households was replaced by larger-scale production managed by people's communes with production teams as their basic accounting units. But the collectivized peasants are by and large still doing the work by hand. In our drive for the four modernizations, we are going to use the up-to-date science and technologies to transform all the departments of the national economy, including agriculture, step by step, and replace most manual or semimanual operations by highly mechanized automatic operations. This will mean a big jump in production. It will invariably require a corresponding widening of exchange. At the same time we should also expand our foreign trade, exporting more for more imports of advanced technology and equipment to speed the pace of socialist construction. But not a few of our comrades still view and organize large-scale socialist production with the mentality, habits and methods of a smallholder. Their goal in agriculture, more or less consciously, is still some kind of self-contained or semi-self-contained economy; in industry they yearn for "all-embracing complexes," on a large scale or small, so that they, the reasoning goes, will not have to look to others for help. People with such a mentality fail to see that the expansion of production requires specialization, division of labor and cooperation, and a widening of the area of exchange. They do not understand that

improved technologies and equipment, improved quality of products, increased variety and specifications, lower cost, better planned production and greater efficiency and productivity, in a word, a rapid growth of production, hinges on a greater division of labor and cooperation and widening the area of exchange. Wider exchange requires strengthened and expanded commercial and service work. But comrades whose visions are limited by a smallholder mentality often underrate or neglect the importance of commercial, service, financial and bank work, thinking that the organization of production refers only to industry and agriculture. They do not understand that modern large-scale production cannot advance without a strong commercial and service network and strong financial and bank work. A view of this kind had existed for a long time and, during the period when Lin Piao and the "gang of four" ran amuck, played into their hands and swelled viciously. Quite a few cadres are still under the influence of such a view, as are some financial and trade workers, so that they look down upon their work and become discontented with their jobs. This state of mind, which leads to underestimating and neglecting commercial and service, financial and bank work, has long been at odds with our country's planned socialist economy. The closer we advance toward the four modernizations, the more obvious this will become. Therefore, we must correct this erroneous thinking.

We must make conscious use of such means as general and selective purchasing of goods from producers, grading of products and purchase prices to give a great impetus to grain production and a diversified economy and to give vigorous assistance to the planning departments at all levels and work alongside them to help the enterprises, big and small, throughout the country to organize their production in accordance with the state requirements for variety, specifications, quality, quantity, cost and delivery time. We must, without fail, use persuasion and education among those production units which turn out products that do not meet the needs of the state, the consumer units and the people, and propose to them ways to make improvements and, when necessary, give them warnings. We must see to it that they correct the erroneous view that causes them to drive blindly for output value and that leads them to believe that once they turn something out, no matter whether it is suitable for use, the state will purchase it. The purpose is to prevent violations of the state plans, eliminate waste of fuel, electricity, raw material, equipment, manpower and funds and remove obstacles to the rapid development of the socialist economy and the carrying out of the general task for the new period.

That is the active and vigorous role that commercial work is expected to play in the realization of the four modernizations, as is financial and bank work.

Economics decides finance. Finance and banking will have a reliable material foundation when the economy, industry, agriculture and commerce are developed. But it should also be recognized that whether financial

and bank work is done correctly and effectively has a great impact on the development of the economy. Without scientific management and a strict supervision of finance and credit, the funds provided by industry, agriculture and commerce cannot be rationally pooled, distributed and used.

We should do a good job of financial and monetary management, strengthen supervision of finance and credit and improve financial work in all enterprises, communes, brigades and teams, so as to increase revenue and practice economy. There must be effective supervision of state investment in agriculture and of agricultural credit to make sure that they are used fruitfully, and real efforts must be made to help communes and their subdivisions increase both production and incomes. All enterprises must be helped to strengthen economic accounting, raise the quality of management, create more wealth and provide more profit to the state. Production enterprises must be encouraged to increase the utilization rate of equipment, reduce the depreciation of fixed assets, save raw material and other material, fuel and electricity, improve the method of per-shift quotas for workers, avoid waste of manpower, raise productivity, increase quantity of products, improve quality, reduce cost, minimize the time that funds are tied up and speed up the turnover rate. Capital construction units must strictly follow construction plans and procedures and insure the quality of projects, lower the consumption of material, raise labor productivity and shorten the construction period. Commercial enterprises must aim at speeding up the circulation of commodities, maintaining appropriate stocks and cutting down overstocking, organizing efficient transportation, minimizing damaged goods, insuring the rational use of manpower, raising the efficiency and amount of purchasing and marketing, and finding ways to lower the costs of circulation. In short, our financial and monetary management must help production grow, encourage the advanced and stimulate those lagging behind to catch up with the advanced.

When long-term state financial plans are made and the annual budget is worked out, attention should be paid to bringing into full play both central and local initiative. The localities should, besides increasing production and revenue and insuring the construction of major projects undertaken by the state, be given more funds year by year so that the provinces and counties will gradually have the necessary financial resources at their disposal. National autonomy areas may be given even more. This will enable the localities to plan more undertakings, first of all developing agriculture in a big way and then expanding industries that support farm production and light industry, with locally available raw material, and fill out the branches of commerce and service trades that serve agriculture, industry and the people's daily needs.

The economic departments should examine the economic results of the enterprises under their supervision, and financial and bank departments should also work out effective measures to develop active cooperation with the economic departments in such examination and supervision. Needless to say, state investments must not be wasted, misappropriated,

embezzled or stolen. If a state investment brings little economic results or even losses, that would be an even greater waste. Such enterprises are to shoulder certain financial responsibility for this, unless it is due to unavoidable objective reasons, so that these and other enterprises take a warning from the experience.

In the last few years, owing to the disruption by Lin Piao and the "gang of four," financial and monetary rules and regulations were abolished or ignored, financial and economic discipline was relaxed and financial institutions were weakened. In the course of rectification, all effective rules and discipline should be restored or improved. All necessary institutions should be reinstituted and strengthened. It is necessary to sum up our new experience and make improvements that suit the new conditions.

Second question: Grasp class struggle.

Class struggle is the key link in all our work. At present it means mainly the exposure and criticism of the "gang of four" in the field of finance and trade, as in other work. For over a year the gang has been fully exposed as counterrevolutionaries. They wanted to ruin the socialist system and restore capitalism in China. They deliberately opposed Chairman Mao's instruction on "pushing the national economy forward" and carried out a line of "pushing the national economy backward." They tried everywhere to incite work stoppages. As a result, the workers were not at ease at work nor the peasants at farming, and both industrial and agricultural production were stagnant or fell off. The material basis of finance and trade was therefore sabotaged. The "gang of four" also perverted the line and organizational systems of finance and trade and caused confusion in the thinking of the workers. They tampered with Chairman Mao's line in finance and trade and replaced it with a counter-revolutionary revisionist line. They negated the tremendous achievements that had been made in these fields since liberation. They usurped leadership in finance and trade in some places, spread anarchy, opposed party and government leadership in these fields and cast to the winds the rules, methods and discipline of financial and trade management which had proved effective over many years. Their sabotage meant that the state revenue plan was unfulfilled for several years running; large amounts of material and funds were tied up, and there was serious waste; foreign trade made slow headway, exports could not be sent out on schedule and the same thing happened with imports; the supply for the domestic market was inadequate; the channeling of goods was disrupted, service was poor and the practice of using the "back door" became common, arousing great dissatisfaction among the people. We should never minimize the gravity of the sabotage by the gang, nor should we slacken our struggle against them. Looking at matters on a nationwide scale, decisive victory has been won in the struggle on the financial and trade front to investigate the "gang of four." However, the movement in various departments and places is uneven. We should pay attention to the weak links in this

movement and strengthen them. We should keep deepening our criticism of the pernicious ideological and political influence of the gang on current problems in various units in finance and trade and bring that influence to an end.

It is obvious that unless we distinguish the right and wrong between our line and that of the gang, smash their factional setup, and wipe out their pernicious ideological and political influence, we cannot advance our finance and trade work, nor can we fulfill the important task the party and the state have entrusted to us. Therefore, we must grasp the key link of exposing and criticizing the "gang of four" and make this the impetus and guarantee for fulfilling our current tasks.

Class enemies and capitalist forces used the support and protection of the gang for years to exploit the shortcomings in certain links in the socialist system, our poor organization of commodity exchange and the looseness of our financial management system to speculate, embezzle and steal. Capitalism developed unchecked in some places. The movement to expose and criticize the "gang of four" is being conducted in many places side by side with the struggle against speculation and embezzlement, and real gains are being made. Quite a few criminals have been exposed, and a lot of others have of their own volition owned up and made restitution. These struggles have our approval. At the appropriate time the Central Committee will launch this struggle throughout the country. We have to warn all those who, to one degree or another, are guilty of the crimes of speculation and embezzlement and up till now have still not made a clean breast of it that they had better do so quickly. Our party's policy has always been leniency to those who own up and severity to die-hards. Whoever owns up of his own free will and makes restitution will be treated leniently. Those who refuse to come to their senses and continue their criminal activities will never be able to escape punishment by the people. The financial and trade departments should rely on the masses in the struggle against speculation, embezzlement and theft, seriously study the loopholes in various aspects of our work and take strict measures to close them, and do their utmost not to give the enemy any advantage.

Third question: Improving management of financial and trade work.

Financial and trade work is of great significance for achieving the four modernizations; at the same time we recognize that our present management of financial and trade work far from meets the requirements of the party and state. The "gang of four" did grave damage to financial and commercial work; at the same time we recognize that big efforts must be made if we want to restore our financial and trade work to its best level and on this basis raise it to a new level. Our finance and trade staff members and workers exerted themselves for years and made tremendous achievements, and we are now able to strive for the four modernizations precisely because of that hard work and the tremendous achievements in

finance and trade. This must be given its full weight. We must thoroughly repudiate all the slanders spread by the "gang of four" against our financial and commercial work. Our conference should conscientiously study and popularize the good experience of advanced units and individuals and spread this experience far and wide. At the same time we must boldly expose our shortcomings and problems so as to push our work forward. The many problems that now exist in our financial and trade work of course have external causes, but, more important, they have internal causes. This conference will lay emphasis on finding the internal causes, in particular internal causes in leadership and management work. All financial and commercial units should take advanced units as their example, pinpoint where they lag behind, sum up their experience and strive to improve the quality of their management. Advanced units should on no account become complacent; they should keep working hard and advance toward still higher goals.

Leaders of financial and commercial departments and units must gradually become specialists in the work for which they are responsible. Whoever is in charge of a commercial enterprise should become familiar with the physical properties of the goods in its line of work, their quality, specifications, varieties, production, packing, warehousing, transportation, selling, turnover time, circulating cost, marketing, price, and supply and demand, in addition to how they are purchased from producers and how they are used. They should be aware of the gap between the advanced levels in China and other countries and the level in links of the given enterprise and the measures to be taken to reach advanced levels, and of how its operations can get maximum result at minimum cost and meet the needs of consumers while insuring reasonable profit. It is a pity that many of our comrades have not done this. According to a survey made in Shanghai on bicycles, more than 2.4 million bicycles were shipped to different parts of the country each year in the last 2 years, and improper packing, transport and handling and loss of spare parts resulted in a loss of over 2 million yuan. A dozen companies in Changsha and other cities in Hunan Province responsible for the supply of means of production for agriculture last year, outside their plan, purchased from the Tientsin People's Insecticide Plant over 1,000 tons of costly and poor-quality insecticide, which they later sold at a discount with a total loss of over 1 million yuan. Due to mismanagement and going against state price policy, commercial departments in Kirin Province spent 55 million yuan in excess for the purchase of pigs last year, averaging a loss to the state of 41 yuan for each pig. Many local commercial authorities did not set up wholesale organizations on the basis of economic areas but on the basis of administrative divisions, and this caused great waste. For instance, Kaifeng Prefecture in Honan Province has a wholesale distribution center. But Kaifeng Municipality and Kaifeng County created parallel organizations in the same city; not only was manpower wasted and funds tied up, but competition for goods and the common withholding of commodities caused large quantities of goods to be detoured during shipment or even be sent back toward the point of origin.

Commercial departments in both urban and rural areas at present have more than 3 billion yuan worth of commodities in transit, tying up large quantities of goods and funds. The question of losses and waste as a result of improper management also exists in the foreign trade departments, financial and bank departments and other economic departments. It must be noted that such serious losses did not exist before but were caused by the deterioration of management as a result of the disruption by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" in the past 10 years. When the operational costs for grain and oil transactions throughout the country are restored to the previous best level, 1.3 billion yuan a year can be saved, and if the use of liquid funds by rural commercial departments is restored to the best level, 2.6 billion yuan a year can be saved. Comrades, the best level in management to which we are referring was at best a very low level and cannot meet the needs of the new situation of present socialist construction. The speedy development of the four modernizations requires that we vigorously develop new commerce and service trades, accumulate more funds and expand imports and exports greatly, and modernize commerce, the service trades, financial and bank services and management of finances and trade itself. But right now we still have to make very great efforts to restore the best level of our management. With such serious problems before us, shouldn't we redouble our efforts? Therefore, I propose that we take up improvement of management as a very important question for discussion at our conference.

Our socialist financial and trade work has accumulated a large amount of positive and negative experience, and our present task is to sum up the experience systematically so that we can do our work more consciously and reduce our blindness. We have a serious task before us. Our leading cadres at all levels need to be trained in rotation and organized to study on the job; this is even more so as regards our young staff members and workers.

The question of raising the quality of management does not exist exclusively in finance and trade but also in agriculture, industry, capital construction, communications and transport and other areas of work. This is an urgent problem that requires solution in all economic work and socialist construction as a whole and that must receive full attention from the entire party.

Four: Strengthening party leadership over financial and trade work.

All the achievements in finance and trade have been won under the leadership of the party. Finance and trade is confronted with new and gigantic tasks in the carrying out of the four modernizations. Financial and trade work must quickly be made stronger, class struggle grasped and the level of management improved. We must strengthen party leadership over financial and trade work in order to solve these problems.

How should the party organizations at all levels in various localities strengthen their leadership over financial and trade work? I think there are two important aspects: One is to grasp industry, agriculture and commerce simultaneously; the other is to grasp politics and economics at the same time, that is, to grasp the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment. I have already dealt with the question of why we must grasp industry, agriculture and commerce together. Questions of principle and important concrete problems in finance and trade must be put on the party's agenda and given prompt and real answers. Taking hold of industrial and agricultural production and construction while ignoring the rectification and development of commerce, services and financial and bank work cannot lead to the correct and effective development of production and construction. Nor can it help bring about the four modernizations and accomplishment of the general task for the new period. Chairman Mao long ago solved the question of why we should grasp politics and economics, grasp the three great revolutionary movements at the same time. Chairman Mao said: "There is absolutely no doubt about the unity of politics and economics, the unity of politics and technique. This is true now and will always be true. This is what is meant by being Red and expert... Ideological work and political work are the guarantee for accomplishing economic work and technical work, and they serve the economic base. Moreover, ideology and politics are the commander, the soul. If our ideological work and political work slacken just a little, economic work and technical work are bound to go astray." However, Lin Piao and the "gang of four" pitted politics and economics against each other and forbade people to say that politics must be embodied in specific work. This confused people's thinking. Of course, their so-called politics were the counterrevolutionary politics of the bourgeoisie and not proletarian politics. Proletarian politics can never be divorced from proletarian economics. What we should do now is to grasp economics and specific work with full confidence under the command of proletarian politics and guarantee the accomplishment of the general task for the new period.

The line, principles and policies of the party Central Committee on economic and financial and trade work must be carried out resolutely in order to strengthen political leadership over financial and trade work. We should not allow the departments in each locality to go their own way on questions of fundamental principle. At the same time, implementation of the Central Committee's line, principles and policies must be combined with the concrete situation in the departments in various localities. This requires conscientious investigation and study and concrete analysis of concrete questions instead of a mechanical copying and transmission, much like a "relay station."

The cadre question must be solved in every type of financial and trade organization at all levels, first of all in leading bodies, in order to strengthen political leadership over financial and trade work. Leading bodies must be in the hands of reliable people who are loyal to the party,

the proletariat and the people. The "gang of four's" factionalists, bourgeois embezzlers and grafters and other bad elements must not be allowed to sneak into leading organs. The three-in-one combination of old, middle-aged and young must be applied in accordance with the three fundamental principles and five requirements that Chairman Mao set forth. Leading cadres at all levels should pay attention to cultivating middle-aged and young cadres by passing on their experience to them, helping and guiding them, and training successors in a planned and selective way. The work of cadres should be reviewed and rewards and punishment made clear. All leading cadres are required to make marked advances in their work within 3 years. If they fail to do so, they should willingly turn their work over to those who are more qualified.

Ideological and political education must be strengthened among financial and trade workers and concern shown for their well-being as political leadership over financial and trade work is strengthened. They must be taught how to learn the spirit of Taching and Tachai in order to restore and carry forward in financial and trade work the fine tradition of hard work and wholehearted service to the people and correct unhealthy tendencies resulting from sabotage by Lin Piao and the "gang of four." Workers in finance and trade have a hard job to do, and some of them have difficulties in their daily life. Leading comrades at all levels must show concern for the masses and get to know their problems in good time and help solve them. The principle of "to each according to his work, and he who works more should get more" must be implemented and the life of finance and trade workers improved gradually so that they can march forward with spirit in the cause of socialist revolution and construction.

Comrades, we have started a new great Long March, a march toward the four modernizations. The financial and trade departments are the rear service department in the contingent of the Long March and must do everything to insure its victory. In every respect, conditions are far better now than at the time of the first Long March 40 years ago. During that Long March, though faced by a powerful enemy and bad conditions and material supplies, our party and army, under the correct leadership of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Chou and Commander in Chief Chu, surmounted all kinds of hardships and difficulties and defeated a fierce enemy armed to the teeth. During the current Long March the financial and trade departments must, under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, work in coordination with other fields, make full use of favorable conditions, surmount all obstacles and storm every fortress to promote and guarantee the four modernizations. Financial and trade work has made big achievements in carrying out the strategic decision of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua to grasp the key link of class struggle and run the country well. But we must not become complacent. Like the people of Taching and Tachai, we must analyze our work from the standpoint that one divides into two. While affirming our achievements, we must recognize that there are still many problems in our work and that

we have many shortcomings. Our potential is great. I hope that all you comrades present at the conference will use your brains, broaden your thinking, put your heads together to bring out good ideas, strengthen your determination and use the conference to improve our financial and trade work. The party Central Committee places high hopes on this conference. It is my belief that the comrades will not fall short of the expectations of the party Central Committee.

HEIGHTEN VIGILANCE, BE READY TO FIGHT

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[Article by Hsu Hsiang-chien]

[Text] We are greeting the glorious festive day, the anniversary of the founding of the PLA, in the excellent situation of winning significant victories in grasping the key link and running the country well.

Combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the great leader and teacher Chairman Mao blazed a new path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed force. At the critical moment of our defeat in the first revolutionary civil war, Chairman Mao and his close comrades-in-arms, Premier Chou En-lai and NPC Standing Committee Chairman Chu and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation, founded this heroic army of the proletariat and, at another critical moment in the Chinese revolution as a result of Wang Ming's erroneous line, led us in the world-shaking Long March. The victory of the Long March laid the foundation for defeating the Japanese aggressors, burying the Chiang family dynasty and founding the new China. Now the party Central Committee headed by wise leader Chairman Hua, after scoring the historical victory of smashing the "gang of four," has formulated the general task for the new period and is leading us on a new Long March. This is another monumental, world-shaking heroic undertaking. "The Red Army fears not the trials of the Long March, holding light ten thousand crags and torrents." To celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the PLA, we should make greater efforts to carry forward the glorious tradition of the then worker-peasant Red Army's Long March and advance valiantly to realize China's socialist modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology.

It should be noted that our new Long March is being carried out in an international atmosphere of great disquiet. Building our country into a modernized socialist power pleases the people but frightens our enemy. That vicious enemy who has not given up his ambition to subjugate China

will certainly resort to all possible means to undermine it, and it is possible that he might resort to war. In an incisive analysis of the international situation, Chairman Hua clearly pointed out, "The danger of a world war is a growing menace to the people of the world," and he called on us to "maintain a high level of vigilance and be prepared against a war of aggression launched by the superpowers." We must hold aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao and, under the wise leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, implement the line of the 11th National CCP Congress, the general task of the new period, and the policy and tasks of grasping the key link and running the army well and being ready to fight, as formulated by the Military Commission meeting. We must race against the enemy for time and speed, strive to do a good job in preparedness against war and always be ready to smash social imperialism and imperialism in any aggressive war they might unleash.

A question that worries the people of all countries is whether a third world war will break out. There was an interval of only 21 years between World War I and World War II. There has been no world war in the 33 years since the end of World War II, although there have been incessant small wars and local wars of a comparatively large scale. How long will this situation last? Can a new world war be averted after all? World opinion differs on this question. The Soviet revisionists allege that "detente has become a secure and irresistible course" and that "conditions exist for negating the inevitability of war," while U.S. imperialism claims that a Soviet-U.S. agreement on limiting strategic arms will avert a world war. All this is humbug. Western appeasers believe that compromising with, making concessions to and appeasing the Soviet Union will enable them to attain peace through begging. Others believe that since both the Soviet Union and the United States have nuclear weapons and each is afraid of the other, so long as the nuclear balance is not tipped war might be averted.

The Marxist viewpoint is fundamentally different. We hold that in a class society war is a phenomena between two periods of peace. War is the continuation of politics and also the continuation of peace. A new world war can only be delayed, but it is inevitable. The people of our country and the whole world cherish peace and oppose war. The longer the peaceful international environment is preserved, the better it is for the people of all countries. However, as Lenin once described it, the present remains an era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Imperialism and social imperialism exist in this world, and so long as those social systems remain unchanged, war is inevitable. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are both seeking world hegemony. Soviet social imperialism, in particular, is desperately contending for world hegemony and has become the root cause of the further sharpening of all kinds of basic contradictions in the contemporary world, as well as the root cause of the world's unrest. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are locked in a fierce struggle for hegemony, and, as a result, World War III will break out

one day. We have noted this point on a number of occasions. Is it because we like war? No, we are resolutely opposed to war. Opposition to a new world war is embodied in our nation's constitution. However, the danger of war stands out as an objective reality. By looking at it squarely and emphasizing it, we want to enable people to maintain a high state of vigilance against a new world war and strive to put off the outbreak of war. Once war breaks out, we should form the broadest possible global united front to deal a fatal blow to the one who unleashed the war.

The international situation has undergone tremendous changes in the 33 years since the war ended. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution. This has become an irresistible historical trend. U.S. imperialism has slipped rapidly from its hegemonic position in the capitalist world, while the Soviet Union has changed from a socialist country to a social imperialist country. The imperialist camp is split and disintegrated, the socialist camp no longer exists. The contention by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for world hegemony and the struggle by the world's people against them have become the center of activities in current world politics. Having scientifically analyzed the new changes in the international class struggle, Chairman Mao put forth the great "three worlds" theory, in which he defined the principal revolutionary force, the middle force that can be won over and rallied, and the principal enemy, thereby further exposing the nature of Soviet social imperialism, pointing out the danger of a new world war and charting a course for the people of the whole world in their struggle against the hegemonic powers, particularly Soviet social imperialism.

The Soviet social system has changed and so have its policies. This is reflected in its foreign relations, in which it vigorously pushes hegemonism and expansionism. The Soviet Union is an up-and-coming imperialism. While its economy is based on highly concentrated state monopoly capitalism, its economic strength is relatively weak, and thus it has to rely primarily on its military might and threats of war to engage in expansionism. The Soviet Union has set up a fascist dictatorship, thereby making it easier to militarize its entire national economy and state machinery. It has totally inherited the reactionary mantle of the old tsars while simultaneously cloaking itself in socialism. It is therefore avaricious, adventurous and deceitful in nature. With the role of the United States weakening, the hands of the Soviet Union are reaching out farther and farther, thereby becoming a source of world war far more dangerous than the United States.

The strategic goal of Soviet social imperialism is to seek world hegemony. It harbors a great ambition, namely, "the intention to seize all of Europe, Asia and Africa." Regarding the United States as its opponent, it has resorted to political, economic and military measures to engage in a fierce rivalry for world hegemony. It considers Europe a key area

for contention, and it has thus deployed more than three-fourths of its military strength in Europe proper and Eastern Europe to control Eastern Europe and pose a threat to Western Europe. Taking advantage of the slackness and weakness of the West European countries, it has stepped up its tactic of crushing them one by one. It has amassed a large number of warships in the southern and northern straits of Europe in order to encircle Western Europe. Its northern and Baltic Sea fleets constantly send fighting ships on cruises in the Atlantic Ocean, and its Black Sea Fleet often appears in the Mediterranean to display its power, in a vain attempt to cut off contact between Western Europe and the United States in wartime. To outflank Europe and subdue the West European countries without attacking them, it has made desperate efforts to contend for the Middle East, Africa and the Gulf area, seize important strategic positions, seek domination of the sea, foster and aid pro-Soviet forces, subvert sovereign states and steal energy resources. Of late the Soviet Union has even quickened its pace of aggression and expansion by hook or by crook, and in a more violent, flagrant way. In Africa it has incited one country against the other, created incidents, provoked war everywhere and sent Cuban mercenaries to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. Cuba has become the Soviet Union's satellite and accomplice, as well as a Soviet agent in wrecking the nonaligned movement. In the South Asian and Red Sea regions it has resorted to the most cruel and vicious tactics to direct and support certain pro-Soviet forces to engage in assassination and subversion and incite coups d'etat. It has even dispatched its military personnel to these regions to participate in the engineering of bloody incidents so as to facilitate its southward advance toward ice-free ports. In Southeast Asia it has encouraged and aided that Vietnamese authority which pursues regional hegemonism to provoke incidents everywhere, launch armed aggression against Kampuchea and serve as a Cuba in the East. Is there any region where a change is taking place or a disturbance is going on where the evil shadow of Soviet social imperialism does not loom? It is because of its wild attacks that the danger of a world war is obviously increasing.

To realize its ambition of seeking world hegemony by force, the Soviet Union is locked in an arms race with the United States on an unprecedented scale and at unprecedented speed. In the past few years its military expenditures have reached more than \$100 billion a year, which, added to its other expenses allocated for military purposes, accounts for 20 percent of its gross national product. The number of its troops in combat readiness has increased from 3 million to more than 4 million. In addition, it has stored nuclear weapons equivalent to some 10 billion tons of TNT, produced several dozen thousand tanks and built up an offensive naval fleet capable of fighting on the high seas. At present the Soviet Union possesses almost an equal number of strategic weapons as the United States, but its conventional weapons surpass the combined number of those possessed by the United States and the West European countries. It has therefore become a super-military power. Atomic bombs and guided missiles are not bread and butter, and aircraft,

warships, tanks and cannons cannot be regarded as goulash. They are not things you can eat or wear, and their accumulation is for no other purpose than to fight a world war. Is it for "self-defense"? Or for good appearance? The new Soviet tsars are on the back of an unbridled horse of arms expansion and war preparation, moving from post to pillar and from pillar to post. At a certain time they will itch for action. This is independent of man's will.

The Soviet Union and the United States have both taken offensive and defensive steps in their global rivalry, but the former is mainly in an offensive posture while the latter is in a defensive posture. In contending for each and every place, the Soviet Union invariably seeks to seize a piece of meat off the U.S. plate. Ambitious and covetous as it is, can the Soviet Union stop without having seized all the meat off the U.S. plate? Meanwhile, the United States is still powerful to a certain degree, but will it let the things it has already seized be stolen by others? Chairman Mao said: "The United States wants to protect its interests in the world, and the Soviet Union wants to expand; and this can in no way be changed." The contradiction between the Soviet Union and the United States is irreconcilable, and their contention is bound to continue.

Lenin had a famous saying: "The content of imperialist politics is 'world domination,' and the continuation of these politics is imperialist war." Today only the Soviet Union and the United States want to fight and are capable of fighting a world war. It will either be the Soviet Union or the United States that ignites the spark of war, and the danger comes mainly from the arctic bear. Brezhnev and his ilk have asserted that "a world war is no longer unavoidable." How can these Hitlerian lies cover up cruel reality!

A new world war is inevitable. We say this in terms of a law or a tendency and by no means indicating that war is imminent and will be fought very soon. At present both hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have their own weaknesses and problems. By nature Soviet social imperialism is weak, and its ambition far exceeds its strength. Its aggressive and expansionist activities have often met with frustration, and its global strategic plan for launching a world war is yet to be completed. Beset by growing crises, the United States is also finding the going tougher and tougher with each passing day. As long as we act in accordance with Chairman Mao's great theory of differentiating the three worlds to unite with the Third World, win over the Second World, form an extensive international united front against the two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and lay emphasis on exposing and attacking the aggressive and warlike policies pursued by Soviet social imperialism, it is possible to delay the outbreak of war.

Social imperialism and imperialism pay attention only to positions of strength. They will bully you if you are weak but be afraid of you if you are strong. To cope with their counterrevolutionary policy of strength, we must carry out a revolutionary policy of strength. Soviet social imperialism is filled with arrogance by virtue of its certain superiority in weaponry and equipment. However, it will stop and think provided the people of all countries strengthen their own defensive capabilities, make earnest efforts to insure their preparedness against war and vigorously increase their strength against wars of aggression. We will be in an advantageous position even if Soviet social imperialism becomes so mad as to provoke a war in disregard of all the consequences.

To launch a global war, social imperialism and imperialism must establish certain naval and air bases and seize and occupy certain key strategic positions in various places throughout the world. To delay the outbreak of war, we must stand on the side of the people throughout the world and make earnest efforts to disrupt the global strategic deployment of the two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union in particular. Wherever the Soviet Union is making trouble, we should help and aid the people there so that they can carry out a resolute struggle against it. We should cut off the Soviet Union's claws wherever they stretch. The more resolute the struggle we wage and the stronger our attack, the better will we be able to throw into confusion the Soviet Union's timetable for launching a war.

Appeasement is the catalyst of war. To postpone the outbreak of war it is necessary to oppose appeasement of the Soviet Union, regardless of whether it is military, political or economic. The nature of Soviet social imperialism can never change. Its methods, tactics and means of contending for hegemony may change, but not the goal of its established global strategy. If you compromise and yield to it, it will demand still more, whether you sign a so-called disarmament agreement or a so-called SALT accord. The Soviets will not be bound by it. These accords cannot maintain a so-called "nuclear balance" or "nuclear stalemate," nor can they forestall any conventional war by the USSR. The attempt to divert the threat to the Soviet Union eastward to China is to lift a rock only to drop it on one's own feet. Giving loans, grain and advanced technology to the USSR will only help it overcome its economic difficulties and increase its strategic stockpile and will not in the least control it. A fed bear will not change its cannibal nature. Why was Hitler able to initiate a war? Wasn't it because of Chamberlain, Daladier and their ilk that he became much stronger militarily and economically? Today a trend toward appeasement is prevalent in the West. It suits the needs of the Soviet Union for aggression and expansion, enhances its strategic global position, and stimulates the growth of the factors for war. By pursuing such a policy, one is sure to reap the bitter fruits of his own sowing, just like nourishing a tiger so that it becomes a source of trouble later.

The great People's Republic of China is a formidable obstacle to Soviet social imperialism's contention for world hegemony. "Soviet revisionism will never relinquish its ambition to subjugate China" and harbors inveterate hatred for China. The Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique has not only totally inherited the old tsars' policy of aggression and expansion but has gone much further. With malicious intentions Khrushchev proposed establishing a "joint fleet" and a "longwave radio station" in China, engaged in subversive activities in the Sinkiang area and raved about the so-called "yellow peril" in Western nations in an attempt to have China destroyed by other people. Even more ferocious, Brezhnev has bared all his fangs. The Soviet Union has stationed a million troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, has deployed offensive strategic weapons there, has greatly strengthened the power of its Pacific Fleet, frequently holds large-scale military exercises with the objective of invading China and has plotted to perform "surgical nuclear operations" on China, posing a direct military threat to China. It has constantly intruded into China's territorial land, waters and airspace and created a series of grave incidents, including the Chenpao Island and Tiehliekti incidents. It has mobilized all its propaganda machinery to incite anti-China hysteria. Not long ago Brezhnev personally sneaked into Siberia and the Soviet Far East to encourage the Soviet troops and issue war cries. The Soviet Union has been desperately trying to foster pro-Soviet forces, seek military bases and peddle the "Asian security system" in countries and areas around China in a wild attempt to strategically encircle China. More recently, as the Vietnamese authorities' rabid anti-China activities have seriously eroded Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Soviet Union has popped up from behind the scenes to fabricate lies, slander China and blatantly engage in incitement and agitation, fully revealing its sinister intention of encircling China in all possible ways while intruding into Southeast Asia, an area long coveted by the Soviet Union. All the actions of Soviet social imperialism are of course aimed against the United States and threaten Japan, yet it is also making increasing efforts to prepare for an aggressive war against China.

Soviet social imperialism is our chief and most dangerous enemy. We must deal with it seriously. Faced with the lofty task of strengthening socialist construction and realizing the four modernizations, the people of our country have a pressing need for a peaceful environment. However, we have never feared war and will never beg for peace. In dealing with Soviet social imperialism we will still use the old method of dealing with all reactionaries called tit for tat. Chairman Mao has taught us: "We must be prepared to deal with surprise attacks. As long as imperialists exist in the world, there will be some idiots who, in disregard of the people's opposition, will impose world war on the people. We must fully count on such a possibility." We must continue to assume that the enemy will start a war sooner than is expected. We must be prepared for a war that is bigger than expected, for a nuclear war and for the enemy's

surprise attack. We should race against time and do a good job in making every preparation for a war against aggression.

The most fundamental things in preparing well for a war against aggression are holding aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao, resolutely implementing Chairman Mao's thinking on military affairs, implementing the line of the 11th party congress and the general task for the new period, implementing the principles and tasks of grasping the key link and running the army well and of being prepared for war, as decided on by the conference of the Military Commission, firmly grasping the key link of exposing and criticizing the "gang of four," grasping the key links in army work of "it is necessary to consolidate the army" and "prepare for fighting," speeding up the achievement of our country's four modernizations, speeding up the building of our army's revolutionization and modernization, doing a good job in preparing mentally and materially for fighting, and laying a concrete foundation for fighting a people's war under modern conditions.

People's war is the core of the system of Chairman Mao's military thinking. It is a magic weapon with which to defeat the enemy and win victory and a secret master plan for overcoming the aggressors bequeathed to us by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao said: "The army and people are the foundation of victory," "the deepest roots of the power of war lie among the people," and "mobilizing the ordinary citizens of the whole country means creating a vast ocean for pulling the enemy down under the waves, creating conditions for making up for the shortcomings in weapons and other things and creating prerequisites for overcoming all difficulties in war." In the past, by relying on people's war, we have defeated powerful enemies at home and abroad; in the future we should still make full use of our country's vast land and population, superior system, rich, glorious tradition of people's war and other favorable conditions and win victory in a hard, bitter and protracted people's war.

In the future war against aggression our enemy's only superiority will be its slightly better military technology, weapons and equipment. However, its military theories are corrupt and reactionary, and the aggressive war it launches will be unjust and divorced from the people and will be fought with soldiers who are low in spirit and morale. Therefore, no matter what the quantity or quality of its weapons and equipment, their role cannot be brought into full play. The higher the degree of their modernization, the more they will depend on fuel, communications, transportation and logistics and supplies. We have a sharp weapon--Chairman Mao's most advanced thinking on military affairs--and weapons and equipment that are far better than those we had in the past. If the enemy dares to invade, we can rely on the principal armies and the local armies to wipe out large numbers of the enemy, and we can mobilize the broad masses of militiamen and people to use the enemy's weak points, strike at the enemy extensively and destroy its communications and

transportation, gas pipelines and supplies. Each of us is a fighter, every village is a bastion and every part of our land is a battlefield. No matter how many troops the enemy has, they will not be able to withstand our kind of blows and attrition. Did not those Westerners with some military foresight say: To attack socialist China is a military taboo; if one is trapped there, one can never pull out. This opinion is very incisive. The people's war has limitless power and great promise. Because of this, we are filled with confidence in victory.

Chairman Mao has pointed out: "Marxism must become further developed and should develop with practice. It should not remain stagnant. If it does and maintains old ways, it will be lifeless." The same is true for the theory of people's war, which must develop in line with historical developments. We must adhere to the basic principle of Marxism and Mao Tsetung Thought--seeking truth from facts--analyze and study the practical situation, and solve practical problems by proceeding from practical conditions. Modern war has many different characteristics compared with past wars. Our enemy has greatly changed, and we are also very different from what we were in the past. This means that we must more closely integrate Chairman Mao's thinking on people's war with the new historic conditions, conscientiously study the new characteristics and laws of people's war under modern conditions, and do a good job of making preparations in all fields.

The three-in-one system of combining the field armies, the regional armies and the militia is the best way to organize a people's war. The future war against aggression will be a large-scale people's war against an enemy who will be everywhere--in the front, in the rear, in the air, on the sea, on the ground and under the ground--and we will have all the more reason to adhere to the three-in-one system of combining the armed forces. It is not only necessary to have a people's army with modernized equipment under absolute party leadership. It is also necessary to have the cooperation of the broad masses of militiamen. If we have only a regular army without the broad masses of militiamen, we will not be able to maintain an endless supply of troops and the powerful support of the masses. No matter how powerful our field armies are, they will only be like a one-armed general. If we only have regional armies and the militia without the field armies, we will be without the main structure of a people's war. By opposing and disrupting the army and engaging in a "second armed force," Lin Piao and the "gang of four" greatly sabotaged army and militia building and the three-in-one system of combining the armed forces. While doing a good job in building the field and regional armies, we must also do a good job in providing the militia with a solid organizational, political and military base, raising militia building to a new level; and developing the broad masses of militiamen into a really powerful reserve force for the various arms and services which will be able to efficiently attack and wipe out the enemy, in cooperation with the PLA units, in time of war.

Actively defending against and luring the enemy in deep are the basic principles of our strategy for winning a future war against aggression. Chairman Mao said that if a fisherman doesn't give any bait to the fish the fish will not be caught. Resisting the enemy outside the country has never been a good method. Our country is a socialist country, and our socialist system determines that our strategic principle should be one of active defense. In dealing with aggressors we will strike at the enemy after we allow him to come in and then strategically gain mastery by striking him again. The tricks peddled by Lin Piao and the "gang of four"--such as "locking horns" with the enemy and "locking horns" with the enemy "lock, stock and barrel"--totally reflected the passive defense of resisting the enemy outside the country, a method which has long since been criticized. The situation will be reasonable and favorable for us and our struggle will be easier only if we allow the enemy to come in and then strike at him. Only by so doing can we force the enemy to scatter his forces, carry the burden on his shoulders and be encircled and trapped by all the people; only by so doing can we utilize our strong points to attack the enemy's weak points and destroy the enemy troops one after another. However, luring the enemy in deep does not mean allowing the enemy to go wherever he likes; it means forcing him to move in the direction we want, organizing a strong defense with our priorities well placed, preventing the enemy from driving deep into our areas, leading him to battlefields prepared and organized in advance, and, in accordance with actual conditions, concentrating our superior forces on wiping out the enemy troops one by one by using Chairman Mao's 10 major principles of military affairs. We must adhere to the principle of protracted war. We firmly believe that by carrying out an arduous and protracted struggle we will be able to gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, carry out a strategic counteroffensive and win final victory.

Strengthening military education and training and military science research is an important strategic task for improving fighting skills used in a people's war under modern conditions. Engels pointed out: "With only enthusiasm but without training and organization, nobody can win a war." Modern warfare places higher demands on the army and militia with regard to organizational and command abilities and tactical skills. Wielding the big stick of a "purely military viewpoint" to wantonly attack people everywhere, Lin Piao and the "gang of four" practiced out-and-out liquidationism with regard to military training and military science studies. We must raise the levels of education and training in order to reach a strategic position, increase military science studies, improve the military quality and scientific and cultural levels of cadre fighters, and run the army as a big school. It is necessary to comprehensively and accurately study and implement Chairman Mao's military thinking and conduct conscientious research on the enemy's characteristics and the laws of modern warfare. To meet the needs of actual war, it is essential to set strict standards for training and place strict demands on the army, carry out mass military training programs in an extensive,

down-to-earth way, improve the content and methods of training in light of the improvements and most recent developments in military science and techniques, and guard against formalism and championship mentality. It is imperative to use Chairman Mao's military thinking to systematically adjust and sum up our experiences in carrying out army building and combat training and in developing an advanced military science suitable to China's proletariat. It is necessary to run military academies and schools of all categories well and to train command and technical personnel who are both Red and expert and capable of carrying out modern warfare. It is essential to strengthen militia training and actively promote a mass campaign for learning military skills. By so doing we will be able to achieve an improved state of the military art with which our country's army and people can triumph over the enemy.

Acceleration of the development of national defense science and technology and the national defense industry and improvement of weapons and equipment are our material bases in increasing the strength of people's war under modern conditions. We wage just wars, and, as long as we bring the potential of available weapons and equipment into full play and make flexible use of the strategy and tactics of a people's war, we will be able to triumph over better-equipped enemies with our inferior equipment. This is our historical experience. However, in the present age in which science and technology is developing by leaps and bounds, we will be subject to attack if we do not have modernized and powerful national defense strength and do not master all the weapons as well as the tactics and methods of struggle which the enemy already possesses or may possess. We should quickly overcome the backwardness of our army's weapons and equipment, caused by the sabotage of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," and rapidly carry out a national defense modernization program simultaneously with the acceleration of national economic construction. It is also necessary to pay attention to learning from the advanced experiences of foreign countries, effectively improve the weapons and equipment of our army, navy, air force and militia and not only have modern conventional arms and sufficient ammunition but also improve the quality of atomic bombs, guided missiles and other sophisticated weaponry and equipment. If our army has high political consciousness, masters advanced military science theories and techniques, has the support of people throughout the country, and possesses modern arms and equipment, we will be greatly strengthened and will be more confident of defeating the enemy.

Building our strategic rear into a powerful, solid base area is a reliable means for carrying out people's war. In modern warfare no great differences exist between the front and the rear, and all areas affected by the war are subject to possible division and isolation. This demands that we build the vast rear area into a strategic base capable not only of supporting a protracted war but also of fighting the war independently. We must thoroughly criticize the crimes of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" in undermining our army's construction work and accelerate the revolutionization and modernization of logistics. In accordance with the

principle of integrating the army with the people and combining work during peacetime with work during wartime, we should quickly build necessary communications, medical and health facilities, oil pipelines, maintenance depots and other war-supportive projects, gradually increase our reserves of strategic materials and build a firmly complete, integrated network in a modern, well-stocked rear base.

Strengthening the building of people's air defense is a major strategic measure for saving oneself and destroying the enemy in a modern war and a development of Chairman Mao's concept of people's war under new historic conditions. In the face of the stockpiling of guided missiles and nuclear weapons by social imperialism and imperialism and their habitual surprise attacks, we must conscientiously improve the building of people's air defense so that in the event of war we can conserve our strength, minimize losses and avoid confusion, thus smoothly transforming the country from a state of peace to a state of war. Lin Piao basically ignored the work of people's air defense and "submitted it to the will of God." The "gang of four" babbled that "there is still plenty of time to carry out construction projects for people's air defense even after a war breaks out." They completely disregarded national security and public safety. In light of Chairman Mao's instruction to "dig tunnels deep" and the plans of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, we must fully mobilize the masses to persist in the principle of self-reliance and hard work. In response to the call for integrating peacetime production with preparedness against war and offense with defense, we must speed up the building of people's air defense projects with good-quality work, not only in important cities but in other cities when conditions are available and in vital localities. Future urban construction and capital construction must take into full account the strategic requirements of people's air defense. It is necessary to build our country's people's air defense system into an underground "great wall" which will provide conditions for people to live, engage in production, defend themselves, launch offensives, and carry out tunnel warfare and street fighting at the same time.

Restoring and carrying forward the fine traditions of the political and ideological work of our party and army and giving full play to the power of this work are important guarantees for winning a future war against aggression, as well as for achieving our country's socialist modernization. Political work is the lifeblood of our army, the source of its fighting capability and a decisive factor in upholding absolute party leadership over the army and preserving our army's proletarian nature. A future war against aggression will be the most fierce and most cruel war ever. Therefore, our troops will have to have a higher degree of awareness, a more heroic fighting spirit, stricter discipline, more centralized, unified purpose and closer unity and cooperation. Without powerful political work it will be impossible to meet all these requirements. Under the new historical conditions it is necessary to enable

vast numbers of commanders and fighters to always maintain a high degree of revolutionary vigilance, overcome a false sense of peace and tranquillity, and always prepare well for crushing the subversion and aggression of social imperialism and imperialism and liberating Taiwan. All this requires greater efforts in strengthening political and ideological work. We must thoroughly eliminate the pernicious influence of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" in political work, oppose any tendency to weaken this work, conscientiously grasp class struggle in the ideological field, straighten things out in every field of work, particularly by consolidating the leading bodies, and strengthen political and ideological work at the grassroots level so as to promote the fine political work traditions fostered by Chairman Mao. We must also persist in the principles of seeking truth from facts, proceeding with everything from reality and integrating theory with practice, carry out political and ideological work in all fields to achieve the general task for the new period and the various tasks in grasping the key link, running the army well and preparing to fight, and make good use of the fine traditions of political work in a modern war so that this work can play its dual role of leading all other work and guaranteeing its accomplishment. Only by so doing can we successfully put modernization in command of revolutionization, insure a socialist orientation in the development of our modernization, train more Lei Feng-type cadres and fighters, Hardbone 6th Company-type companies and leading bodies like the party committee of the 1st Air Force Flight Division, and, along with thoroughly improving the army's combat strength, fight a vigorous, awe-inspiring people's war in time of war.

Chairman Mao repeatedly stressed: "The whole party must pay great attention to war, study military affairs and prepare to fight." Stepping up war preparedness is not purely a military event but a major event for the entire party, people throughout the country and all national fronts. A powerful national defense is based on a strong national economy. Only faster development of economic construction can provide greater progress in the building of national defense, and only powerful national defense capabilities can reliably insure the motherland's security and smooth realization of the general task for the new period. The working class, poor and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary soldiers and intellectuals in our country must work hard at their posts to accelerate the realization of the four modernizations and expand our country's economic and defense strengths. In other words, they must contribute their share to stepping up war preparedness.

We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. Let the enemy who dares to launch a war of aggression against our country have a go at it. The 800 million armymen and people of our country have long been ready in their battle array. We are armed with Chairman Mao's invincible military thought. We have the wise leader Chairman Hua to serve as our supreme commander and the party Central Committee and its Military Commission headed by Chairman Hua

to correctly guide us. We have battle-tested veteran proletarian strategists and the invincible People's Liberation Army, vast numbers of militiamen and people of all nationalities who were tempered during decades of war. We have rich experience in vanquishing the enemy through people's war and fine political work traditions. We have the sympathy and support of people all over the world. No matter when and where the enemy attacks us, we will wipe him out lock, stock and barrel.

Chairman Mao pointed out: "Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation." If social imperialism and imperialism insist on imposing a new global war on the people of the world, they will spur the world's people to rise in revolution. Social imperialism and imperialism definitely cannot escape their destiny--total destruction. Socialism and communism will prevail all over the world.

TAKE UP ARMS IN A STRUGGLE FOR THE PARTY

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[Article by Cheng Tzu-hua [4453 1311 5478]]

[Text] In greeting the Army Day of the great Chinese PLA--the day commemorating the 1 August Nanchang Uprising--we deeply cherish the memory of esteemed and beloved Comrade Chou En-lai, one of the founders and leaders of our army and an outstanding leader in the Nanchang Uprising who helped Chairman Mao pioneer the proletarian revolutionary cause. We miss him so much that thoughts flood our minds. Comrade Chou En-lai was a great Marxist revolutionary and military strategist. He performed revolutionary deeds for the people that will forever be remembered. His heroic deeds and his towering image will always shine side by side with the glorious communist cause. He will have our infinite respect. His memory will never die.

During the period of the Northern Expedition, Comrade Chou En-lai stood side by side with great leader and teacher Chairman Mao in brave struggle. He resolutely safeguarded Chairman Mao's political line and military line. After Chiang Kai-shek carried out the "April 12" massacre and betrayed the revolution, Comrade Chou En-lai adhered to the correct guideline put forward by Chairman Mao effecting a land revolution and organizing a revolutionary armed force of workers and peasants. He devoted himself to organizing revolutionary armed forces. At the crucial moment when Wang Ching-wei staged a counterrevolutionary coup and Chen Tu-hsiu finally betrayed the revolution, Comrade Chou En-lai, holding high the great banner of Marxism-Leninism, came up with an emergency plan for the party Central Committee. It called for launching the Nanchang Uprising to save the revolution. The party Central Committee acted on it and appointed Comrade Chou En-lai as secretary of the front committee responsible for organizing the Nanchang Uprising. That great historical event--the world-renowned Nanchang Uprising--was a ringing opening shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries. In the form of spectacular revolutionary armed struggle, it expressed support for the Marxist-Leninist line of the party represented by Chairman Mao. Chen Tu-hsiu's right capitulationist

line was criticized. The history of our party building a people's army and launching an armed struggle of its own began at that time. Later, summing up the lessons from the failure of the great revolution, Chairman Mao profoundly pointed out: "The failure of the revolution has given us a painful lesson. We had the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising and entered a new period of building the Red Army. This was an extremely important period, requiring our party's thorough understanding of the importance of the army." ("Problems of War and Strategy") Like many revolutionaries of the older generation, Comrade Chou En-lai joined Chairman Mao in turning over a new page in this chapter of history.

Comrade Chou En-lai was the earliest leader in our party to pay attention to military problems and take up military work. His thinking on armed revolution was synonymous with Chairman Mao's thinking on armed seizure of political power. Summing up the historical experience of war and the strategic development of the Chinese revolution, Chairman Mao pointed out in 1938 that for the Chinese revolution the main form of struggle was war and the main form of organization was the army. "An important part of our political line is armed struggle." ("Introducing 'The Communist'") In the long period of the revolutionary war led by Chairman Mao, one of Comrade Chou En-lai's greatest contributions to the party was his lifelong struggle for our party organization and leading revolutionary armed forces. His struggle over 10 years of civil war pointed to his persistent effort to defend Chairman Mao's correct line and oppose Chen Tu-hsiu's right opportunist line and Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line--whether in theory or in practice. As I recall here several pieces of advice from Comrade Chou En-lai, I feel all the greater respect for him as Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and as a great proletarian revolutionary.

My First Meeting With Esteemed and Beloved Comrade Chou En-lai

A great happy event engraved on my mind was my first meeting with Comrade Chou En-lai in Shanghai in 1930. In May that year the Red Army attacked the county town of Juichang. I was wounded in battle and transferred to Shanghai for treatment. When I was almost fully recovered, the party Central Committee sent Comrade Wu Te-feng to tell me to attend a meeting of a party organization. Attending the meeting that day were six or seven persons. One, called Comrade Wu Hao, struck me as approachable and yet quiet. In a speech he told us what had happened: There were Kuomintang troops stationed at Minhang. Our comrades had infiltrated as spies. Now the party organization had been discovered by the enemy and ran the risk of being destroyed. There were two ways open to us: organizing a mutiny or arranging a quick withdrawal of our comrades. Here he stopped and turned to me, saying, "Didn't you direct the Tayeh Mutiny? Suppose we let you take charge of the Minhang mutiny?" I asked myself why this comrade knew so much about the Tayeh Mutiny and about me.

Who was he? When I returned to the hotel, Wu Te-feng asked me, "Didn't you see Chou En-lai today?" I said, "No." "Why!" said Comrade Wu. I was surprised. He reminded me: "Wu Hao, who spoke at today's meeting, was none other than Chou En-lai!" I was greatly excited. A mixed feeling of joy and surprise filled me. My only regret was that I had not paid more attention to Wu Hao at that precious moment.

Comrade Chou En-lai, an outstanding proletarian revolutionary and a great leader of the Nanchang Uprising, had long been an example we deeply cherished. He was the leader of the successful Tayeh Mutiny and a guide to us on how to carry out work among enemy troops. Anyone would gravitate toward him and crave a glimpse of his face. But I never realized that the one who gave me personal guidance was great Comrade Chou En-lai. When I learned that Comrade Chou En-lai had appeared before my very eyes, I tried to relive the scene and his teachings. His concern for the comrades of Minhang and the pains he took to plan everything down to the last detail exemplified his concern for the rest of us. I soon left Shanghai but thought the comrades of Minhang must have escaped. His closeness in feeling and thought left the deepest impression on me. How warm and sincere he had been to us!

Seize the White Army's Armed Forces in a Mutiny

Concerning work among enemy troops, Comrade Chou En-lai applied the policy of seizing armed forces to educate the party members working in the White Army. His consistent guiding thought was just as Chairman Mao later correctly summed it up: "...It is impossible to succeed in revolution in both rural and urban areas without destroying the main tool the enemy uses to fight the people, i.e., enemy troops. Therefore, apart from their elimination in war, the disintegration of their ranks is an important task." ("The Chinese Revolution and the CCP") To accomplish this task, Comrade Chou En-lai's instructions told us that we must wage a hard and tortuous struggle and must pay attention to practical work methods. Everything he said was a fundamental education to us. I began to learn something in this respect in September 1928. In the summer of that year I returned to north China after the loss of the Hailufeng base area. Through the activities of party member schoolmate Comrade Kuo Ping of the Wuhan Central Military School, I got a post as a battalion-level adjutant in an army unit commanded by Yueh Wei-chun in Chuehshancheng, Honan. The deputy commander of this battalion, its political instructor, its secretary general--Chao Pin-san--and other comrades were party members. Together we did secret party work. In this army unit our party organization gradually developed. Following the spring of 1929, party branches had been established in 14 or 15 company units with a total of more than 70 party members. A solid combat bastion had been formed.

This local warlord army was originally the II Army Corps of the Kuomintang. Martyr Liu Tien-chang was once the secretary of our party organization in this army unit. Since our party had done political work there, an

organizational foundation had been laid for our party. Most of the officers and men had come under the influence of the great revolution. This army unit was not so keen on fighting communism as other units directly under Chiang Kai-shek. It also lacked anticommunist experience. At that time we could still manage to teach the rank and file to sing revolutionary songs and to read. In the process we instilled revolutionary principles in them. Very cordial relations such as are seen between townsmen and former comrades-in-arms existed between officers and men. We could mix with them easily. We befriended them and taught them new ideas.

With the core of party leadership established, we started secret work, recruited party members, spread revolutionary ideas and united sympathizers and progressives. We were on sure ground, since party influence extended to the rank and file and to the lower-rank officers. The party organization worked under the leadership of the Central Military Commission. Acting concurrently as secretary of the Military Commission was our highly respected and beloved Comrade Chou En-lai. Comrade Nieh Jung-chen helped Comrade Chou in his work. The instructions of Comrade Chou En-lai and the Military Commission had all along guided us in studying the revolution, studying the struggle and fighting in unity.

The army unit commanded by Yueh Wei-chun was not directly under Chiang Kai-shek. It was not keen on supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had long wanted to swallow it. In the winter of 1928 Chiang transferred Yueh's unit to the area of Huaiyin, Kiangsu, for reorganization. This unit had 50,000 or 60,000 members and was reorganized as the new 1st Division. The reorganization resulted in certain old officers being discharged or demoted. Certain members of our party also were removed. The battalion to which I belonged became the 5th Company of the 2d Battalion of the 6th Regiment. Party member officers in the battalion became superfluous. Battalion commander Meng Tsung-lu was demoted to company commander. I became a platoon leader. Officers and men were ill at ease. It looked as though things would not come to a head. Our worry was: What should be done? At this time the Military Commission gave us specific guidelines. We must hold to the party's position. We were provided with everything necessary to do so. The party members were solidly united. They could exploit favorable conditions to carry out activities. They could watch for new trends in carrying their work a step further. Instances of platoon leaders being demoted to squad leaders, harsh living conditions of soldiers and lower-level officers and the failure of the dismissed veteran officers to receive discharge allowances aroused universal dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-shek. Though few in number, we were a factor and a force in disrupting the old army. We concentrated all our efforts on consolidating the party's position. This was a basic point in our persistent struggle.

To further eliminate dissidents, Chiang Kai-shek in early 1929 again transferred Yueh's unit to Nanhui, Wuchang, for "training." On the

pretext that Yueh Wei-chun was not keen on opposing Feng Yu-hsiang, Chiang relieved him of his post as division commander. Tsao Wan-shun replaced him. Tsao brought with him a large number of officers of the Whampoa Military Academy. Many veteran officers were removed. More members of our party left. Chiang Kai-shek's aim was to control this unit and put it at his disposal. Veteran officers and men were deeply dissatisfied with the high-handed methods of Chiang and Tsao and with the exclusion of and discrimination against army units other than their own. Feelings against Chiang and against Whampoa Academy officers grew rapidly among the officers and men. This new contradiction was helpful to us in deepening our party's work. But this group of Whampoa Academy students was resolute in fighting communism and had anticommunist experience. This caused many difficulties for our activities. Struggle also became more complicated. The Military Commission again taught us: We must follow the guideline of ingeniously lying low, conserve our strength, preserve the party organization, persist in doing party work, and bide our time to seize this armed force. This teaching greatly inspired us.

Yueh's unit soon went to the front, as confused fighting broke out among warlords. To start a mutiny in this unit for the sake of building the Red Army, the party organization waged a heated struggle. But due to lack of practical experience and failure to fully understand Comrade Chou En-lai's teachings, we did not achieve the expected results.

At that time Chang Fa-kuei was fighting against Chiang Kai-shek in Ichang and Shashih. Chiang Kai-shek threw the newly organized 1st Division into the battle. The 1st, 2d and 3d regiments of the division started out in advance. They moved into west Hupeh, only to be ambushed by Chang Fa-kuei's unit. They were disarmed. When the subsequent 4th, 5th and 6th regiments arrived, Chang Fa-kuei's unit had withdrawn to the south. The 4th and 5th regiments were stationed at Ichang and Shashih. The 6th Regiment remained in the county town of Tzukuei. Before their arrival the party organization had devised a plan for mutiny. The party had also decided to organize a relevant headquarters. This White Army came to fight and suffered a severe setback. This setback, coupled with the fact that the army was stationed near the Hunghu base area, provided additional favorable conditions for our starting a mutiny for the sake of building up the Red Army. The Military Commission had taken this new situation into consideration and made a resolute decision. But at the same time Wang Chun-chieh, commander of the 5th Regiment, wanted to profit from the situation to serve his own ends. His desire was to stage a coup as a veteran officer. He would break away with a force of his own. This army unit had reached a crossroads--whether to follow the road of the Red Army or continue to follow the road of the old army. Seeing the coup being prepared by Wang Chun-chieh, a responsible person of the party organization thought only of the influence Wang had exercised in the army. He was prepared to cooperate with Wang. He failed to see clearly what sort of person Wang was and to guard against this enemy. The responsible person

of the party organization unthinkingly let Wang Chun-chieh in on the idea of "staging a mutiny for the sake of building up a Red Army." The plan thus became known. Wang Chun-chieh beat us to it by starting a mutiny in Ichang. He ran away with the 4th and 5th regiments. He killed a number of Whampoa Academy officers. The responsible person of the party organization and some of our comrades also were mercilessly killed by him. Later the 6th Regiment received orders to move from Tzukuei to Ichang. When it arrived at the harbor, Chiang Kai-shek's warship "Weisheng" kept a close watch on it. All the officers and men of the 6th Regiment were taken aboard and disarmed. Only then did I learn about the Ichang incident. The forces our party had built up in the 4th and 5th regiments could have forced these two regiments or part of their forces to break away from warlord rule. But due to poor guidance this armed force was taken away by Wang Chun-chieh.

In line with the spirit of Comrade Chou En-lai's directive, our actions must be cautious and prudent. Because of lack of training in grasping and applying this directive under rapidly changing conditions, the party organization failed to start a mutiny when the time was ripe. They let a chance for victory slip away. When they did act, they lost their vigilance and played into the hands of the enemy and therefore suffered a defeat. As we recall Comrade Chou En-lai's teaching that we should guard against wavering too much, we especially sense its worth. It will remain forever engraved on our minds!

When he learned that this army unit was not under his firm rule, Chiang Kai-shek immediately carried out a thorough purge. As the 6th Regiment returned without any results from Ichang to the Hankow Bridge, it was reorganized as the independent 15th Brigade. The brigade commander was Tang Yun-shan. In starting a mutiny Wang Chun-chieh had shouted the slogan that the officers of the Whampoa Academy must be killed. He killed some of those from the Whampoa Academy. Chiang Kai-shek seized on this as an excuse and charged that Yueh's unit started out with bandits as its core and that the officers had backgrounds as bandits. He replaced all the veteran officers with students of the Whampoa Academy. The company and platoon commanders and even squad leaders were removed. At this time I was the only responsible person left in the party organization. I was left alone only because I did not reveal that I had been a student of the Wuhan Central Military School. Instead, I said I had graduated from Yen Hsi-shan's cadet corps. They thought that Yen Hsi-san was a feudal warlord. They therefore considered me politically backward and not someone with a bandit's background. They saw some value in me as far as military skills were concerned. With our party organization considerably reduced in size, the struggle became more acute. Comrade Chou En-lai's instructions told us that adhering to and consolidating the party's position at this time was more important. Only in this way could we take good care of the army unit. Therefore, we first set the party organization in order. In two battalions and three companies I got

close to company and platoon commanders by cultivating friendships. The party members among the soldiers also stepped up secret work to influence and unite sympathizers. The party organizations in other battalions of the 2d Regiment were contacted by me on a one-way basis. Comrade Pai I-chieh, a responsible person of the party organization of the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion and leader of the 4th Squad, and party member Comrade Wang Yu of the 9th Company of the 3d Battalion also worked persistently in this way. When I contacted Chao Pin-san and other comrades outside, I got through to the Central Commission. Despite several organizational changes in army units, our party's influence was growing. This was what Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Yun-shan and the Whampao Academy officers could not prevent, because they were plagued by multiple internal contradictions. We learned from mistakes. The level of our struggle was also rising. The party organization had shrunk in size but had received more training. More importantly, the party had a good mass foundation. It therefore had solid strength. We made full preparations for mounting a victorious mutiny.

The shattered independent 15th Brigade went so far as to attack the Red Army. The enemy troops had not expected that this would only be a fuse that hastened the outbreak of a mutiny. At that time the Red XII Army Corps had waged a struggle against the enemy in the areas of Tayeh and Yanghsin southeast of Hupeh. In the first part of September 1929, after the arrival of the 5th Column of the Red V Army Corps led by Comrades Ho Chang-kung and Li Tsan, an upsurge in arousing the masses in the base area was especially whipped up. By early October of that year the independent 15th Brigade ordered the 1st and 2d battalions of its 2d Regiment to head for the county town of Tayeh and Yanghsin to attack the Red Army. On learning this, I immediately contacted Chao Pin-san and other comrades. We unanimously agreed to start a mutiny. At this time the Military Commission sent Comrades Shih Chung-wei, Ko Nai-kang (Ching-shih) and Teng Kan-yuan from Shanghai to see me at Hankow. This filled me with great joy. After discussions we decided to carry out the plan to start a mutiny for the sake of building up the Red Army. Shih Chung-wei was to report to the Military Commission. Comrade Ko and others were to establish contact with the espionage committee of southeast Hupeh and the Red Army and to send people to keep in touch with me in Tayeh. I then told Comrades Pai I-chieh and Wang Yu everything about the mutiny plan. The 2d Battalion of the 2d Regiment then came to the war scene--Tayeh. The enemy placed the 1st Battalion in Yanghsin and the 3d Battalion in Tuanfeng, north of the Yangtze River.

In early December Comrade Liu Chen-shan, who was sent by the Military Commission of the party Central Committee, arrived at Tayeh and informed me of the party's decision to adopt the plan of coordinating a mutiny inside while the Red Army attacked from the outside. We then discussed the timing of the mutiny. I said that 11 December was the day of the Canton Uprising, and if the mutiny took place in Tayeh on that day, would it not commemorate the Canton Uprising? Since I had participated

in the Canton revolt as a member of the instructors group, my thoughts inevitably turned to this day. Liu said that time did not allow us to do so. After deliberations we decided to time the mutiny for midnight on 14 December. We would go into action first, and the Red Army would follow with a predawn attack on the city. After Liu Chen-shan left us to make his report, we began to prepare intensely both within and outside the party for the uprising.

Rain fell during the evening of the 14th. At 2330 I called the party members and squad leaders of the 5th Company to assemble and openly unfurled the red flag: Revolt! Join the Red Army! The first important step was to finish off the reactionary military officers. Without firing a shot, we quickly arrested the company commander, the platoon leaders and the personnel of the company headquarters. We did not take such steps against the deputy leaders of the platoons; instead, we educated and persuaded them to join us. We then aroused the soldiers of the whole company by shouting the slogan: Arise and join the Red Army! They were very excited by now. Those who were not fully awakened politically also came over to us. We used two platoons to finish off the other two companies and used two squads to capture the battalion headquarters. The 6th Company had a party organization, and the whole company fell apart when the company headquarters was taken. The 7th Company had been sent from the 1st Regiment a short while earlier, and since the party had not done any work in it, it was not finished off smoothly. Thus, fighting ensued between the enemy's battalion headquarters and the 7th Company and our mutiny forces. Because it was not feasible for us to fight such battles, I led the 5th and 6th companies in a retreat to the suburbs. The 5th Column of the Red Army attacked the city at dawn. The enemy battalion commander led the 7th Company in quick flight from the city, but the Red Army intercepted and disarmed them. The mutiny forces victoriously joined hands with the Red Army.

In Yanghsin City, Comrade Pai I-chieh also quickly went into action. When the revolt in Tayeh succeeded, he laid the groundwork for winning over the 1st and 2d companies. Unfortunately, when the reactionary company commander was executed, Comrade Pai was killed by the leader of the 1st Squad, who wanted to take his men to the mountains to become bandits. At this point the other party members led the 1st and 2d companies to the suburbs. When the personnel of the 2d Company did not see Pai I-chieh, a number of them returned to the city. Thus, part of the 1st and 2d companies, led by the party members, headed for our base area.

The victory of the revolt greatly shocked the enemy, who then quickly assembled the 1st Regiment and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Regiment and sent them to Tayeh. Comrade Wang Yu of the 9th Company was preparing for his revolt, but the enemy troops, long thinking that the 9th Company was "unstable," placed that company in the center of the county town and watched it closely. On the 24th, as the common people were telling each other about a coming attack by the Red Army, other companies in the city

prepared themselves for battle. Wang Yu took the opportunity to start a revolt with 80-90 of his men. Seeing that the odds had turned against them, the enemy troops quickly fled to Wuhan.

The Tayeh revolt was executed promptly with some certainty of success because it was coordinated with an attack from the Red Army. It was also timed to take place when the Chiang troops launched an offensive against the Red Army. The Red Army and the revolutionary flames of the base area were just outside the city of Tayeh. Motivated by the revolt on the 14th, Comrades Pai I-chieh and Wang Yu led the uprisings according to plan by using this favorable situation. The old troops who came under the influence of the revolution were led by the party, and as long as they had a reliable work basis, made no mistakes and grasped the opportunity to fight, and if they were led by a small number of strong party members, they could persuade a certain number of enemy troops to successfully stage the revolt.

With Comrade Chou En-lai's correct leadership, we conserved our strength through skillful camouflage and succeeded in forcing part of the warlord troops to leave the reactionary camp and join the Red Army. Comrade Chou used Mao Tsetung Thought to teach us to rely on party work in persuading the White troops to come to our side and in remolding them, an important revolutionary undertaking. He taught us to be brave in and good at fighting. Only by embodying in every concrete struggle a firm standpoint, a revolutionary style and strategic thinking can a communist act correctly and in accord with the party's interests. It will be recalled that in his lifelong dedication to struggle Comrade Chou was a shining example in this respect.

The army unit which staged the revolt was reorganized as the 2d Detachment of the Red Army's 5th Column, with Comrade Chen Chi as the party representative and me as the leader of the detachment. As part of the Red Army, the unit which staged the revolt bravely embarked on the journey of defending Hupeh's southeast base areas. Under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Chou and Commander in Chief Chu, this unit has since fought bravely for the Chinese people's liberation cause through a glorious fighting career of nearly 50 years. As many of its forerunners have left us, only Comrade Hsiao Ying-tang, former deputy commander of the Peking Military Region, Comrade Pai Chih-wen, vice chairman of the Hopei Provincial Committee of the CPPCC, and myself have survived. As long as I live I will continue to fight for the great cause of socialist revolution and construction.

The 25th Red Army's Successful Strategic Transfer

When I was in Juichin in June 1934 I was briefed by Comrade Chou En-lai on the situation in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas and on problems regarding the Red Army's moves. He was then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. At that time the provincial CCP committee for Hupeh,

Honan and Anhwei sent Comrade Cheng Fang-wu to report the situation to the CCP Central Committee, with a request that military cadres be assigned there. Vice Chairman Chou asked me to leave the central soviet area to work in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas.

Vice Chairman Chou was aware of the enemy's absolute superiority in these regions. Our base areas were continually reduced and fragmented because of fortifications and blockades. The enemy's defensive and offensive units were alternately employed to attack, intercept and pursue us. As a result, our base areas shrank, while rising casualties reduced the Red Army's strength. There were serious shortages of manpower and material supplies in the base areas. He pointed out that the base areas would cease to exist if the situation continued to worsen, with the Red Army facing the prospect of annihilation because of lack of reinforcements in both manpower and material supplies. As a way out, he suggested a strategic shift by the Red Army's main force, which was approved by the central authorities, to establish new base areas. This would reinforce our army and divert the enemy's main force, thereby easing the pressure on the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas. With the strength of the enemy forces around the base areas reduced, the remaining portion of our forces could hold on in the old base areas.

In discussing the problem of establishing new base areas by the Red Army's main force, Vice Chairman Chou proceeded from the basic requirements set by Chairman Mao for establishing base areas. He said that by establishing base areas in places where the enemy forces were less concentrated, our party would be able to exercise greater revolutionary influence on the masses and thus win their support. He also mentioned factors that would facilitate our army's combat operations in topographically defensible positions and those having easy access to adequate food supplies.

I listened attentively to Vice Chairman Chou's candid talk. His grasp of what could affect immediate and anticipated developments was both accurate and comprehensive. His deep concern for the people and the Red Army in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas and his sense of responsibility for the party and revolution were an immense source of strength for me. By learning and understanding things in my fighting career, I gradually realized the profound implications of Vice Chairman Chou's teachings. As a result of his strategic guidance of the Red Army operating in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas, the 25th Red Army's strategic shift was a success. This was a shining example of how Vice Chairman Chou led us to combat the "leftist" opportunist line of favoring a negative and passive defense. Vice Chairman Chou's strategic thinking was fully in accord with Chairman Mao's correct policy on the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign launched by the central base areas. Chairman Mao then proposed a strategic offensive by the Red Army's main force, a shift to our exterior lines and the enemy's interior lines thrusting directly at Chekiang in particular but embracing the vast areas of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and Kiangsi. This strategy threatened

the enemy's key areas and forced enemy troops to fall back for reinforcements. By directing our army against enemy troops in field battles and destroying them, the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" could be broken and the central revolutionary base areas protected. But "leftist" opportunists opposed Chairman Mao's correct views, which resulted in the loss of the central revolutionary base areas.

I left Juichin in June and arrived in Shanghai via Swatow, Kwangtung. I was again escorted by Comrade Shih Chien, who handled transportation arrangements for the provincial CCP committee for Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei to travel north via Wuhan. We got off the train at Liulin station. After resting a few days in a comrade's home, we resumed our journey on foot. A dozen li or so later we were ambushed and "captured" by armed men who turned out to be guards in plain clothes sent to pick us up. We stopped in the northeastern part of Hupeh in September, at the quarters of Comrade Cheng Wei-san, to wait for the return of the members of the provincial CCP committee and the 25th Red Army from northwestern Anhwei. The provincial CCP committee approved the central document and the instructions given by Vice Chairman Chou and agreed to the plan set forth in the document and embodied in the instructions. In choosing a desirable location for a new base area after taking into consideration the overall revolutionary situation, a westward shift toward the Hupeh-Honan-Shensi border region was preferred to the other three directions, i.e., east, south and north. There the three remote provinces met. These mountainous provinces were occupied by Chiang Kai-shek and Yang Hu-cheng, and the contradictions between the two could be used to our advantage. The provincial CCP committee therefore decided on the 25th Red Army's strategic shift and advance toward the Hupeh-Honan-Shensi border region. The provincial CCP committee for Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei was renamed the committee for Hupeh, Honan and Shensi, with Comrade Hsu Pao-shan remaining as secretary. I was named commander of the 25th Red Army, Hsu Hai-tung as deputy commander and Wu Huan-hsien as political commissar. In announcing these appointments the provincial CCP committee in fact doubled as the army's CCP committee in leading the 25th Red Army on the Long March to establish base areas in the Hupeh-Honan-Shensi border region. The 28th Red Army was left behind to hold onto the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas. The whole army, numbering over 2,900, began the Long March on 16 November, when our army issued a "Proclamation on the Departure of the Second Expeditionary Force of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army To Resist Japan in the North." After setting out, our army lost contact with the CCP Central Committee. Under these conditions the provincial CCP committee led the army in its advance based on the policy of advance laid down by Vice Chairman Chou. This enabled the Red Army to fulfill the role required of it.

Our army's advance toward the west alerted Chiang Kai-shek, who hurriedly deployed more than 30 regiments to intercept and attack our army in a vain bid to wipe out our forces on the Long March. The enemy troops

tried to ambush our army in three places. The first was Tungpo, the second was Tushuchen and the third was Lushih to the south, the gateway to Shensi. Our army first beat back the pursuing regiments near Loshan County, crossed the Peking-Hankow railway from Hsinyang and entered Tungpo's mountainous area.

To disguise our army's intention to move northward, we diverted the enemy westward after we crossed the Peking-Hankow railway. When our army passed Tungpo and arrived at a spot 30 li east of Huyang Town to camp, the enemy was spotted moving his 40th Army from Nanyang, Piyang, Fangcheng and other counties and the 44th Division from Laohokou west of Hupeh to the Huyang area to intercept our army. The enemy used five detachments of the "Pursue and Suppress Regiment," with the northeast army's 115th Brigade following in hot pursuit in an attempt to attack our force from the front and from the rear. We then consulted a pocket map and moved our army at night to a mountainous region northwest of Chumatien. Having thus been freed from the enemy's two-pronged squeeze, our army made a quick march to the northeast. Our army left the enemy behind once it passed Pinghsih and Piyang and reached the mountains.

Our next move was to reach the Funiu Mountains. To do so our army had to cross the Hsuchang-Nanyang highway. When the enemy discovered that our army had gone to the north, they made new moves to close the highway and to fiercely attack our army when it neared Tushu. It was very cold on that day. Suffering from hunger and the bitter cold in making a forced march through a snowstorm, our army was exhausted, yet none quit fighting. The comrades were unable to place their frozen fingers on their triggers. Waving his saber, Political Commissar Wu Huan-hsien shouted: "Follow me, communists!" He led his men in close combat with the enemy and in repeatedly charging the enemy troops. Deputy Commander Hsu Hai-tung arrived at the scene of the fighting with a regiment and joined the fierce combat to overpower the enemy and hold their position. To avoid being pursued by the enemy and risk falling into a trap, we did not stay in this position long. We crossed the highway that night in a downpour and reached the Funiu Mountains the next morning. We thus managed to leave the enemy behind. The Red Army was capable of fighting bravely and unflinchingly because its men were imbued with a sense of proletarian consciousness. They were aware of the great importance of the Long March and realized that the Red Army fought in order to realize the party's political aims and to liberate the masses and the whole nation. In the battle of Tushu our army fought under such unfavorable conditions as bad weather and flat terrain. Yet with a force of under 3,000 men we beat back the combined fierce attacks launched by several tens of thousands of enemy infantry and cavalry units. This turned the tide. The battle was crucial to the preservation of the 25th Red Army and to the successful completion of the shift. This explains why our army was in particularly high spirits after the men had crossed the vast plain in Honan and ascended the Funiu Mountains.

But the Funiu mountainous area was ringed tight with reactionary organizations and rife with fortifications of the landlords. The masses were confined behind such fortifications. The provincial CCP committee therefore decided to move toward south Shensi. However, the only approach to Shensi was closed by the 60th Division of the enemy 19th Route Army, which was holding Chuyang Pass and a narrow undefended passage at Wulichuan south of Lushih. Taking advantage of this situation, our army bypassed Lushih at night and entered Shensi through a narrow passage north of the Lo River. This thwarted the enemy's attempt to block our army's advance.

The enemy then moved two regiments of the 42d Division of the Shensi troops from Tungkuan and Huayang to Sanyaoshih to intercept our army. In the ensuing encounter we wiped out one of the enemy battalions. In taking on the enemy 60th Division in a pitched battle south of the Lo River, our army killed or wounded over 800 men. We also lost more than 200 men. Both Comrade Hsu Hai-tung and I were badly wounded in this battle. But the two successful battles finally smashed the enemy's attempts to pursue and intercept us.

From the time our army set out until 10 December, we broke the converging and fierce onslaughts of an enemy force that was numerically over 20 times larger than our army, achieved a strategic shift and successfully completed a section of the Long March. The Red Army's victory was mainly the victory of counter-"encirclement and suppression."

Another Red Area and a New Advance

The provincial CCP committee chose the convergence of Hupeh, Honan and Shensi to establish a foothold. It estimated that Chiang Kai-shek and Yang Hu-cheng would not be able to quickly redeploy their troops in order to take on our army. Thus, it took advantage of the contradictions between the Shensi troops and the Chiang army and seized the opportunity to quickly set up a base area to implement Vice Chairman Chou's glorious but formidable task. The local populace warmly hailed the Red Army, for they had previously resisted feudal exploitation and oppression, a struggle that was still going on at that time. The 4th Red Front Army and the 3d Red Army entered Szechwan by way of south Shensi in the winter of 1932. They fought there and thus sowed the seeds of revolution. A year earlier the 26th Red Army had also fought there, a mountainous region with few accessible roads but suitable for waging guerrilla warfare.

The instructions Vice Chairman Chou gave in Juichin conformed with actual conditions. They embodied Chairman Mao's strategic thinking and defined the close relationships between revolutionary armed forces, the agrarian revolution and base areas, thereby placing heavy responsibility on the Red Army. We continued to follow the only correct road for the Chinese revolution indicated by Chairman Mao, i.e., using the countryside to surround the cities before finally capturing the cities to win victory

in the revolution throughout the country. To set up base areas we first had to use the Red Army to wipe out the foundations of the KMT warlord rule in rural China and eliminate armed local self-defense corps and the reactionary government. After that our army shuttled back and forth between Lonan and Hsunhsi before advancing eastward toward Lushih and turning west to Lantien in battles to wipe out reactionary webs, widen the influence of the party and the Red Army and broadly mobilize the masses. After taking this step and after conducting investigation and study, the provincial CCP committee decided to set up base areas along the border areas of four counties in southern Shensi: Shanyang, Chenan, Hsunhsi and Hsunyang. Thus, the setting up of revolutionary base areas was preceded by armed struggles, which resulted in a new development of "the armed force of the workers and peasants being in control."

We must rely on the Red Army's victorious battles in publicizing, organizing and arming the masses and in establishing revolutionary political power. If there were no struggles in support of armed struggles and revolutionary wars, it would be impossible to set up base areas. As an armed body for fighting, our army also carried out the task of mobilizing the masses and of assigning army units and cadres to scattered areas to do local work. In correctly implementing the party's policies, they struck down the reactionary civilian corps, suppressed local tyrants, confiscated the landlords' land and assets and distributed them to poor peasants, expanded the Red Army, formed guerrilla units and other mass organizations and founded the people's government. Consequently, mass revolutionary movements engulfed the broad countryside. With the masses supporting revolutionary political power, the military, political, economic and cultural conditions were right for forming a Red area. Thus, when the KMT army attacked in January 1935, we had already established a base area foundation. This provided the Red Army with reliable backing in resisting and fighting the enemy.

The enemy was bent on "encircling and suppressing" the Red Army. The victories won by the Red Army on the battlefield were determined primarily by its ability to smash the attacks launched by enemy troops. However, mobilizing the masses and breaking "encirclement and suppression" were part of the same process for protecting and developing the base areas.

In the latter part of January Chiang Kai-shek ordered the two regiments of the 40th Army's 115th Brigade stationed in Honan to enter south Shensi. He also moved the 44th Division's 130th Brigade from Hupeh to Shangchin and Paiho and placed this unit under Yang Fu-cheng's command. With supportive actions provided by Shensi troops, "encirclement and suppression" of our army was begun. The Red Army combined mobile warfare with the guerrilla warfare of the masses to wipe out the 126th Brigade's three battalions in Chenan before proceeding with border work in the five counties north of the border region. Our army then moved to the south to seize Ningshen and Fuping. After smashing a pursuing guard

brigade, our army wiped out 5 more battalions, killed more than 200 men and captured over 400 officers below the rank of regimental commander. This cleared the way for setting up the Yanghsien-Huayang area. Our army then turned back to the east to wipe out another guard brigade of the Shensi troops. This broke the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and united scattered guerrilla bases. In the wake of this victory the Red Army seized Lonan and advanced to the east of Shanghsien. This started revolutionary struggles in the Honan-Shensi border region. To strengthen army building, the Red Army made use of free moments during fighting intervals to conduct combat training courses in Shanghsien and Lungkou. Such courses were designed to improve military skills, conduct education in current events and tasks and mobilize the masses to counter "encirclement and suppression."

In April Chiang Kai-shek moved three divisions of the 67th Army of the northeast army stationed in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border region and the 95th Division stationed in Chengchow to south Shensi. Between 32 and 34 regiments, part of the 40th Army, the 44th Division and some units of the Shensi troops were massed to spring a second "encirclement and suppression" against our army, a force over 15 times greater than ours. A terse order was issued to completely exterminate our army within 3 months. In the first half of May the 67th Army's nine regiments and the 95th Division's three regiments were moved from Lonan to the south, while the 44th Division's four regiments were moved from Hsunhsi and Shangtsin to the north. These forces were then combined to attack our army. At the same time the 40th Army's five regiments, together with the 38th Army's four regiments, two regiments of the 2d Guard Brigade and another two regiments of a special brigade were moved from the south to the north and deployed along positions extending from Ankang, Chenan and Tsoshui to Lantien to intercept and attack our forces.

Before fighting resumed we conducted education among the cadres and fighters. We followed the guiding principles that Chairman Mao had applied in the central base areas in successfully breaking the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression"--i.e., stalling the enemy before hitting him hard. The use of stalling tactics to disrupt the enemy's attack plans and hold the exhausted enemy forces at bay was accompanied by the combined application of mobile and guerrilla warfare to isolate the enemy units and wipe them out one by one. Our army first struck suddenly from the south and then entered Shanghsien and Lonan to inflict casualties on the enemy and to disarm the rest. This action changed the enemy's plan to attack us in the south. However, our army advanced rapidly to the southeast to attack the Fushui Pass and capture Ching-shanchieh, along with over 170 enemy officers and men. This drew the enemy force to the outer flank. Before the enemy was aware of our intentions, our army attacked the Chingtzu Pass from a distant point and wiped out an enemy company holding the pass. This threw the enemy force into disarray and exhausted its men. Our army then moved quickly

toward Shangnan to lure the enemy into the center of the base area. With the support of a guerrilla division, our army fought against the enemy at Yuanchiakou, completely wiping out an enemy guard brigade, killing over 300 and capturing Tang Szu-tung, a brigade commander, and more than 1,400 officers and men, besides seizing thousands of rifles. In this campaign, party and administrative organs in various localities mobilized and organized the masses and guerrilla forces. Their vacating houses and clearing the fields to make way for guerrilla warfare and encouraging people to join the army and to participate in the fighting greatly boosted the Red Army. Our victory dashed Chiang Kai-shek's wild ambition to destroy our army. After our army had smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression," Comrade Hsu Pao-shan, secretary of the provincial CCP committee, died of illness in Lungchuchai. He was succeeded as secretary by Comrade Wu Huan-hsien. To carry on where Comrade Pao-shan had left off, after burying him we continued the fighting.

Five months after the provincial CCP committee led the 25th Red Army into Shensi, a guerrilla base that offered possibilities for expansion was set up. The Red Army also grew in strength. At that time the CCP's special committees for Hupeh and Shensi and for Honan and Shensi, the work committees of five counties, as well as scores of revolutionary rural administrative structures and two county-level governments were functioning. A guerrilla force of more than 3,700 men was augmented by 6 guerrilla divisions in Hupeh and Shensi, 4 guerrilla detachments in Honan and Shensi and 2 guerrilla brigades in the Huayang area. A spectacular mass movement was on the upsurge, with "everything growing out of the barrels of guns." This is the truth of revolutionary wars. The truth also means that in fighting, the Red Army aimed at transforming society. We fought in order to transform all of China.

Comrade Chou En-lai's teachings wisely anticipated the progress of the 25th Red Army in its struggles and gains. He was closely following the emerging people's revolution and the new victories won by the Red Army movement. The victorious 25th Red Army was ready to carry out the strategic tasks for the new period--i.e., gloriously participate in defending the revolutionary center of the whole country and proceed to the front of the impending great war of resistance against Japan. To divert the enemy force from its base and to destroy it when the moment was ripe, while widening the areas for mass struggles and augmenting the Red Army's manpower and material supplies, our army assigned a guerrilla division to strike north of the Tungnan Mountain in mid-July. When the vanguard was within 20 li south of Sian, the enemy's command in that city was severely jolted. The provincial CCP committee and the Red Army were then unable to establish contact with Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee, but the latter also missed us. When our army was in Tzuwuchen, Comrade Shih Chien-min of the communications section of the provincial CCP committee bravely delivered a copy of TA KUNG PAO. All of us hailed the big news that the Central Red Army led by Chairman Mao had joined forces

with the 4th Red Front Army in west Szechwan and that the combined force was moving northward toward the Chinghai-Kansu border. This substantially changed the situation. Comrade Shih, who acted to enable our army to adopt new marching plans at appropriate moments, was later arrested by the Kuomintang and gloriously laid down his life. His death evoked our memories. The policy of the 25th Red Army at that time was to coordinate with the Red Army's main force to stall the enemy and disrupt his rear area. These efforts were also aimed at establishing contact with the Red Army in north Shensi and greeting Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee with new victories. The provincial CCP committee therefore correctly decided to leave a part of the Red Army to hold the guerrilla base so that the 25th Red Army could continue the Long March toward north Shensi. In the face of the new situation, our army moved westward and entered south Kansu after crossing the Sian-Lanchow highway. Advancing toward east Kansu, our army battled its way, attacking and seizing enemy strongpoints and cities and repulsing and wiping out the intercepting and pursuing enemy troops. In the Chingchuan battle the enemy side suffered heavy casualties, while our casualties were also high, including the loss of Comrade Wu Huan-hsien, who was esteemed by the entire Red Army. His death was meaningful, because this strategic move disrupted the enemy's rear and forced enemy troops to fight us in separate positions. This facilitated the northward advance of the Red Army's main force. Subsequently our army completed the Long March from south Shensi to north Shensi and reached Yungping in Yenchang County on 18 September 1935 to join forces with the 26th and 27th Red armies. They were later regrouped as the 15th Red Army Group, with Comrade Hsu Hai-tung as commander and Comrade Liu Chih-tan as deputy commander. I became political commissar. This army group soon joined battles in the Shensi-Kansu border region to break traitor Chiang Kai-shek's "encirclement and suppression." In the battle which took place at Laoshan south of Yen-an, our army destroyed two regiments of the northeast army's 110th Division, killed divisional commander Ho Li-chung, wiped out four battalions of the 107th Division holding Yulin Bridge south of Kanchuan and captured regimental commander Kao Fu-yuan. Our army group greeted the arrival in Wuchi Town of great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade-in-arms, Vice Chairman Chou, with this signal victory.

On arriving at Kanchuan in the latter part of October, the Central Red Army joined forces with the 15th Army Group. Under the direct command of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Chou, who personally visited the front-line, the Central Red Army, fighting alongside the 15th Army Group, conducted the Chihlo Town campaign. Before the battle began, Chairman Mao repeatedly instructed us to fight a battle of annihilation. After our army had wiped out the greater part of the 109th Division, the Central Red Army went after the fleeing enemy near the Heishui Temple, while the enemy's divisional commander and his remnants held a fortified village. Before dusk, Vice Chairman Chou came to our position. He joined us in examining the topography of the fortified village, predicted that the enemy would flee and instructed us to destroy the enemy force on

the move. Our army attacked in the evening. In fleeing the remnants of the enemy force were completely routed by our pursuing army. This battle annihilated the entire 109th Division and a regiment of the 106th Division, completely smashing the KMT army's third siege of the Shensi-Kansu border region. The Chihlo Town campaign served as a foundation for the CCP Central Committee to set the task of placing the revolutionary seat of the whole country in the northwest. To the rejoicing of the people the Chinese revolution had entered a great new period, auguring well for a bright future.

Meeting Vice Chairman Chou in the north Shensi highland, I was full of emotions. We waited for him to inspect the Red Army, but our esteem for him went beyond that. It was he, as everybody knows, who assisted Chairman Mao in planning and promoting the great liberation cause of the people. It was he who contributed immensely with his remarkable fortitude and leadership. When the revolutionary flames were raging, he encouraged us with his unyielding resolve, his noble qualities and selfless labor, his sincerity toward the fighters and his devotion to the party, to Chairman Mao and to the people. Vice Chairman Chou told me why he had assigned me to the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border area in the preceding summer. It was that part of the force which took part in the Tayeh revolt that had been merged with the Red Army operating in southeast Hupeh as the 15th Red Army. The men of this part of the Red Army operating in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border region had fought alongside me. His candidness toward cadres, as I recall it after more than 40 years, is deeply touching even to this day.

The 25th Red Army grew in strength from 2,980 or so at the outset to more than 4,000, and its qualities and fighting power were improved. One battalion and the wounded left in the guerrilla base in the Hupeh-Honan-Shensi border region were regrouped as the 74th Division. Led by Comrade Cheng Wei-san, that division held out and conducted guerrilla warfare in the base area. By the end of 1936 it had wiped out more than 2,000 enemy troops and had grown in strength to more than 1,700 men. The 28th Red Army was led by Comrade Kao Ching-ting. It persisted in guerrilla warfare for 3 years amid extremely harsh conditions and succeeded in keeping the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base area intact. During the war of resistance against Japan the 28th Red Army became a detachment of the New 4th Army. By following the correct path, carrying out the political tasks of the revolution and opening up and building revolutionary base areas, these Red armies grew in strength in heroic fighting and advanced in triumph toward a new national and revolutionary upsurge. This clearly defined strategic policy was formulated by Vice Chairman Chou in 1934 for the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base areas on the basis of Chairman Mao's great strategic thinking. It was the result of the heroic struggles of the vast number of commanders and fighters and the masses. This achievement serves as a forceful rebuttal of the erroneous Wang Ming line and was a great victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Chairman Mao's thinking and line, Comrade Chou En-lai's teachings and the Red Army's

indomitable fighting spirit are indestructible. Chairman Mao's great banner, Premier Chou's great image and the Red Army's glorious record of fighting will always be interwoven in the depths of my mind. Premier Chou's unbounded loyalty to the party, to Chairman Mao and to the people will always be a shining example for us to follow.

Carrying out Chairman Mao's behests, wise leader Chairman Hua has brought down the "gang of four." He is leading 800 million brave people and taking our great nation into a bright and promising period of development. Under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, we will carry out the behests of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou and turn China into a modern and powerful socialist country. The people of our country are bravely fighting to realize the general task for the new period and striving to bring great order throughout the land to the great rejoicings of the masses. What we have achieved so far and what we will achieve in the future, made possible by the party and the people, are of great consolation to Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, NPC Chairman Chu and proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation. In following Chairman Hua in continuing the new Long March, we must redouble our efforts in carrying forward the revolutionary spirit of the Long March of the past. We must seize the day and the hour, study assiduously, work ceaselessly and fight continuously. The grand plan embodies our nation's bright future. Chairman Mao's great banner will wave forever!

OUR GOOD DIRECTOR COMRADE LO JUNG-HUAN OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

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[Article by the theoretical study group of the General Political Department of the PLA]

[Text] At the recent Army Political Work Conference our esteemed and beloved Vice Chairman Yeh pointed out: "Comrade Lo Jung-huan made important contributions to our army political work. He was a good director of the General Political Department as well as an example for us to learn from." Learning from Comrade Lo Jung-huan's brilliant achievements is of great importance in comprehensively and correctly understanding Chairman Mao's theory and instructions on political work, in displaying the fine traditions of political work under the new historical conditions, in increasing our army's fighting strength and in realizing the general task for the new period set by the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan was the student and close comrade-in-arms of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao. He was also a great fighter for the Chinese people, an outstanding proletarian revolutionary, our party's military expert and one of the excellent leaders of our army. He held aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao, faithfully followed Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and made outstanding contributions to our country's new democratic revolution, socialist revolution and construction and to building and developing our party's proletarian army, especially in our army's political work. He had a firm and clear-cut stand and a Red heart of complete dedication. He was open, aboveboard and brave, struggled hard, sought truth from facts, maintained ties with the masses, and devoted his whole life to the cause of communism. He was respected and loved by the whole party, the army and the people of the entire country.

During his entire revolutionary life Comrade Lo Jung-huan devoted most of his time and energy to our army's political work. During the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the early period of our army's growth, he took part in the reorganization of our army at Sanwan and in the Kutien conference

under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao. In both his first post of company party representative and his later post of director of the General Political Department, he always followed Chairman Mao's concept of army building and constantly improved and developed our army's political work in the course of practice. He embodied the fine qualities, traditions and workstyle of our army's political work.

1. Comrade Lo Jung-huan persistently stood on the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. He struggled indomitably against the "left" and right opportunist lines and the bourgeois military line regardless of the situation--during the revolutionary war years, during the period of socialist revolution and construction, and during the struggle between the two lines within the party. After Comrade Lo Jung-huan died, Chairman Mao said at a conference of the Standing Committee of the party Central Committee Politburo: Comrade Lo Jung-huan has died. It is not easy for a person to be loyal to the party for scores of years on end! This was our great leader's high evaluation of Comrade Lo Jung-huan.

Our army entered a new period of development after winning nationwide victory. During the early 1950's a fierce struggle developed in our army between the two military lines. The fundamental problem underlying this struggle was whether or not the party should exercise absolute leadership over the army, persistently follow our political work system, and inherit and carry forward our army's glorious traditions. Kao Kang preached the "army party theory," opposed the principle that the "party should command the gun," and denied the party's absolute leadership over the army. Peng Te-huai copied foreign things mechanically and, on the pretext of developing a modern and regular army, did his best to promote the single-leadership system in order to eliminate political commissars and turn army party committees into party affairs committees which merely had charge of specific jobs within the party, and he tried to turn the army's political organs into clubs like those in foreign armies. This was a vain attempt to weaken and do away with the party's absolute leadership over the army and revolutionary political work. In the light of Kao Kang's and Peng Te-huai's fallacies, Comrade Lo Jung-huan frequently taught cadres that the question of maintaining the party's leadership and revolutionary political work had always been a fundamental problem involving a struggle between the two military lines; that only when we maintain party leadership and revolutionary political work can we truly have a people's army; and that if we had not maintained party leadership and political work, our army would have lost its soul and become no different from the Kuomintang army, and there would not have been a people's army.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan struggled fiercely against Peng Te-huai. In August 1953 in Peitaiho he criticized Peng Te-huai to his face for preaching the fallacy of the necessity of carrying out the single-leadership system and for weakening political work, and he asked him: "Doesn't your way negate Chairman Mao's political work and the political commissar

system he created during the Chingkangshan period? Doesn't your way negate the party's absolute leadership over the army advocated by Chairman Mao?" In addition, he penetratingly pointed out that practicing the single-leadership system meant negating Chairman Mao's line on army building. Comrade Lo Jung-huan personally reported to Chairman Mao: "There is a crisis in political work, but we should not throw away our army's glorious traditions." Chairman Mao completely agreed with and supported Comrade Lo Jung-huan's opinion and instructed that it was still necessary to practice the double-leadership system, persist in the system of division of responsibility between chiefs under the unified collective leadership of party committees, follow the political work and political commissar system, and display the fine traditions of our party and army. In 1954, under the leadership of Comrade Lo Jung-huan, the "Chinese PLA Political Work Regulations," which systematically summed up our army's experience in developing political work and which further stressed party leadership and the political work and political commissar system, were formulated. Chairman Mao approved these "regulations" and reaffirmed that "the CCP's political work in the Chinese PLA is our army's lifeblood." This fully confirmed the position and role of our army's political work and forcefully repulsed Peng Te-huai's vain attempt to weaken and do away with our party's leadership and political work. In August 1955, in his article "Continue To Carry Forward Our Army's Glorious Traditions," Comrade Lo Jung-huan sharply pointed out: "Certain forces now exist in our army which are trying to weaken its glorious traditions, and these forces are growing. This is a dangerous tendency." He stressed that our army's glorious traditions "not only were needed in the past but are all the more necessary in the modernization of our army."

After usurping authority over the daily work of the Military Commission, Lin Piao, a fake leftist but a real rightist, made frenzied efforts to sabotage army building and army political work. This was really a very serious struggle. From the very beginning, Comrade Lo Jung-huan rejected and struggled against Lin Piao's wrongdoings. During the liberation war, Comrade Lo Jung-huan resolutely struggled against Lin Piao's right opportunism in accordance with Chairman Mao's instruction on "establishing and consolidating the northeast China base area." During the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, he again carried out a tit-for-tat struggle against Lin Piao's wrongdoings, which ran counter to Chairman Mao's war guidelines. During the early 1960's, Lin Piao, a counterrevolutionary doubledealer, nonsensically said that political ideas could replace everything, as if he attached special significance to politics. He even confused politics with military affairs and did everything possible to promote bourgeois politics. He consequently damaged military operations and proletarian politics. In his struggle against Lin Piao's fallacies, Comrade Lo Jung-huan explicitly defined the dialectical relationships between politics and military affairs and between professional knowledge and technical know-how on the basis of Chairman Mao's teachings. In a September 1961 speech at a political education conference of all military academies, he pointed out: Politics must be combined with a

variety of concrete practices. Being Red is mainly a question of orientation. In other words, anyone who is Red must have proletarian consciousness. Those who are Red must lead professional work, insure the implementation of various projects by experts, and meet their demands. In November 1961 he further pointed out at an all-army political work conference: It is necessary to "put politics in command and place Mao Tsetung Thought in the lead." "Anyone who is Red must have professional knowledge. Without professional knowledge he can do nothing."

Lin Piao undermined the fundamental Marxist principle and revolutionary study style of integrating theory with practice, prevented people from comprehensively and systematically studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, and encouraged them to take shortcuts in studying, to seek quick results from learning, to memorize only the "three constantly read articles" and individual phrases and to seek readily available answers to certain questions from these articles. While opposing these very harmful practices, Comrade Lo Jung-huan stressed the need to systematically and practically study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in order to know its spirit and essence and understand its stand, viewpoint and method, which can serve as a guide to action. He said: "Mao Tsetung Thought resulted from a systematic summation of experiences of various revolutionary periods. Only by repeatedly studying it can we comprehend it. Can a youngster who is not exposed to revolutionary practice get quick results from study? Nothing can be so simple." Comrade Lo Jung-huan once personally told Lin Piao: "Since Chairman Mao has written so many works, we must study them systematically. It is insufficient to select merely his three articles for study, namely, 'Serve the People,' 'In Memory of Norman Bethune' and 'The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains.'" On several occasions he called this a philistine approach to the study of Mao Tsetung Thought.

Disputes also existed between Comrade Lo Jung-huan and Lin Piao over the handling of matters concerning the army and local governments. During the difficult 3-year economic period, army cadres and fighters called the attention of the higher authorities to some problems stemming from the prevalence of the "communist wind." In this connection, Comrade Lo Jung-huan suggested that party committees of army units and government organizations be authorized to collect and present these problems for consideration by local party committees. He said: "On the one hand this approach would provide an opportunity to listen to the voice of the masses, and on the other it would help local governments to quickly learn what was really going on in their areas and correct mistakes. This is an approach which would result in strengthening army-people unity and benefit the party and people." But Lin Piao rejected this correct recommendation and attacked it as a measure to undermine unity between the army and local government and the people. For this reason he persistently refused to make these problems known to local party committees.

Harboring bitter hatred for Comrade Lo Jung-huan and spreading the word that Comrade Lo Jung-huan did everything contrary to his wishes, Lin Piao said viciously: "Lin (Piao) and Lo (Jung-huan) will split. Lin and Lo have never worked in harmony." In 1963 Comrade Lo Jung-huan died of illness. However, in 1967 Lin Piao still did not forget to send one of his sworn followers to the General Political Department to wildly attack and slander Comrade Lo Jung-huan by name. To give vent to his bitter hatred against Comrade Lo Jung-huan, he raved that opposition to Lin Piao's guiding principles for study meant opposition to Mao Tsetung Thought. Later Lin Piao used various excuses to persecute the family of Comrade Lo Jung-huan.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan's life was devoted to faithfully implementing and resolutely defending Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. "In my life I have done at least one thing right, that is, to closely follow Chairman Mao." This deathbed statement by Comrade Lo Jung-huan reflected the lofty quality of a proletarian revolutionary fighter.

2. Comrade Lo Jung-huan consistently upheld the principle of integrating theory with practice and applied Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought to command and guide the revolutionization and modernization of our army.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan fervently and correctly propagated Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. While propagating Marxism-Leninism he made great efforts to propagate Mao Tsetung Thought, which integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. As early as July 1941, in his article "Study Comrade Mao Tsetung's Thinking," he criticized Wang Ming and his ilk for smearing Mao Tsetung Thought, pointing out that Mao Tsetung Thought is the development of Marxism-Leninism through revolutionary practice and is contrary to dogmatism. After the founding of our country, in the light of some people's fallacies that Chairman Mao's works cannot be considered canonical works, he repeatedly pointed out that Marxism-Leninism must continue to surge forward with the development of history and that the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are canonical works as are Chairman Mao's. He objected to the idea that studying Chairman Mao's works means opposition to Marxism.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan persisted in using Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought to arm all the army's fighters and regarded this as the most important part of political work. He always stressed the importance of studying the works of Marx, Lenin and Chairman Mao. He always carried books wherever he went and never stopped studying even when he was very busy. He persisted in studying when he was being carried on a stretcher during the war years and when he was lying in bed after the founding of our country. He was the first person to suggest that all soldiers read all of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung." He set a personal example by going over the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" four times while recuperating from an illness. In September 1963, before he was

hospitalized for a serious illness, he still patiently urged all cadres of the General Political Department to read all of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung." In addition, he proposed the "one thread and five-in-one combination" method of study on the basis of the study experience of PLA unit and military school cadres and of his own experience. The "one thread" meant that one should take party history as the thread of his thought while reading Chairman Mao's works. He held that if one studied this way one would understand how Chairman Mao integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution in different periods, how Chairman Mao's revolutionary line fought against the "left" and right opportunist lines and how Chairman Mao made great contributions to the Chinese revolution. The "five-in-one combination" meant the combination of study of Chairman Mao's works with selective study of the major works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the combination of study of Chairman Mao's works with study of the party's line, policies and resolutions, the combination of study of Chairman Mao's works with the current domestic and international situation and army building, the combination of study of all of Chairman Mao's works and study of special subjects, and the combination of regular theoretical education with political movements.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan paid close attention to our army's ideological revolutionization and used Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought to continuously solve the new ideological problems emerging after the army entered a peaceful environment. First of all, he firmly grasped the struggle against bourgeois ideas. After the nationwide victory a number of cadres were unable to resist the attack of sugar-coated bullets by the bourgeoisie. They engaged in bourgeois individualism; they were arrogant because of their meritorious service. They compared each other's qualifications, position and pay and only sought pleasure. Some of them even violated law and discipline and became degenerate. In the spirit of Chairman Mao's report at the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee, Comrade Lo Jung-huan continuously focused on education work aimed at maintaining the true nature of the proletarian army, firmly grasped and seriously dealt with individual problems and important examples, issued directives and circulars, and launched a struggle against bourgeois corruption. He constantly advised cadres: The degeneration of our daily life sets the foundation for revisionism. If cadres are influenced by the corrupt, bourgeois style of living and pay no attention to correcting and criticizing this lifestyle, this will lead to political corruption and deterioration. He pointed out: A large number of our cadres came from families of the petit bourgeoisie and were often more or less influenced by individualism. This individualism would develop if no attention were paid to it, and whoever was seriously influenced by it would lose his bearings amid the great storms and waves of class struggle. Comrade Lo Jung-huan particularly stressed that it is essential to maintain the workstyle of plain living and hard struggle and to develop the glorious tradition of uniting the army with the people and uniting the officers with the men, in view of the fact that during the

war, after the army moved into the barracks, its ties with the masses were not as close as before, and, after a wage system was adopted, the pay of the cadres and the fighters varied greatly. He insisted that cadres should not be highly paid. He said on several occasions: We are a people's army. Cadres' living allowances and pay should not be too high, because this will alienate them from the masses and from the fighters. If the army does not maintain the workstyle of plain living and hard struggle in peacetime, it will be unable to sustain the challenge of a cruel war. To cope with pacifism and lack of vigilance among the troops, he repeatedly stressed that it is essential to establish the thinking that the army is always a fighting force, stressed that the army should follow the concept of preparing for war, and pointed out that it is essential to heighten vigilance, do a good job in training and be prepared against external imperialist aggression and against troubles stirred up by enemies at home. In the several political movements under Comrade Lo Jung-huan's leadership, the General Political Department issued timely directives, prepared outlines and teaching materials, firmly grasped education for the PLA units, overcame all erroneous ideas that ran against the party's line, policies and principles, and insured that the cadres and fighters resolutely took the road to socialism. After the Soviet Union turned revisionist, Comrade Lo Jung-huan, in adherence to Chairman Mao's instruction, stressed that it is essential to grasp well education in opposing and preventing revisionism, and he criticized the erroneous concept of grasping anti-imperialist education and ignoring antirevisionist education.

While grasping the army's revolutionization, Comrade Lo Jung-huan also paid close attention to its modernization. Since the great majority of our army's cadres and fighters came from the families of workers and peasants and their cultural levels were relatively low, it was essential to enhance their cultural and scientific levels if modernization was to be considered. This was a matter of strategic significance. In the early period after the founding of the PRC, Comrade Lo Jung-huan repeatedly pointed out: To build a modern army, a powerful air force and navy and other special forces, it is essential to enhance the troops' military skills and cultural and scientific levels. Under his leadership, the General Political Department drafted for the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission the "Directive on Enforcing the Cultural Education of the Troops." Chairman Mao personally revised and approved the directive in August 1950. The directive mentions the task of "enhancing the cultural, scientific and technical levels of all commanders and fighters and training a large number of intellectuals from among those in the army who come from families of workers and peasants." The directive contains "a standard educational principle of emphasizing quick learning and linking study with practice," stipulates the amount of time for military training, political education and cultural education, and also stipulates the running of primary and middle schools for cadres where methods of quick learning are taught. After the publication of the directive, the whole army promptly and enthusiastically launched a

cultural march, and its commanders and fighters continued to enhance their cultural and scientific levels, thus setting the foundation for mastering modern military skills.

In revolutionizing and modernizing our army, we are confronted with the question of how to learn from other countries' experiences. Should we adopt the dogmatic method of mechanically copying everything from other countries, or should we establish our own foundation and analytically and critically learn from other countries? These are two diametrically opposed attitudes. Holding that everything foreign is good, Peng Te-huai called for learning from everything foreign just as it is. Comrade Lo Jung-huan opposed such a dogmatic attitude by pointing out: We should be discriminating in learning from other countries and should not mechanically copy everything from them. We should learn from them what is really good and useful and apply it according to our actual conditions. However, not everything foreign is good. Not only should we not learn from anything which runs counter to our glorious traditions, but we should criticize it.

Acting according to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and proceeding from reality, Comrade Lo Jung-huan always tried to solve problems in a practical manner. This was one of his remarkable characteristics from which we should learn.

3. Comrade Lo Jung-huan resolutely implemented Chairman Mao's line and policy on cadres, united cadres working in various fields and worked together with them.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan served as director of the General Political Department and concurrently as director of the General Cadre Department in the 1950's. He persisted in the policy of appointing people on merit, no matter where they came from. He bitterly hated the phenomenon of appointing people because of favoritism, building mountain strongholds and organizing factions. He treated all cadres equally, no matter which area or unit they came from or whether they were close to him. He was broad-minded and able to unite not only with those who held the same views as his but also with those whose views were different. He never bore a grudge against those who opposed him. He resolutely opposed "the change of ministers with a new emperor ascending the throne." He said: "If a leader's decision on appointing a cadre is based on whether he knows the cadre, he cannot accept and employ large numbers of cadres. In that case he can only confine the employment of cadres to his small group of acquaintances. When he is transferred to a new job he will want to take all his acquaintances along. This will result in an individualist tendency in implementing cadre policy."

Comrade Lo Jung-huan paid attention to uniting not only with veteran cadres and worker-peasant cadres but also with new cadres and intellectual cadres. He said: "We should take account of veteran cadres as well as new cadres." "We should pay attention to the new forces, and this is

a question involving orientation." During the war Comrade Lo Jung-huan instructed young cadres by words and deeds and trained them to lead troops, to direct marches and to do political work. He let young cadres temper themselves in the complicated struggle, boldly promoted them to important positions and encouraged them to do their work bravely and not to be afraid to trip and fall. Many of the young cadres led and trained by him have become senior cadres. Many comrades said that Comrade Lo Jung-huan was a model in training successors for the revolutionary cause. Comrade Lo Jung-huan paid close attention to uniting with, educating and remolding intellectual cadres. He instructed them to go to work among workers and peasants in order to identify themselves with them. In 1962 some people indiscriminately described intellectuals working in academies, schools and research institutes of the army as bourgeois intellectuals. After learning of this he sternly refuted it by saying: These are select cadres, and some of them have been admitted to the party. Why should they be described as bourgeois intellectuals? Is this aimed at uniting them or at making them feel uneasy? These remarks by Comrade Lo Jung-huan were designed to correct an erroneous tendency at that time. When they are applied to the present they constitute a powerful criticism of the crimes of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" in undermining the party's policy on intellectuals and in hitting hard at and persecuting scientists and technicians.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan got along easily with people and treated everybody equally. Therefore, cadres liked to talk to him and opened their minds to him. Many comrades said: "Comrade Lo Jung-huan's home is the home of cadres." In chatting with him, cadres talked freely and did not care if they said something wrong. He accepted positive as well as negative opinions and listened patiently to the opinions of some backward cadres. When he listened to someone's opinion, he never interrupted him and gave him correct guidance if he said something wrong. He gave well-intentioned criticism and assistance and never labeled and bludgeoned people. He often said: "Now that we have entered the city, we must pay keen attention to getting close to and maintaining contacts with the masses. We must warmly receive cadres at lower levels who come to see us, because it is not easy for them to call on us." He instructed his staff: "If people call on me, don't turn them away. Let them see me promptly." Once a cadre telephoned him and wanted to come to see him. It was already late in the day. Taking his health into consideration, his staff told the cadre to come the next day. On hearing this the next day, Comrade Lo Jung-huan said critically: "This is no good. In the past, when we fought a guerrilla war in the mountains, people could come to see us whenever they wanted to. Why not now? Is it because I am ill? Let them come to see me and talk as much as my health permits. If I cannot talk, just let them see me." At first he worked at the General Political Department. Later, when he became sick, he worked at home. Cadres of the General Political Department who went for instructions or to report on their work could freely enter his office. Sometimes he talked to cadres from his bed. When he was gravely ill the doctor repeatedly

turned down his visitors, but he still wanted to see them. Even at his last moment he was worried because he had not yet talked to a leading cadre whose job had been changed shortly before. When this leading cadre came to see him, he said cheerfully: "I thought of you a few days ago. Why didn't you come talk to me?"

Comrade Lo Jung-huan made strict demands on cadres' political thinking and never compromised on questions of principle. He said: "Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping has said: 'As the ruling party we must make strict demands on party cadres. Sloppiness is not permitted.'" Shortly after liberation he sternly criticized some fickle cadres who wanted to get divorces and some who sought higher positions and salaries. When he criticized people he tried to convince them with reasoning and, using the principle of dividing one into two, gradually and patiently educated them and gave them guidance. He said: "A sonorous drum does not need heavy drumsticks," and "The best way to criticize and educate cadres is to encourage them to criticize themselves. In order words, external causes become operative through internal causes." Comrade Lo Jung-huan never discriminated against comrades who had made mistakes and, having no prejudice against them, tried to win them over if he could. He never suppressed these comrades. He said: "When a cadre makes mistakes he needs assistance from leaders and comrades the most. Leaders must especially show warm concern for him." Comrade Lo Jung-huan once returned to Peking from a trip not feeling well. A leading cadre who had made mistakes telephoned him and wanted to see him. Comrade Lo Jung-huan went to see this leading cadre before the cadre came to see him, thus deeply moving this leading cadre.

As for those individuals who broke laws, violated discipline and refused to correct their mistakes after repeated education, Comrade Lo Jung-huan called for severe punishment of them regardless of their position and seniority. In the early 1960's a senior cadre broke laws, violated discipline and refused to correct his mistakes after repeated education. Some comrades disagreed with the General Political Department's decision to give him severe punishment. Acting against this erroneous opinion, Comrade Lo Jung-huan upheld the party's principle and took disciplinary action against this cadre. He said: "If we do not uphold the principle and punish those who should be punished, we are not protecting cadres but destroying them."

Comrade Lo Jung-huan not only looked after cadres politically and ideologically but also cared for them in every conceivable way. When cadres were wounded he would comfort them, and when they fell ill he would personally voice his concern. If they encountered difficult problems, he would seek every possible means to help solve them. He often volunteered to take care of the sons and daughters of cadres who went to the war front. While meeting with aging unmarried cadres, he would ask: Why did you insist on being a bachelor? Did you need any help from the party organizations? When a cadre died he always directed

his staff to take good care of his family. Comrade Lo Jung-huan once presented sunglasses to a cadre plagued by eye disease. That comrade still treasures this gift from Comrade Lo Jung-huan.

"Regard the Masses as Intimate Friends and View Cadres as Close Relatives." This poem, in memory of Comrade Lo Jung-huan, precisely reflects the heartfelt admiration of all comrades for him.

4. Comrade Lo Jung-huan's contributions to our army's political work and political organs were numerous. One of his important contributions was his proposal for establishing the powerful, prestigious General Political Department in our army.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan first concentrated his efforts on building various organs of the General Political Department as well-organized units. On the day of the founding of new China, the General Political Department was staffed by only a few people. He clearly directed that deputy directors of the General Political Department and its section chiefs and office heads and cadres must be selected from various front armies, field armies and services. In his opinion, only in this way could cadres who knew field troops well work in harmony. He once personally met with departments concerned to study measures for appointing cadres to leading groups at all levels of the General Political Department. Under his leadership, several hundred outstanding, politically and ideologically sound and capable cadres with correct workstyles and practical experiences were eventually appointed to the General Political Department on a continuing basis and later contributed to laying a fine foundation for it.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan stressed that the General Political Department's primary task was to insure the thorough implementation of the party's line, principles and policies in the army. He thoroughly implemented the instructions of the party Central Committee and its Military Commission, dared to keep in touch with reality and was good at doing this. He never copied or transmitted anything as received. He often said: "To implement the party's principles and policies requires that we consider the actual situation. Only by so doing can we make the party's principles and policy effectively bear fruit." He resolutely opposed the workstyle of encouraging people to copy everything they received for transmission to the lower-level units. On the basis of the instructions of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee and the special requirements of the peacetime army, he inherited and carried forward the fine tradition of political work done during revolutionary war. In this way he issued many important instructions in various areas of political work.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan attached great importance to party building in the peacetime army units. In the early 1950's many new problems appeared in company building. How should these problems be solved? Comrade Lo

Jung-huan stressed the necessity of strengthening party building in companies and consolidating the company party branches extensively and step by step. In the early 1960's Lin Piao, having ulterior motives, preached "taking the four goods as the key link" and ordered that all tasks in the army units center on the "four goods" and that the "four goods" be used to replace party building. In view of this situation, Comrade Lo Jung-huan repeatedly stressed the necessity of strengthening party work and pointed out that party building was an important task and should be grasped regularly. In addition, he put forward a series of concrete measures on strengthening party building. He put special emphasis on the necessity to improve democratic centralism for the whole party. He said that all party committees and branches should allow their subordinates to speak out and should listen to the opinions of the cadres and fighters. Political work was done to insure democracy, on whose basis the goal of centralization and unity was attained.

In security work, Comrade Lo Jung-huan listed key tasks and problems which warranted attention according to the characteristics of class struggle in different periods and the actual conditions of the army units. During the 3-year period when our country faced economic difficulties, he suggested that in security work "special attention be given to correctly distinguishing between the two different types of contradictions and to preventing the widening of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves." He instructed that in dealing with problems "there should be both leniency and strictness, both tension and looseness." He said: "During the present temporary difficult time, when the contradictions among the people are surfacing and the enemy is using them as a cover for his sabotage activities, the struggle situation is becoming more complicated. We should intentionally deal with some problems loosely and leniently. Dealing with problems loosely can help us see them more clearly and enable the masses to recognize the features of enemies. The policy of leniency is aimed at dealing with the enemy strictly and at disintegrating the enemy in order to further isolate and attack him." He also gave clear instructions on what cases should be dealt with strictly and what cases should be dealt with leniently.

In cultural work, in response to the need of class struggle in the ideological sphere, Comrade Lo Jung-huan proposed in the 1950's that a cultural department be set up, that cultural work be strengthened, that it be geared to the needs of the companies, grassroots units and workers, peasants and soldiers, and that the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom be carried out. Again in the early 1960's, in view of the problems in the army's cultural work, he stressed that "the army's cultural workers should make greater efforts to reflect life in the army and depict our army's glorious history" and that they "should mainly write about armed struggle." He instructed that art troupes maintain and carry forward the traditions of the Red Army's propaganda teams, produce more small-scale programs, stage shows more often in the companies

and fulfill the task of "bringing a lively atmosphere to the army and helping improve its combat strength."

Regarding work with the masses, Comrade Lo Jung-huan stressed the need to improve the relationship between the army and the people, to "constantly pay attention to the working people's livelihood and struggle and give them support," to "oppose the gun-comes-first mentality," to "educate the army to respect the government," and to "always observe state laws and decrees and government regulations." He called for organizing more activities to support the government and cherish the people, soliciting local opinion on one's own initiative and listening to the masses' criticism. In militia building, Comrade Lo Jung-huan pointed out: In militia building in the socialist period we cannot entirely follow past methods, nor can we use what is being practiced in building regular forces. We should pay more attention to production and integrate it with the central task of militia work.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan attached great importance to ideological construction and the workstyle of General Political Department organizations. He stressed that the General Political Department should take a good lead and set a good example for the lower levels. He constantly taught the department cadres to acquire the courage to adhere to the party's principles, to criticize cadres who did something wrong and to struggle against violations of the party's principles. He said: "This is our old practice and glorious tradition." He always urged department cadres to warmly receive comrades who came from army units on official business and to make them feel at home. He said that "organizational and cadre departments should hold heart-to-heart talks with cadres and party members, and the more such talks are held, the better. They should never let themselves become 'shops run by the king of hell which even the spirits dare not patronize.'" He pointed out: "The companies' political work is the foundation of our army's political work. We must constantly study their conditions and help them solve problems." He urged the General Political Department organizations to familiarize themselves with the companies, provide them with better services and go deep among them to study and investigate. He demanded that the department cadres write investigation reports on their return from companies where they had served as temporary soldiers or performed other tasks. He resolutely opposed office cadres' drawing up plans blindly behind closed doors, which would only cause more trouble for army units. He said that if they want to do this they might as well stay at home. He often reminded comrades of the lesson learned during the period of Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line, when "imperial envoys" were everywhere and caused enormous losses in many areas. He asked them to resolutely oppose the "imperial envoys'" workstyle of arguing with and judging army units unwarrantedly. He stressed that the General Political Department organizations should grasp the situation accurately and constantly criticize those who were ignorant of the answer to every question or who at best could only answer "perhaps" and "maybe." He demanded that they carry out their tasks expeditiously,

answer the requests of various units as quickly as possible, request approvals from higher levels without delay if such approvals were required, advise the lower unit of possible delay if such were the case, not let the lower unit wait unduly, and never push onto lower units things that should be handled by the General Political Department organizations. He paid special attention to cultivating the workstyle of seeking truth from facts and of hard work and plain living among the General Political Department organizations. He prohibited the playing of tricks, making high-sounding statements, shouting empty slogans or writing empty, voluminous articles.

In his work Comrade Lo Jung-huan paid particular attention to giving full play to the role of each department and listened to the views of the masses. He often called to a discussion meeting cadres of various departments, not only department directors but section chiefs and cadres as well. Even when he was ill, he still personally went to the army units to investigate, called political instructors to discussion meetings, or discussed and studied problems with the responsible cadres of various battalions, regiments and divisions in order to understand the situation. When he was unable to go down to the units as often as he wished because of poor health, he would invite comrades to his home to discuss the situation and problems. He often said: "It is beneficial in every aspect for leading cadres to make frequent contact with the masses," and "The wisdom of the masses is precious. A question which has puzzled a leading cadre for several days may be solved very easily by the masses if he tries to talk with them."

The General Political Department under the leadership of Comrade Lo Jung-huan was truly the highest leading organ in the proletarian army's political work. It was an organ which resolutely implemented the line, principle and policies of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee. It was a great obstacle to the bourgeois careerists' attempt to oppose and disrupt the army. From Lin Piao's "smashing the General Political Department, the palace of hell" to the "gang of four's" "blackjacking of the General Political Department," the spearhead was directed at Chairman Mao, the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.

Great leader and teacher Chairman Mao cherished a profound proletarian affection for Comrade Lo Jung-huan. When Comrade Nieh Jung-chen reported to Chairman Mao the unfortunate news of Lo Jung-huan's death at the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau's Standing Committee meeting on 16 December 1963, Chairman Mao, with a heavy heart, took the lead in standing up and paying a silent tribute. After the end of the silent tribute, Chairman Mao said: "Comrade Lo Jung-huan was a man of principle. He was merciless toward the enemy and never criticized others behind their backs. It is necessary to have principle and a principled spirit within our party." After the end of the meeting, Chairman Mao,

Comrade Ho Lung and Comrade Nieh Jung-chen went to the hospital to pay their last respects to the remains of Comrade Lo Jung-huan and expressed their deep sorrow over his death.

Comrade Lo Jung-huan's life was one of fighting and brilliance and has left a profound impression in our hearts. His revolutionary spirit will always stimulate us to march forward. In memory of Comrade Lo Jung-huan, the best thing for us to do is to conscientiously study his fine thinking and workstyle; strive, under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua and the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission, to restore the function, role and prestige of the political organizations to the level of the periods of the Red Army, the war of resistance against Japan and the liberation war; further develop them under the new conditions; and make still greater contributions to carrying out the policy and task of grasping the key link to run the army well and getting prepared for war and to fulfilling the general task for the new period.

ANOTHER SHINING BANNER ON CHINA'S CULTURAL FRONT—IN MEMORY OF ESTEEMED
AND BELOVED COMRADE KUO MO-JO

Peking RED FLAG in Chinese No 8, 1 Aug 78 pp 69-73

[Article by the Chinese Academy of Social Science]

[Text] Comrade Kuo Mo-jo lived in an epoch when China was undergoing tremendous changes, a great epoch in which the dark old China was switching over to a prosperous socialist new China. He plunged into the torrent of the epoch and fought courageously for 60 years, from the May Fourth Movement to the new Long March of today. Every step forward he took coincided with the advance of the revolution of the Chinese people. He took part in the gunsmoke-filled Northern Expedition and the Nanchang Uprising, led the mighty cultural revolutionary army and carried out fierce and complicated battles on the front of the struggle against imperialism and revisionism.

Whether in the period of the democratic revolution or in the period of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, he manifested the revolutionary spirit of a proletarian fighter in the face of the danger of arrest by the Japanese police, physical torture by the Kuomintang special agents and persecution by the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao "gang of four." He was a firm and unyielding revolutionary of our party who fought throughout his life for the communist cause.

Like Lu Hsun, Kuo Mo-jo was a proletarian cultural fighter of broad and profound learning and marked talent in the history of modern Chinese culture. He produced rich fruits in various fields of philosophy and social science, including literature, art, philosophy, history, archeology and the study of ancient Chinese scripts, and in translating and introducing Marxist theoretical writings and progressive foreign literature and art. The literary creations and scientific research of Comrade Kuo Mo-jo were from first to last closely linked with the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people. Fearing no hardship and courageously scaling the heights, he brought out a large number of outstanding literary works, edited many historical and archeological works with

profound knowledge and deep insight and left behind for our people a most precious cultural asset. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, after Lu Hsun, was another brilliant standard bearer on our country's cultural front.

Comrade Kuo Mo-jo had a broad social outlook, profound cultural and scientific knowledge, and rich revolutionary practice and experience. With the education and assistance of the party he embraced and continuously studied Marxism-Leninism and gradually became a proletarian thinker. He had a penetrating insight into intricate and complex social phenomenon and could with acute sensitivity feel the pulse of the epoch. Some of his famous works which summed up historical experiences shone with a Marxist splendor and became important documents for conducting ideological and political education in our party. Whether in international and domestic political struggles or in scientific research and literary creation, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo manifested his talent as a crystal-clear thinker.

As early as the period of the May Fourth Movement, as leaders of the new cultural force, Kuo Mo-jo fought together with Lu Hsun in the forefront. At that time the dawn of the victory of the October Revolution and the dissemination of Marxism in China had aroused a new hope of liberation among the Chinese people. Promoting science and democracy and opposing the old ethics and culture had become deafening slogans in the new cultural movement. Lu Hsun's first novel, "The Diary of a Madman," and Kuo Mo-jo's first volume of poetry, "Goddess," both written in spoken-language style, educated hundreds of millions of youths and instilled in them the strength and courage to oppose the old world. Filled with momentum, pride and enthusiasm, "Goddess" brimmed over with a thirst for freedom and a patriotic sentiment and revolutionary ideal in pursuit of brightness. It strongly reflected the thorough and uncompromising anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolutionary spirit of the May Fourth epoch. With a thirst for the liberation of the motherland, he looked with admiration to the Great October Socialist Revolution. Comrade Kuo Mo-jo fervently hoped that from that blaze a new life would be born in the disaster-stricken motherland. "Goddess" was a grand and clarion combat bugle, an overwhelming revolutionary tidal wave and a most influential and successful volume of new poetry in the new cultural history of our country. Its appearance initiated a new revolutionary style in poetry. Comrade Kuo Mo-jo was the person who laid the cornerstone for our country's new poetic movement.

As the revolution deepened, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo continued to advance in struggle. The anti-imperialist indignation of the Chinese people and the bloody suppression by the reactionaries in China and abroad enabled him to understand more profoundly the reality of Chinese society. He became even more dedicated to the revolutionary cause led by the party. He began to study Marxist viewpoints and to apply them to his writing

of many essays in literature and art. He understood more clearly the important questions such as the class nature and social role of literature and art, and he proposed the revolutionary slogan "Go among the soldiers, go among the people, go among the factories and plunge into the revolutionary vortex," thus greatly motivating the development of a revolutionary literature. In the spring of 1926 he emphatically pointed out: "The literature and art we need now is a literature and art that speaks for the fourth class. This literature and art is realistic in form and socialistic in content.... I dare make this statement here with decision and dispatch." Tempered by the revolutionary struggles, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo further understood the revolutionary power of the workers and peasants and deepened his affection for the laboring people. When the great teacher Lenin passed away, when revolutionary people throughout the world were filled with boundless sorrow, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo published in CREATION WEEKLY his memorial poem "The Sun Has Set," in which he eulogized with true and profound sentiment the proletarian revolutionary teacher Lenin. The brilliant poems written during that period were lofty revolutionary marches which strongly reflected the revolutionary feelings of Comrade Kuo Mo-jo.

Comrade Kuo Mo-jo not only used poetry as his weapon to inspire the revolutionary fervor of the people, but also personally rushed to the battlefield whenever the revolution needed him. In the summer of 1926 Comrade Kuo Mo-jo threw aside his pen and took up his sword to participate in the Northern Expedition. As a revolutionary armyman he went from Canton to Wuhan and then to Nanchang, going through dangers and obstacles and undergoing the test of war. After the Northern Expeditionary Army had occupied Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek craftily seized the general headquarters of the Northern Expeditionary Army and secretly sent a bunch of riffraff, party tyrants and underworld characters to engineer a succession of tragic incidents, massacring Communist Party members and the revolutionary masses on a large scale. But Chiang Kai-shek's honeyed words disguised his vicious features. Coupled with the influence of Chen Tu-hsiu's right capitulationism, the false image of Chiang Kai-shek as "commander in chief of the revolutionary army" was still able to fool the youth. How to recognize the counterrevolutionary essence of Chiang Kai-shek became a very important issue at the time. Right after the "March 23" Anching Massacre Comrade Kuo Mo-jo was filled with proletarian revolutionary indignation, and while living in the house of Comrade Chu Te at the end of March he vehemently wrote the article "Please Look at the Chiang Kai-shek of Today," in which he incisively exposed the counterrevolutionary features of Chiang Kai-shek, shouted "Down with Chiang Kai-shek, who betrayed the revolution and massacred the people!" and exerted a tremendous influence among the people throughout the country. Later he took part in the "August 1" Nanchang Uprising, and upon its failure he went to stay temporarily in Shanghai. In the midst of the unbridled White terror, with the undaunted courage of a communist in the face of peril he continued to struggle on the cultural front and wrote many militant poems. At this time Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, under the

leadership of the party, had more systematically studied the Marxist theories and at the same time had undergone the stern trials of revolutionary setbacks. These experiences filled his volume of poetry "Recovery" with an unswerving revolutionary fervor and a high degree of revolutionary optimism. He believed deeply that the "dark skies" before his eyes were but the "prelude to a tempest," that "whether the present struggle is a success or a failure, we will win the final victory!" Concurrently, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo experienced a basic change in his thinking toward literature and art. He emphasized that revolutionary theory should guide literary and art creation, that literature and art should reflect the spirit of the age, and that literature and art should serve revolutionary struggles, and he actively proposed a proletarian revolutionary literature. He was the first person to wave the revolutionary banner of "proletarian literature."

Because the Kuomintang reactionaries had issued a warrant for his arrest, the party organization, in consideration of the safety of Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, advised him to leave the country. So in February 1928 he went to Japan and began his 10 years of political exile. These 10 years coincided with the period of the second revolutionary civil war. At that time the Kuomintang reactionaries not only "encircled and suppressed" the Red revolutionary bases militarily, but assembled a group of reactionary men of letters to launch a counterrevolutionary cultural "encirclement and suppression" on the ideological and cultural front. A major component of this struggle between "encirclement and suppression" and counter-"encirclement and suppression" was a polemic on the question of the history of Chinese society, a continuation of the polemic on the question of the nature of Chinese society. The focus of this polemic was on whether or not there was a slave society in ancient China and what were the beginning, development and characteristics of Chinese feudal society. All feudal compradore men of letters endeavored to deny that there had been a slave society in China and alleged with certainty that the Chinese feudal society had fallen apart before the Chin and Han dynasties. Under the pretext that China had "different traditions," all manner of men of letters and politicians and a motley bunch of strange theories denied the applicability to China of the universal law of social development set forth by Marxism, in an effort to stop the dissemination of Marxism in China and to abolish the revolution in China.

Physically living abroad, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo embraced the motherland in his breast and actively took part in this struggle, making indelible contributions accordingly. In the midst of extremely arduous living conditions and under the surveillance of the Japanese police, with stubborn and unyielding revolutionary will he carried out studies in ancient Chinese society. Dominating the literary circles in China at that time were the believers in the classical literary tradition of the feudal landlord class and those skeptical of the classical literary tradition of the bourgeoisie. The popular theories of history were "history for history's sake" advocated by Liang Chi-chao and

"historiography is only the science of history" advocated by Hu Shih and Fu Ssu-nien. They all denied the objective law of the historical development of society and opposed using the Marxist viewpoint in the study of the history of China. Hu Shih, who claimed to have a "craving for history," waved the banner of applying a "scientific" method in the reorganization of the nation's past history and launched a frantic attack on the Marxist materialist conception of history, utilizing the idealist conception of history. Thus, to study the history of ancient China it is first necessary to answer the questions as to why one studies and how one studies it. The political aim of Comrade Kuo Mo-jo's study of the history of ancient China had from the beginning been made very explicit. He said: "Our expectation of the future society has forced us to demand an examination of the past society," and "recognizing how we got here aptly determines where we are heading." He also clearly pointed out that it was necessary to use the Marxist viewpoint in studying the history of China and to break through the "wall of prejudice" of the bourgeois historians. He openly challenged Hu Shih, who at the time was assuming the pose of authority in the reorganization of the nation's past history, saying: "It is necessary for us to 'criticize' afresh all the processes which he has already 'reorganized.'" For the sake of this struggle, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo at one time devoted all his efforts and wisdom to studying the history of ancient Chinese society. "A Study of Ancient Society in China," published for the first time in 1930, systematically used the Marxist viewpoint in analyzing historical documents such as the "Book of Odes," "Book of History" and "Book of Changes," as well as materials on the inscriptions on oracle bones and tortoise shells and inscriptions on bronze vessels, and it creatively explained and proved that ancient society in our country, in full accord with the universal law of social development set forth by Marx and Engels, likewise underwent the various stages of primitive society, slave society and feudal society. It effectively refuted the reactionary fallacies that "our country has different traditions" and "Marxism is not suitable for China" advocated by those like Hu Shih and the Trotskyites. This was the first work that used the Marxist viewpoint in the study of ancient Chinese history. In spite of some unavoidable mistakes in an early work, it was a glorious exploit in the initial battle between Marxist historiography and bourgeois historiography. Comrade Kuo Mo-jo was the trailblazer of our country in using the Marxist viewpoint in the study of ancient Chinese history.

This initial victory was not easily won. To learn about ancient Chinese society, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo defied hardships and, with the tenacious will of a trailblazer, carried out studies in the inscriptions on oracle bones, tortoise shells and bronze vessels. "This task appears to be very broad in scope. But then it is the only way one can perceive the truth about the past." Past reputable scholars in the studies of inscriptions on oracle bones, tortoise shells and bronze vessels had made contributions. But they were fragmentary materials which had been collected and collated, and they lacked an all-round systematic

arrangement. Using Marxist theory as his guide, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo studied the ancient Chinese scripts, then applied the fruits of his study of ancient Chinese scripts to an analysis of the history of the development of ancient Chinese society. This was a task which had never before been attempted and was a new world in the study of history created by Kuo Mo-jo. From that time on he continued to make use of his profound knowledge of the inscriptions on oracle bones, tortoise shells and bronze vessels in his relentless struggle on the ideological and cultural front. In 1936 he wrote an article, "Refuting 'On Confucianism,'" in which he criticized Hu Shih for twisting the facts of the history of the Yin and Chou dynasties, pointed out that Hu Shih was the model of apriorism and exposed the essence of his pragmatism. In the following year he wrote another article, "Refuting Shih An's Theory," in which he criticized the reactionary fallacy of Chen Tu-hsiu, who alleged that Chinese feudal society was built on the ruins of the primitive commune and that there was never a stage of slave society. "A Dictionary of the Inscriptions on Bronze Vessels of the Two Chou Dynasties" established the system for the study of bronze inscriptions in China. In particular, this work initiated an entirely new method of determining the period of time of the Bronze Age. It was the most important contribution which Comrade Kuo Mo-jo made in the realm of archeology and laid the foundation for the study of the inscriptions on bronze vessels. Forty years of research proved that the system he devised for determining the period of time of the Bronze Age was correct, and it was acknowledged by academic circles both at home and abroad.

After the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo risked his life by boldly returning to the motherland to take part in the war. During many months of hardship, under the direct leadership of esteemed and beloved Premier Chou, he carried out resist-Japan united front work in the Kuomintang-ruled areas, fought on the battlefield of cultural propaganda and launched resolute struggles against the Kuomintang diehards who pretended to resist Japan but who actually opposed communism. He united many progressive cultural personages who did a great deal of work in resolutely uniting to resist Japan, oppose civil war and achieve democracy. The home of Old Kuo at Tien Kuan Fu in Chungking was a frequent meeting place for Premier Chou and the cultural circles and democratic personages.

During the Chungking days Comrade Kuo Mo-jo produced many stage plays based on historical materials and received a profound welcome from the masses. These plays became effective weapons in uniting the people and attacking the enemies and played a powerful role in motivating the democratic movement in the Kuomintang-ruled areas. In the popular hymn of lightning and thunder in "Chu Yuan," Comrade Kuo Mo-jo fully expressed his indignation toward the reactionary Kuomintang rule. The poignant, gallant and stirring voice uttered the accusation of the hundreds of millions of people who were oppressed by the three big mountains under the reactionary Kuomintang rule.

After the victory of the war of resistance, the U.S. imperialists played the trick of "mediation" and assisted Chiang Kai-shek in setting off a nationwide counterrevolutionary civil war. Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand sent special agents to assassinate democratic personages and on the other hand bribed a group of shameless politicians to speak in their behalf. Amidst the White terror in the Kuomintang-ruled areas, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo stepped forth fearlessly and righteously to expose the plot of the United States and Chiang in unleashing a civil war by playing on the idea of peace talk; he sternly unmasked the ugly features of the politicians, united with the masses of patriotic, democratic personages and launched unswerving struggles for the cause of liberation of the Chinese people.

After the founding of the PRC, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo shouldered heavy responsibilities of leadership in state affairs, scientific, cultural and educational work and international exchanges. He held aloft the great banner of Mao Tsetung Thought, persisted in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and stood steadfastly on the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in the intraparty struggles between the two lines, in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism and in the struggle against the bourgeoisie in the ideological and cultural fields. As a proletarian cultural fighter, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo actively participated in many discussions on major academic issues since the founding of the nation, such as questions concerning the grouping of ancient history in different time periods and the evaluation of historical figures and the Peasants War, and he wrote articles on many special topics. In his academic activities he studied industriously, probed painstakingly and energetically engaged himself in writing. He dared to persist in the truth, courageously corrected his mistakes, never overwhelmed other people with his authority and set himself as an example in implementing Chairman Mao's policy on "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend." As a leader in the field of literature and art, he not only worked hard for the building of a proletarian rank of literature and art, but revived his youthful spirit and wrote diligently, bringing forth a large amount of literary and art works of various forms for the motherland's garden of a hundred flowers and rendering important contributions to making the socialist literary and art creation flourish.

All his life Comrade Kuo Mo-jo ardently loved the party, the motherland and the people, and he cherished deep proletarian feelings for the great leader and teacher Chairman Mao and for the esteemed and beloved Premier Chou. In Canton in 1926 Comrade Kuo Mo-jo met Chairman Mao and Premier Chou and, inspired by their great communist spirit, took part in the Northern Expedition and worked under the direct leadership of Premier Chou. After the Northern Expeditionary Army arrived in Wuhan, he again met Chairman Mao, from whom he received kind instructions. In 1927 Comrade Kuo Mo-jo took part in the Nanchang Uprising led by Premier Chou, Chairman Chu of the NPC Standing Committee and others. In their advance

south, Premier Chou and Comrade Li I-mang recommended that Comrade Kuo Mo-jo join the CCP. Prior to his stay in Japan he again heeded Premier Chou's instructions. It was precisely through the concern and under the leadership of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou that Comrade Kuo Mo-jo gained the spiritual strength to struggle all his life for the communist cause.

The great leader and teacher Chairman Mao showed great concern for Comrade Kuo Mo-jo's work in Chungking. On 11 February 1944 he personally wrote a letter to Comrade Kuo Mo-jo and entrusted the letter to Premier Chou to bring to Chungking. In the letter Chairman Mao said encouragingly: "We regard your article 'The Tricentennial of the Year 1644' as a document on the rectification of the style of work. A little success breeds arrogance, and great success breeds still more arrogance. Thus, time and again one suffers reverses. It is worth noticing how these errors should be avoided. It will indeed be beneficial if you could write an essay dealing fully with the experience of the Taiping army. But I dare not formally propose it for fear of burdening you too much." He further said: "Your historical essays and historical stage plays are highly beneficial to the Chinese people. You cannot write too much. Your efforts will not be wasted. I hope you will continue to work hard."

Esteemed and beloved Premier Chou all along showed concern for Comrade Kuo Mo-jo and highly commended his contributions to the cultural front. As early as 1941 Premier Chou published in HSINHUA DAILY "What I Wish to Say," in which for the first time he spoke of Kuo Mo-jo and Lu Hsun in the same breath and praised the former as the "protagonist in the new cultural movement" and "guide in our advance," who "not only stepped forth boldly in the high tide of the revolution and stood in the front-line of the revolutionary ranks, but who also knew how to maintain his spirit during the low tide of the revolution, engage himself in quiet study and equip himself for the sake of making new contributions to and preparing new strength for the revolution." Premier Chou showed great respect for the historical stage plays by Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, both "Chu Yuan" in the forties and "Tsai Wen-chi" in the fifties, and he personally attended the rehearsals and gave concrete instructions and warm encouragement.

After the country's liberation, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo received even greater concern and instructions from Chairman Mao and Premier Chou. His proletarian feelings toward Chairman Mao and Premier Chou deepened as the days went by and were consolidated in the protracted revolutionary struggles through half a century. The noble character of professing boundless loyalty to the party, the people and the revolution and the lofty ideal of fighting all his life for the communist cause which Comrade Kuo Mo-jo embraced were inseparable from the kind concern and teaching extended to him by Chairman Mao and Premier Chou.

In the successive struggles between the two lines, particularly in the struggles against Lin Piao and the "gang of four" antiparty clique,

Comrade Kuo Mo-jo resolutely stood on the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and manifested the noble quality of a Communist Party member who persevered in the party's principles. When the tidings of the smashing of the "gang of four" at one stroke by the whole party under the leadership of Chairman Hua were spread, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo felt greatly inspired and warmly acclaimed: "The 'gang of four' has been ferreted out! What wonderful news!" "Support Chairman Hua and support the party Central Committee," he cried, expressing the common aspiration of hundreds of millions of people. In February and March this year, while he was seriously ill, Comrade Kuo Mo-jo read Chairman Hua's report on the work of the government, Vice Chairman Yeh's report on the revision of the constitution, and the draft of the revised constitution, and he fervently wrote a poem to the tune of "shui tiao ko tou" eulogizing the brilliant leader Chairman Hua, praising the great strategic policy decision of grasping the key link in running the country and praising the new Long March under the leadership of Chairman Hua.

All his life Comrade Kuo Mo-jo persisted in the truth, dared to struggle, made stern demands on himself, made great efforts to change his world outlook, and from beginning to end struggled courageously for the cause of liberating the Chinese people. The road he followed all his life was a glorious example for the people, particularly the scientific, cultural and educational workers and the masses of intellectuals. We must learn from Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, hold aloft Chairman Mao's great banner, persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, resolutely implement the line of the 11th party congress, foster vast contingents of proletarian scientific and cultural personnel and make a stride forward on the new Long March!

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APPLY ECONOMIC LAWS AND RAISE THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

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[Article by RED FLAG contributing commentator]

[Text] The National Conference of Departments of Finance and Trade on Learning From Taching and Tachai, which was shown great concern by the people across the country, satisfactorily fulfilled its task under the direct leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua and came to a triumphant conclusion. The comrades who attended the meeting have returned to their posts and are now leading the masses of finance and trade workers to implement the directives of Chairman Hua and the party Central Committee, as well as the tasks, principles and policies set by the conference for finance and trade in the new period. They are striving to speedily raise the level of finance and trade work, promote the rapid development of the national economy, and accelerate the tempo of building a powerful, modern socialist country.

The important speeches given to the conference by Chairman Hua and Vice Chairman Li, as well as the report delivered by Vice Premier Yu Chiu-li, correctly and penetratingly illustrated the current political and economic situation, elucidating finance and trade work and the important position in the development of the national economy of the general policy of "developing the economy and insuring supplies," reaffirming the proletarian political, production and mass viewpoints, and laying down the orientation and concrete tasks for economic and financial work under new historical conditions. At the same time they emphatically raised the question of studying, grasping and applying the objective laws of socialist economy in order to improve our economic management. Chairman Hua said: "We are now faced with the great and arduous task of achieving socialist modernization, and we must restudy some things. We learned in the past and start from the beginning to learn many new things we have not touched on. Our cadres at all levels must, with an urgent sense of revolutionary responsibility and with high enthusiasm and firm resolve, conscientiously study the theory of socialist economic construction advanced by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman

Mao and delve diligently into various branches of new knowledge on the road of economic construction. Through study and practice we will better understand the economic laws of socialism, more consciously apply objective economic laws, improve our management of economic work, and raise our level of modern science and technology." This extremely important instruction from Chairman Hua is meant not only for the finance and trade front but also for all the other fronts of the country and for the whole party. All of our Communist Party members, state cadres and the broad masses on various fronts should profoundly comprehend and resolutely put this instruction into effect, so that we may consciously master and apply the objective laws of socialist economy to greatly raise the level of management of economic work and, in the new and great Long March, arrive at our goal with all possible speed.

To show respect for economic laws and to do our work according to them--this is the basic standard we communists and proletarian revolutionaries must observe in doing all kinds of work. Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism require that we correctly understand the laws of the objective world and grasp and apply them to transform the world. The struggles waged by Chairman Mao against all sorts of opportunism in the various historical phases of the Chinese revolution are, in the context of the ideological line, struggles against subjectivism which runs counter to objective laws, struggles against idealism and metaphysics which run counter to materialism and dialectics. Our party's first great rectification campaign in Yenan, personally led by Chairman Mao, resulted in the practice of seeking truth from facts and doing things according to objective laws. This practice became the fine workstyle of the whole party. All the victories won by our party during the democratic revolution and in the period of socialist revolution and construction are inseparable from the firm adherence to this fine workstyle of the party.

In the course of socialist construction work after the founding of new China, Chairman Mao on many occasions taught us to pay attention to grasping and applying objective laws. Speaking at the national CCP conference in 1955, Chairman Mao called on the whole party to "gain a better understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of natural science, in short, to gain a better understanding of the laws of the objective world so as to commit fewer subjectivist mistakes." In his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" in 1957, he again warned the whole party in these meaningful terms: "What we must now demand of ourselves is to gain experience in economic construction in a shorter period of time than it took us to gain experience in revolution, and not to pay as high a price for it.... We must realize that there is a contradiction here--the contradiction between the objective laws of economic development of a socialist society and our subjective cognition of them--which needs to be resolved in the course of practice." Because our party has acted on Chairman Mao's teachings and adhered to the fine workstyle and fine tradition of seeking truth from facts and doing things according

to objective laws, our national economy has developed rapidly, thereby changing our extremely backward economic outlook.

Lin Piao and the "gang of four" basically opposed Chairman Mao's teachings and willfully undermined the fine workstyle and fine tradition of seeking truth from facts and doing things according to objective laws. They exaggerated, as never before, the subjective-idealist theory of will being the decisive factor and wildly spread the extremely reactionary, fascist ideas of "power decides everything" and "will decides everything." These most hideous counterrevolutionaries held great power in their hands, but they knew nothing about industry, agriculture, commerce, and fiscal and financial affairs, nor were they acquainted with objective economic laws. Taking the destruction of socialism as their only occupation, they not only gravely undermined the material and technical foundation of our country and brought the entire national economy to the verge of collapse, but also plunged the entire economic management into chaos and confused the thinking of the people. A mistaken tendency to disregard objective conditions and belittle economic laws developed among a number of our economic workers. They often substituted their emotions and "local policies" for the party's principles and policies, and their subjective wishes for the unified plans of the state. This pernicious ideological influence of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" has not yet been entirely eliminated. This situation is incompatible with the magnificent and formidable task of economic construction confronting us. Therefore, at this finance and trade conference Chairman Hua promptly raised the question of paying serious attention to objective economic laws, putting politics in command and doing things according to objective economic laws. Both Vice Chairman Li and Vice Premier Yu Chiu-li emphasized this question and called on us to seriously and realistically study and understand the objective laws of socialist economic development, consciously apply them, strengthen economic management and raise the level of economic work.

Socialist economic laws, like all other objective laws, are inherent in the movement of contradictions in things. They are not dependent on the will of men. To correctly understand, grasp and apply them we must, in the struggle to expose and criticize the "gang of four," further eliminate the pernicious influence of the subjective-idealist theory of will being the decisive factor and of pragmatic sophistry, while restoring and promoting the party's fine workstyle and fine tradition of seeking truth from facts. We must sum up both the positive and negative experiences of work in the past and draw useful lessons from them in accordance with the principle that practice is the only criterion of truth. For the past 28 years since the founding of new China we have undertaken large-scale economic construction, stirred up many vigorous mass movements and taken detours. We have had very rich experiences, both positive and negative. Provided we sum up these experiences objectively and not subjectively, realistically and not hollowly, seriously and not perfunctorily, and at the same time learn from the experiences of other

countries, we shall assuredly be able in a relatively short period of time to better comprehend and master the objective laws of socialist economic development and apply these laws to accelerate the smooth development of the four modernizations.

Marxism holds that different social formations in their economic development should follow their own economic laws as well as those common to all social formations. This is also true in socialist society.

Under socialism, production relations and the superstructure basically conform with the productive forces and the economic base. Since production relations and the superstructure in our country are still inadequate in many respects, they are incompatible with large-scale socialized production and the realization of the four modernizations. They fetter the productive forces and hinder their development. In continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must seriously study the contradictions between production relations and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base, so that proper reforms can be introduced to eliminate the incompatible segments. Only by grasping the principal contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the socialist and capitalist roads and by deeply unfolding the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle and the struggle for production and scientific experiment can our cause of socialist modernization advance in triumph.

Socialist production aims at promoting the interests of the working people as a whole and not just those of a few exploiters. The general policy on "developing the economy and insuring supplies" formulated by Chairman Mao correctly defines the aims of socialist production. To improve the quality of economic management, we must first seriously study the development of the socialist economy, the most essential link, so that production, exchange, distribution and consumption in socialist production are subordinate to the goals of socialist production and to the correct orientation in conducting financial and economic work.

Planning the development of the national economy on the basis of the public ownership of the means of production is an example of the superiority of the socialist system. In the face of new and modern economic construction we must make further efforts to grasp and apply laws on the planned and proportionate development of the national economy. We must do planning work well so that plans for enterprises, trades and occupations, regions and departments, as well as national annual plans and long-range plans, will conform with the needs and potentialities of rapidly developing China's socialist economy and with the party's line, principles and policies. This is aimed at promoting the national economy so that it will advance in a planned and proportionate way along socialist tracks. In conducting socialist economic activities we must properly solve the relationship between speed and proportion by unifying high speed with proportionate development. What

we mean by high speed involves rapid proportionate development. Only by doing this can high speed be maintained over a long period. What we mean by proportionate development involves proportionate development at high speed, and only by doing this can proportionate development be positively maintained. Following the principle that imbalance is absolute and that balance is relative, we must use planned adjustments to continually eliminate the old balance and to form a new balance. On the one hand we must give prominence to key projects so that those important sectors bearing on the overall situation will achieve a more rapid pace of development. On the other hand we must occasionally make a comprehensive balance of various sectors to eliminate the weak segments and enable the national economy to advance rapidly and in an orderly way. The entire body of cadres and workers on the economic and financial fronts must seriously study dialectics and combat metaphysics. They must pay constant attention to the relationship between speed and proportion in performing economic and planning work and give vigorous support to production and promote coordination and development of various economic projects undertaken by industrial, agricultural and commercial enterprises by correctly allocating capital and rationally organizing exchange.

Socialist commodity production and exchange of commodities which exist in our country must be vigorously promoted, with the law of value playing an important role. The "gang of four" attacked the application of the law of value in socialist economic planning as capitalism and did their utmost to undermine economic accounting in socialist enterprises and to wreck the principle of exchange of equal values and the price policy of the state. Because of the fallacies they spread, many comrades often ignored the role of the law of value and made no attempt to apply it in conducting their work. They used subjective administrative measures to deal with complicated economic problems, with the result that work became passive and considerable losses and waste occurred. For example, the units and enterprises in some localities paid no attention to economic effects. There was no fixing of manpower, and no quotas were set for consumption. There was no cost accounting, and this resulted in very low labor productivity and considerable waste. As another example, the purchasing prices for certain categories of farm and subsidiary products were fixed too low. As a result, the peasants were reluctant to produce more than necessary or to sell their products to the state. In cases where the purchasing prices for certain products were fixed too high, there were tendencies to produce things recklessly, regardless of whether they were needed or not. This was also true with the production of industrial goods for daily use and even of the means of production for industrial purposes. If the prices of some products are fixed too high, the enterprises concerned will stand to benefit from the huge profits they can reap. If the prices are fixed too low, then profits will drop drastically no matter how hard the operators try. This promotes tendencies that discourage the use of economic accounting and give rise to abnormalities in supply and demand. Consequently, things required by the state and the people are not produced in large quantities

and are in short supply, while those items that are not needed are produced as usual and tend to pile up in warehouses. The serious extent of waste and losses is also prevalent in urban and rural areas where commercial work is conducted if no attention is paid to applying the law of value to improve operation and management and to rationally adjust the circulation of commodities.

To eliminate confusion in economic work, promote planned and proportionate development of various economic projects and combat serious waste, we must use economic measures to manage the economy, grasp and apply the law of value, formulate rational price policies and improve the quality of economic management. Not only should every enterprise and unit and various national economic departments and systems apply the law of value and strengthen economic accounting, but industrial and commercial enterprises as well as rural communes and production brigades should abide by the law of value in handling economic relations between them according to the principle of exchange of equal values. This does not involve disavowing the use of necessary administrative measures. Rather, it requires that the policies and administrative measures we formulate conform with objective economic laws and anticipate achieving the most desirable economic results.

In terms of the economic relations between the state and state-run enterprises, it is necessary to use exacting economic accounting to examine the operation and management of enterprises. Those enterprises that have been run well and have made significant contributions should be commended and given more operating funds. Those that have been managed improperly and have suffered losses should be made answerable for economic commitments and legal obligations. In terms of economic relations between state-run enterprises, it is necessary to broadly promote the contract system on the basis of state plans, with both sides pledging themselves to clearly defined economic and legal obligations. In short, accounting should be undertaken to avoid taking meals at the communal kitchen. Only through accounting can the law of value which exists objectively be implemented. To do so enables the leading cadres of every department, enterprise and unit of collective production to abide by specific economic obligations in dealing with the quarters concerned.

In the socialist stage the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work" is an important economic law. We must implement this socialist principle in an all-round way in handling the economic relations between the state and individuals and between the collective and individuals. Experience shows that only by examining the work of every worker and commune member on the basis of the amount and quality of his work, fixing labor remuneration on the basis of getting more for doing more work, less for doing less work and nothing for contributing nothing, can we mobilize the socialist activism of all the laborers and promote the development of production. However, if this principle is not followed and if the state and the collective do

not take care to solve the material interests of the laborers, then their enthusiasm for doing their work well for the cause of socialism will be affected. In the past few years the "gang of four" not only disavowed the existence of the law of "to each according to his work" but also slandered our adherence to this law as an attempt to restore capitalism. Consequently, this gave rise to very abnormal developments in many economic units, such as the notion that "nothing will change whether one does something or nothing, whether one does more or does less, whether one prefers performing light work to tackling heavy work and whether one does his work well or poorly." This in fact is an attempt to discourage everyone from contributing anything to socialism until everything derived from socialism is consumed. To change this situation, which is harmful to socialism, we must from now on conduct an economic review of all departments, all enterprises and units, the laborers themselves, including management cadres at all levels, and introduce the system of rewarding those who have done well and punishing those who have done poorly. Only by doing this can the interests of the state be combined with those of the collective and individuals alike.

In stressing the socialist principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work," we do not mean doing so at the expense of ideological and political education. We must continue to strengthen ideological and political education among the vast number of workers and rural commune peasants. We must raise their consciousness of building socialism with all-out efforts and of contributing selflessly to building a modern and powerful socialist state. However, we must combine ideological and political education with the system of "to each according to his work," look after the material interests of the laborers, and enable them to understand that our party truly has the welfare of the people at heart and to recognize that socialist construction is aimed at continually improving the people's living conditions and at giving full play to their socialist enthusiasm and creativity.

It should also be pointed out here that due to the "gang of four's" remnant poison many economic units in certain localities have even to this day implemented their "local policies." They give no workpoints for work done, conduct no reviews, allow no differences in remuneration and oppose bonuses. Comrades who adhere to these practices, regardless of their subjective understanding, in fact resist and even refuse to implement the party's and the state's policies. This must be promptly corrected.

In studying, grasping and applying objective laws we must first adjust our thinking, adhere to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts and clear up issues of right and wrong confused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four." In his speech Chairman Hua pointed out: "Some comrades lack a proper understanding of the importance of studying, grasping and applying socialist economic laws. They even believe that by placing politics in command they can ignore objective economic laws, and that to recognize

economic laws is to disavow placing politics in command. This viewpoint is completely wrong." Marxism holds that politics is a concentrated embodiment of economics and that politics commands economics while serving it. The proletarian concept of placing politics in command requires that it embody in a concentrated way the fundamental economic interests of the proletariat and all the working people. That we have emphasized the political, production and mass viewpoints in finance and trade work shows that we have conformed with the requirements that proletarian politics be placed in command and that socialist economic laws be implemented. We must combine these three major viewpoints in economic management and see to it that they are implemented in various segments of the reproduction process as well as in various economic departments and units. Moreover, they must be implemented in planning work. Proletarian politics, embracing the line, principles and policies of the party and the state and every important measure, must accurately reflect objective economic laws. It must not disavow or even go against them. Politics that is divorced from objective economic laws is utopian, while politics that runs counter to them is reactionary. Lin Piao and the "gang of four" are typical examples of practicing reactionary politics.

It should be admitted that in the new historical conditions and in the face of the new tasks we tend to do things rather recklessly. In our guidance of the four modernizations there are many realms of necessity we have not properly recognized. As the CCP Central Committee and Chairman Hua have repeatedly pointed out, we must study and study again.

Study requires that we not be complacent. Many of our comrades in responsible positions have been imbued, in varying degrees, with conceit and are conservative in their thinking. They turn a deaf ear to views offered by others and think they themselves are right. They fail to realize that with the progress of the four modernizations, economic work, including finance and trade, must be constantly improved on the basis of improved content and newly defined guidelines and policies. They are accustomed to tackling, organizing and running modern production and a modern economy from the viewpoint of the small producer and with the methods employed in the handicraft or semihandicraft industries. Some comrades who are ignorant of objective things pretend to understand them, while some of them even try to impose their own opinions on objective economic laws. This attitude is clearly wrong and harmful. In his speech Chairman Hua was critical of "some comrades who become conceited and no longer make any progress once they have accomplished something." He pointed out: "If this attitude is not resolutely changed, it will be impossible for us to firmly cultivate the soaring ambition to vigorously advance and to learn from the advanced experiences gained at home and abroad, let alone to overtake the advanced levels of foreign countries." Chairman Hua's criticism was to the point. Our comrades must earnestly refrain from displaying conceit and adhering to conservative ideas. They must humbly learn from others.

All our comrades must study in earnest. Those cadres charged with leadership work in particular must study assiduously. They must systematically study basic economic theories and be familiar with vocational work, science and technology, and management. Lenin said: "To exercise management we must know the ropes, minutely study all production conditions, be familiar with the high order of modern production techniques and have a profound knowledge of science. This is a requirement we should measure up to at all events." ("Speech at the Third Congress of All-Russian Water Transport Workers," "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 30, p 394) In conducting education for party cadres, we must attach great importance to education in these respects to completely alter conditions that are divorced from economic practice. We must adhere to the principle of integrating theory with practice and promote delving into economic work and conducting investigation and study in a down-to-earth way so that our thinking and work conform with objective realities. Economic work that embraces finance and trade is complex and requires meticulous effort. Neither general guidance based on so-called "principle" nor what is called "political" leadership that indulges in empty talk and offers no solutions to problems is required. What is needed is concrete and all-embracing leadership based on an understanding of theories and policies and familiarity with vocational work. After the national conference on finance and trade closed, some localities formed investigation groups led by leading cadres. By going deep into realities and among the masses, these groups discovered contradictions and solved problems. This fine workstyle should be vigorously promoted. The vast number of cadres and workers on the economic front should take pride in learning and in digging hard to become experts. They should consider it disgraceful not to learn and to remain ignorant and to be an outsider over a long period. As we make progress in our study effort, our consciousness will be raised and recklessness reduced, and the results achieved will be better. To achieve the grand goal of turning China into a modern and powerful socialist state within this century, we must redouble our efforts in work and in study. Our efforts should be aimed at doing economic work really well, at gradually grasping and skillfully applying economic laws and at greatly improving the management level of economic work as a whole.

SERIOUSLY STUDY CHAIRMAN MAO'S THEORY ON THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

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[Article by Li Shih [7812 4258]]

[Text] China's rural people's commune system has been in existence for 20 years. In those 20 years, with the intensive development of the cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction, the people's commune underwent severe tests of class and line struggles and natural disasters and demonstrated its tremendous superiority and powerful vitality. Our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao personally led the commune movement and, after intensive and repeated investigation and study, summarized the practical experiences of the hundreds of millions of people and proposed an entire set of brilliant theories on the establishment and development of the people's commune. Today, as we review the history of the commune, a restudy of Chairman Mao's theories will be very significant in strengthening the building of the people's commune, fully developing its superiority, realizing the socialist modernization of China's agriculture, and performing even more successfully the general task of the new era proposed by Chairman Hua and the party Central Committee.

I

China's rural commune movement was a great creation of the masses and an inevitable product of the development of China's political and economic situation. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee, China basically completed the socialist reform of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce in 1956 and successfully realized the First Five-Year Plan in 1957, winning a great victory in the rectification movement and antirightist struggles. All these created favorable conditions for forming communes. In the first half of 1958 Chairman Mao summarized China's socialist construction of the past several years and the positive and negative experiences of the Soviet Union, and he proposed the general line of going all out, aiming high and building socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical

results. This general line was a vivid embodiment of Chairman Mao's effort to combine the Marxist theory on socialist construction and China's concrete reality and reflected the will and desire of China's 600 million people. Under the brilliant illumination of the party's general line, the broad masses responded to Chairman Mao's appeal, broke down superstition, liberated their minds, and developed the communist style of courage in thinking, speaking and doing. The production potential of the broad masses obtained an unprecedented great liberation, and a great leap forward situation appeared in the national economy. To launch production enterprises on an even larger scale, the masses of rural production cooperative members and basic level cadres undertook water conservation projects, transformed mountains and rivers, strove for abundant harvests, and attempted to realize a happy and beautiful new life, often breaking down the boundaries between cooperatives and between villages and practicing socialist cooperation. The existing advanced rural production cooperative was no longer suitable to the need of such production development, and the people's commune, like the morning sun appearing on the eastern horizon, was born at this moment. From April 1958 on, the masses and basic level cadres of Honan, Shantung, and Hopeh voluntarily merged the cooperatives and formed large economic organizations known as "people's communes," "communist communes," "large cooperatives," and "farms." In August, when Chairman Mao inspected the rural villages and saw the various industries of the newly formed people's communes, he was very pleased and praised the great creative undertaking of the masses, saying that "the people's commune is excellent." Immediately thereafter the issue of the people's commune was discussed at the Peitai-ho Conference sponsored and called by Chairman Mao, and the party Central Committee resolved to form communes in the rural villages. Under the inspiration of the resolution and the firm leadership of the party committees of all levels, the broad masses of rural cadres and cooperative members enthusiastically plunged into the great commune movement. In barely 6 months the people's commune developed vigorously and made great achievements.

The people's commune possessed the unique features of being big and publicly owned. Although its system of ownership at that stage was not essentially different from that of the agricultural producer cooperative, the people's commune had more people and land, and its scale of organization was large; therefore, it could mobilize and rationally deploy the rural labor force, make unified plans and arrange production on a larger scale. The commune could operate some production enterprises, collect a suitable amount of reserves from the production teams, and undertake certain public welfare projects. The unification of politics and administrative work the commune practiced made it easy to strengthen the leadership and hasten the comprehensive development of workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers and of agriculture, forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery. It created more favorable conditions for agriculture mechanization. Therefore, it had an even greater superiority in many aspects than the agricultural production

cooperative. The organization of the people's commune constituted the best form for the gradual transition from the small collective ownership in the rural village to a large one and for the future transition from the collective to the popular ownership system and from socialism to communism.

The commune movement was a new and unprecedented social movement of several hundred million people. While it was achieving great successes, it was inevitable that certain temporary and partial defects and errors would occur. Mainly it was the "communist style" of "egalitarianism and indiscriminate transfer of manpower, land, etc." Some cadres prematurely negated the nature of the collective ownership system of the people's commune, violated the principles of equivalent exchange and distribution according to labor, and encroached upon the ownership of the means of livelihood and the small amount of means of production which should belong to the individual members of the commune. Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee promptly uncovered such defects and errors, continuously conducted critical education, and successively took effective measures to overcome them. From the Chengchou Conference of November 1958, the Wuch'ang Conference of December 1958, the Chengchou Conference of February 1959, and the Shanghai Conference of March 1959 to the Lushan Conference of July 1959 the party Central Committee and the party committees of all areas performed a large amount of work on rectifying such defects and errors and made tremendous progress. Immediately thereafter, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee continued to investigate and study, summarized the experiences, and formulated a series of concrete policies. In November 1960 the party Central Committee issued the "Emergency Letter of Instruction on the Question of the Current Policy on the Rural People's Commune." At the Canton Conference in March 1961 it formulated the "Draft Regulation on the Work of Rural People's Communes." In February 1962 it issued the "Directive on the Question of Changing the Basic Accounting Unit of the Rural People's Commune." Nationally speaking, with the implementation of these directives and regulations and after commune reorganization and accounting, the defects and errors in the commune movement were rectified. While solving the problems, the serious attitude, effective measures, and correct methods adopted by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee also protected the enthusiasm of the broad masses of cadres and commune members and further reinforced and developed the people's commune system. In September 1962 the party's 10th Central Plenum of the 8th Session made the "Decision on Further Consolidating the Collective Economy of the People's Commune and Developing Agricultural Production." In May 1963 the party Central Committee formulated the "Draft Resolution on a Number of Problems in Current Rural Work." In 1964 Chairman Mao issued the great appeal to "learn from Tachai in agriculture." In January 1965 the party Central Committee issued "Some Problems Posed in the Rural Socialist Education Movement at Present." On 7 May 1966 Chairman Mao stated: "The peasants must take agriculture (including forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery) as the main factor, but they must also

learn military affairs, politics and culture and, when the conditions are present, collectively operate some small plants and criticize the bourgeoisie." Such instructions further enriched the theories on the people's commune and clarified the direction and path of its development.

The people's commune was consolidated and developed in the struggles between the two classes and the two lines. While our party adopted concrete measures to rectify the "leftist" tendency, Peng Te-huai's anti-party clique popped up in 1959, blowing a cold wind from the right. Echoing imperialism and Khrushchev's modern revisionism, it viciously attacked the people's commune as "premature," "messed up," and a manifestation of the "fanaticism of the petit bourgeoisie," and it recklessly assaulted the cause of our great party and great people. During the period of temporary difficulties in the national economy between 1960 and 1962, Liu Shao-chi advocated "fixed output by the household" and dividing the fields for individual operation, and he blew the evil wind of dissolving the collective economy of the people's commune. During the Great Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao and the "gang of four" opposed the party's basic line in the rural areas, protected the capitalist forces, objected to learning from Tachai in agriculture, resisted socialism and recklessly sabotaged the collective economy of the people's commune. Under the guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought, the party and the people smashed their reckless attack and eliminated their interference and sabotage. The people's commune continuously consolidated and developed in struggle and became an impregnable stronghold for China's rural villages to persevere in the socialist direction and develop the collective economy.

II

In the commune movement Chairman Mao carefully examined the contradictions between production relations and production forces, revealed the objective law for the emergence and development of the people's commune, correctly solved a series of problems in its ownership and distribution systems, and assured its sound development.

The nature of the ownership system of the people's commune was a momentous issue encountered right at the beginning of the movement. When the people's commune first appeared, Chairman Mao did not support the name "communist commune." He clearly pointed out that, while it was one level higher than the cooperative, the commune remained socialist in nature, and that the method of its operation was in the experimental stage. Nevertheless, as the commune movement started with a burst of power and the people were very enthusiastic, the progress was very rapid, and many cadres overestimated the commune. Anti-Marxist political swindler Chen Po-ta created much theoretical confusion, negated the nature of the collective ownership system of the commune, advocated abolition of commodity production and exchange, and wanted to realize the transition to communism in 1 or 2 years. Thus, the aforementioned "communist style"

of "egalitarianism, etc." swept over the commune movement and hurt the interests of the peasants, creating a sharp contradiction between our party and the basic-level cadres and peasants. As a result, the nature and management of the commune ownership system became an urgent issue requiring a suitable solution.

The essence of the issue, or the major contradiction, was the interpretation of the commune ownership system. Many comrades mistook the collective ownership system for the popular ownership system, socialism for communism, and distribution according to work for distribution according to need. To help the cadres clarify the dividing lines in ideology and refute Chen Po-ta's fallacies, Chairman Mao vigorously studied political economy and explained theoretically that China's people's communes at the current stage remained a socialist collective ownership system and that, unlike its handling of the products of state-operated industries, the state must not dispose of the products of the people's commune but must follow the commodity exchange system. It was the only form acceptable to the people's commune under the collective ownership system for the purpose of reinforcing the economic links between the city and the village.

Chairman Mao pointed out that the people's commune must undergo a development process for the collective ownership system to advance to the popular ownership system, and that the collective ownership system of the people's commune itself must also undergo a development process. This was determined by the level of development of the current rural production force. The people's commune was organized in answer to the need for the development of the production force and on the foundation of the advanced agricultural producer cooperative. In the degree of public ownership of means of production and the scale of production it was one big step further than the advanced cooperative, but it had not immediately or fundamentally changed the agricultural production conditions or the reliance on manual labor. Restricted by such a production force, the commune collective ownership system must undergo the development process of growing from small to large; it was impossible to introduce the commune basic ownership system the moment the commune was formed. Based on the experience gained in practice, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee in 1959 decided that the people's commune, at its then current stage, must follow the three-level ownership with the team as the foundation, i.e., the three-level ownership system with the production team (equivalent to the production brigade today) as the basic accounting unit, and they proposed that the individual commune members as well as the small production teams (equivalent to the production teams today) enjoy some ownership--the so-called large collective and small freedom. With the development of practice, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee found that the method still lacked perfection because of the distinction between the rights of ownership and of use and between the rights of production and of distribution, which was unfavorable to boosting the enthusiasm of the hundreds of millions of peasants and the

small-team cadres and to the consolidation and development of the commune. To solve the problem and stabilize the management system of the commune, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee in 1962 decided to let production teams serve as the basic accounting unit and remain so for a long period of time. They also pointed out that where the brigade was serving satisfactorily as the accounting unit, with output increasing and the masses satisfied, no change should be made.

Making the production team the basic accounting unit was a momentous decision of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee on the commune ownership system. It not only fundamentally solved the disharmony of the "four rights" and relatively thoroughly overcame the egalitarianism between teams, but also furnished a reliable safeguard to the self-governing rights of the production teams and eliminated the worries of the commune membership. It was even more compatible with the existing level of China's rural production force, the extent of awareness of the peasants, and the management of the basic-level cadres. Therefore, the decision received an enthusiastic welcome from the basic-level cadres and peasants and boosted their enthusiasm in developing the collective economy.

Chairman Mao clearly pointed out not only the inevitable tendency of the continuous development of the commune ownership system, but also the concrete steps and conditions of the transition. The advance from the basic ownership of the production team to that of the commune required two steps. The first step was to change from basic ownership by the production team to basic ownership by the production brigade, i.e., making the brigade the basic accounting unit. The second step was to change basic ownership by the brigade to that by the commune, i.e., making the commune the basic accounting unit. The process required decades, and it could not be hastened. The conditions for the transition were mainly two: One was the economic condition. The brigade (commune) must possess powerful economic strength, and the economic development of the various production teams (brigades) must in general be even. With this condition the relatively rich brigades, production teams and individual commune members would not suffer material loss in the transition but would find it advantageous, so that the production teams would share the wealth of the brigade, and the brigades the wealth of the commune concerned, not the other way round. The other condition was political, i.e., the willingness of the masses of commune members. When the material conditions were met, the change would be made if the masses were willing; if they were unwilling, the change would be postponed until they became willing. Such a starting point and emphasis stressed that the transition of the accounting unit must serve to boost the enthusiasm of the masses and promote the development of production.

The process of Chairman Mao's solution of the commune management system was a process of adhering to the Marxist epistemology, undergoing practice, understanding, repractice, and reunderstanding, gradually

approaching the objective truth step by step, and reflecting the objective law.

Today Chairman Mao's ideology on the commune management system still has realistic significance in guiding the building of the people's commune. In the past 20 years the people's commune has made great improvements in all aspects. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the level of development of China's rural production force is still relatively low, and the three-level ownership with the production team as the basic accounting unit remains basically compatible with the current rural production force and the degree of awareness of the peasants. On the issue of the transition of the ownership system, while adopting a positive attitude we must also proceed gradually. Where the conditions are ready, the transition must be made unit by unit and group by group. Where the conditions are lacking, we must actively create them, especially by helping the poor teams in production and turning them into rich ones, so that the transition can be made when the conditions are present.

In the process of solving the management system of the people's commune, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee made a series of clear provisions on its distribution system and rectified the deviations which once appeared. First, they solved the question of the right to distribute products. In the early period of the commune movement, this right, like the ownership, was concentrated in the commune, and the tendency toward excessive reserve and egalitarianism once existed. To solve the problem, Chairman Mao emphatically pointed out that the right to distribute products must belong to the production team, not the commune. After the production team was made the basic accounting unit, its right to distribute products was safeguarded by the system.

Next, when making distribution we must correctly handle the ratio between reserves and consumption, give consideration to the individual, the collective and the state, and enable the absolute majority of the commune members to increase their income year after year with the development of production in normal years. While opposing the tendency to excessive state and collective reserves but inadequate distribution to the commune members, we must also guard against ignoring reserves and dividing up everything. On the relationship among the three, Chairman Mao reminded everyone of the error once committed by the Soviet Union in depriving the peasants, which resulted in the long-term backwardness of agricultural production. He also educated the broad cadres with China's revolutionary history and pointed out that, beginning with Ching-kang-shan, we had always practiced fair trade and equal exchange of value. A Marxist must never exploit the laborers. Since we did not adopt the method of deprivation without compensation toward the national bourgeoisie, an exploiting class, how could we take the fruits of the laboring people without compensation? In 1959 Chairman Mao pointed out emphatically that an accounting must be made of the assets of the production teams and peasants taken without compensation and that we must

be determined to repay the debt even if we had to go bankrupt. We must not hesitate to relinquish such assets, because they were taken by force.

How intimate are Chairman Mao's instructions when we read them today! Currently, in a considerably large number of rural areas, the serious situation of "stretching one's hands to the production teams above and below, left and right, and excavating its foundation wall on all sides" exists. Some people always try to get something from the peasants, levying labor force, resources, and funds from production teams for all kinds of local industries, shifting to the peasants the burden of expenses which they should not have shouldered and creating the situation of an increase in output bringing no increase in income and distribution in some areas. This situation seriously undermines the socialist enthusiasm of the peasants, making it difficult to rally the hundreds of millions to struggle for the general task of the new era. We must adopt concrete and effective measures and firmly rectify all conduct infringing, directly or in disguise, on the interests of the peasants.

Thirdly, in the distribution of consumer goods to individuals we must firmly follow the socialist principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work," compensation according to the quantity and quality of work, and more to those who work more, and we must firmly rectify egalitarianism. This is an important condition for successfully handling the socialist collective economy. Chairman Mao pointed out that channeling communism toward egalitarianism was undesirable, but so was excessive discrepancy, and that suitable consideration must be given to the five-guarantee households, households having difficulties, and family members of military patriots; they must not be ignored. Meanwhile, we must successfully handle the collective welfare. Chairman Mao said: "Political work must be combined with distribution according to labor. I think it is an excellent thing." In distribution work we must reinforce political-ideological work and combine the communist spirit and the socialist system. To implement the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his labor," Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee summarized the experiences since cooperativization and provided a set of effective and concrete methods, such as quota management and workpoints by evaluation.

Due to the interference and sabotage of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," the distribution principles and methods formulated by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee were not conscientiously implemented in some areas. In such areas the political work was undermined, and the management system was slack. The egalitarian tendency toward no distinction between whether one worked or not, between more and less work and between satisfactory and unsatisfactory work prevailed, and more labor did not bring more pay. Such a situation was unfavorable to boosting the enthusiasm of the peasants and detrimental to the realization of agricultural

modernization. We must, in the process of intensively criticizing the "gang of four," conscientiously correct it.

III

The consolidation and development of the people's commune, at the very bottom, hinge on the vigorous development of the agricultural production force and the realization of agricultural mechanization and modernization. After introducing communization in our rural villages, in the high tide of large-scale rural capital construction and water conservation, the broad masses of cadres deeply felt the shortage of manpower and the low productivity and urgently needed mechanization. Meanwhile, to introduce scientific farming and realize steady and high yields, mechanization was also required. In sum, the wide use of obsolete farm tools and manual labor in the rural villages was a great contradiction to the high-speed development of agricultural production and the ceaseless reinforcement of the commune collective economy. Pinpointing this situation, Chairman Mao pointed out emphatically: "The fundamental path for agriculture is mechanization." Equipping agriculture with machinery was a determining factor for the great development of farming, forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery. After communization, though the level of collective ownership of the means of production rose even higher, if it was not combined with mechanization the development of agricultural production would be limited. Only when China thoroughly completes the socialist reform in the social economic system and uses machinery in all units and areas where machine operation is feasible in the technical aspect will our agricultural production develop greatly and labor productivity increase from several to many dozen times compared with manual labor. Only then will there be a total transformation in the entire social economy.

Agricultural mechanization is not only the most important technical means to raise labor productivity but also the material foundation to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance. After communization, our worker-peasant alliance must enter a new stage, i.e., the stage of building it on the foundation of consolidating the people's commune and realizing mechanization. It cannot be consolidated with communization alone, without mechanization. Only with both communization and mechanization will the worker-peasant alliance built on the foundation of the socialist ownership system be further consolidated on the foundation of modern technology.

The realization of China's communization has created a favorable condition for agricultural mechanization. As the organizational scale of the people's commune is large and its sphere of operation extensive, large numbers of modern machines can be used in production. With the workers, peasants, merchants, students and soldiers as one entity and the general development of farming, forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery, the people's commune, following the development and growth of

the economic and cultural enterprises, can accumulate funds for agricultural mechanization and train technical talent, relying mainly on itself to realize mechanization gradually.

Chairman Mao not only pointed out the necessity and feasibility of agricultural mechanization but also provided the path for its realization in China.

In 1955 he pointed out: "We must first have cooperativization before we can use heavy equipment." He criticized the erroneous viewpoint of "mechanization before cooperativization." He also pointed out that collectivization as the first step and mechanization and electrification on the foundation of collectivization as the second step constituted our party's basic line on the agricultural issue. In other words, China must activate mechanization by the socialist revolution of the system of ownership of the means of production and consolidate the fruits of such a revolution by mechanization.

As China is an economically backward, large agrarian country, agricultural mechanization, "integrating the indigenous and the foreign," must be realized gradually in several stages. In a considerable period of time after communization, due to the shortage of machinery, we must continue to breed draft animals, promote semimechanization, and improve farm tools in order to raise labor efficiency and save manpower. Meanwhile, we must actively produce farm machinery which has been tested and found efficient and which is popular with the masses and, in qualified areas, basically realize mechanization and semimechanization of the major farm tasks. Thereafter we will generally realize mechanization and equip agriculture with modern machinery and science and technology.

Pinpointing China's historical characteristics and concrete conditions, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee proposed that the manufacture of farm machinery must rest mainly with the local areas, that the farm machine products must be mainly medium-size and small, and that the purchase of farm machinery must be undertaken mainly by the collective economy. The policy pointed out that we must, under the unified planning and organization of the central government, activate the positivity of the central and the local and fully develop the positivity and creativity of the local areas and people's communes in developing farm machinery before we can hasten the pace of agricultural mechanization.

With the development of agricultural mechanization, the rural population will drop. In view of the excessive urban population due to agricultural mechanization which has occurred in many countries, Chairman Mao pointed out that it would be undesirable for the rural population, reduced by mechanization, to crowd into the cities, causing an excessive inflation of the urban population. From now on we must pay attention to this issue. To prevent it, the rural living standard must be made approximately the same as the urban living standard, or even slightly better.

With the people's commune it becomes possible to solve the issue. Every people's commune must have its own economic center. It must, in accordance with unified planning, vigorously undertake industries, so that the peasants will turn into workers in their own area. The commune must have its own higher schools to train the high-level intellectuals it needs. Once this point is reached, the rural population will not flow aimlessly into the cities. We must, in accordance with Chairman Mao's thinking, promptly give attention to this issue, which is of strategic significance, study the questions of commune operation of industries, industrialization of agricultural production, and turning peasants into workers in their own areas, and open the path for the final elimination of the gap between the city and the village and between the worker and the peasant.

Agricultural mechanization was a great appeal made by Chairman Mao to the entire party and the people throughout the nation, a decisive measure to rapidly change the backward situation of agriculture, and a momentous event linked with China's destiny. In the past 20 years the cadres and masses in the entire nation, for the purpose of realizing this great goal, have performed diligent labor and laid a definite material foundation. Nevertheless, due to the serious interference and sabotage of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Biao, and especially the "gang of four," the progress of China's agricultural mechanization was delayed. After smashing the "gang of four," the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua promptly called the Third National Conference on Agricultural Mechanization and considered the realization of agricultural mechanization an important task of grasping the key link in running the country. We must firmly implement the spirit of the conference, perform our work successfully, and struggle for the basic realization of agricultural mechanization in 1980!

IV

As the people's commune, compared with the agricultural production cooperative, must organize production on a larger scale and promote the general development of farming, forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery, a higher level of management is required. Adhering to the policy of democratic, diligent and thrifty commune operation and successfully handling commune management are extremely important for consolidating and developing the socialist collective economy.

Democratic commune operation is the fundamental path for the people's commune to succeed in operation and management. The membership masses are the masters of the commune and have the right to control all its enterprises. All the communes and brigades must learn from the PLA and practice democracy in politics, production, finance and military affairs. All important matters must be fully discussed at mass meetings of the membership, or membership delegates; they must not be decided by just a few cadres. In regard to undertaking rural capital construction,

improving the cultivation system, and formulating planting plans and measures to increase output, the opinions of the members must be conscientiously solicited and their practical experience given serious attention. The finances of the communes and brigades must be open to the public, the accounts published according to a schedule, and the supervision of the masses accepted. Only thus will the members truly feel that they are the masters of the commune, become interested in the operation and management of the commune and, together with the cadres, devote their efforts to the various enterprises.

Planned management is an important link in operation and management. Chairman Mao paid serious attention to realizing the planned and proportionate development of the commune economy by means of planned management. After communization, the rural villages acquired more conditions to develop all kinds of industries according to plan. "General development with grain as the key link" is our policy in the development of agricultural production. Based on its own practical situation, the people's commune must, under the guidance of this policy, formulate both relatively long-range and current-year production plans. The plans must be based on objective feasibility, so that in arranging farming, forestry, livestock, subsidiary production and fishery, in assigning production quotas among such crops as grain, cotton, oil and vegetables, in determining the speed of development of production, and in other aspects they will reflect, as much as possible, the demands of objective laws. If we fail to base the plans on objective laws or to adjust to the locale, production will not develop at a high speed according to plan, and it will lose its balance. A margin must be left when formulating plans, so that the cadres and masses will surpass them in practical work, as it will activate their positivity even further. We must propose concrete measures for realizing the plans and assure their performance. To make the economic work of the people's commune even more detailed, intensive, practical and scientific, more careful planning is required. Nevertheless, it is impossible for a plan to be perfect, without the slightest defect. Furthermore, unexpected conditions and problems will be encountered in the process of carrying it out. Anything incompatible with reality must be revised. The leaders of all levels of the people's commune must be skillful in flexibly handling and promptly readjusting plans according to practical conditions in order to guarantee the proportionate and balanced development of all items of the commune economy.

Production management is the most fundamental link in assuring the realization of the economic plans of the people's commune and the continuous development of its production. Chairman Mao made intensive studies of all aspects of production management of the people's commune and issued a series of instructions. Commune leaders of all levels must follow his instructions and reinforce production management, giving special attention to the following items: (1) Generally implement the "eight-character code," i.e., soil improvement, fertilizer, irrigation, seeds, close planting, crop protection, farm tool reform, and field

management. Fully activate the masses and extensively pursue rural capital construction centering on soil improvement and water conservation. Practice scientific farming, stress the cultivation and introduction of superior strains, improve the cultivation system, extensively open up fertilizer sources, widely use organic fertilizer, and rationally apply chemical fertilizer. Conscientiously handle plant protection and control insect pests. Vigorously improve agricultural production tools, develop farm machinery, conscientiously handle the maintenance and management of farm machinery, and cultivate and train farm machine operators. Actively expand the advanced technology of agriculture production and promptly and carefully complete field management. (2) Launch socialist labor competitions and mass movements to compare with, learn from, and catch up with the advanced, help the backward, and surpass the advanced. Stimulate energy and strive for the upstream in the competitions. On the agricultural front, Tachai is the upstream and the model for all communes and brigades in the nation to learn from, catch up with, and surpass. All communes and brigades must establish a noble ambition and make a great determination, work like the Tachai Brigade, and strive for the high-speed development of agriculture. (3) Establish and make sound the production responsibility system and introduce quota management. It is not good to have no one responsible for field management. We must practice the responsibility system, make general arrangements, and perform our work in an orderly manner. We must combine the powerful mass movement with the enforcement of a strict responsibility system and division of labor and responsibility in management, and promptly overcome the disorderly phenomena in production. (4) Based on the plans of the state and the communes and brigades, perfect labor organization and rationally distribute manpower. The commune's distribution of manpower is a momentous issue. Chairman Mao once pointed out that we must make general arrangements according to the legitimate needs of agriculture, industry, transportation, the service industries, and others so that the distribution of manpower in all aspects will reach a balance. We must save manpower, permitting no waste. The personnel of service industries, wherever excessive, must be reduced. Administrative personnel must constitute less than 1 percent of the commune members. The development of the cultural-educational enterprise must not take up excessive manpower. The commune must not permit cultural work groups and sports teams severed from production. Chairman Mao's instructions remain the criterion today in our distribution of manpower. Currently, the irrational distribution of manpower in the commune is its generally inadequate assignment to agriculture, which must be corrected. Primarily, we must guarantee the manpower needs of agriculture, strictly control taking labor away from the production teams, and devote the greater part of manpower to agriculture. We must firmly reduce the nonproduction personnel and shift them to the frontline of agricultural production.

Like any other socialist economic enterprise, the economy of the people's commune requires business accounting. It is an important measure in practicing the policy of "diligent and thrifty operation of the commune."

Business accounting includes making accounts, reducing costs, and increasing income. To attain this point we must, under the guidance of state plans, utilize the law of value as the tool of computation. Business accounting will benefit the rational organization of production, continuously raise labor productivity, and effectively overcome waste in management. Overlooking business accounting and scorning the law of value will damage the commune economy. We must establish and make sound the financial management system and successfully handle business accounting in order to save manpower, materials and money which can be saved, increase the income of the commune members and the reserves of the communes and brigades, and promote the development of the commune economy year after year.

Organizing the life of the commune members is an important part of the commune's management work. Chairman Mao was always extremely concerned about the life of the commune members. In the communization movement the situation of "giving consideration to production and forgetting living" generally occurred. Chairman Mao gave serious attention to the issue, called the attention of the responsible comrades to it many times, and proposed concrete methods of solution: (1) Do not make the tasks too heavy; do not exceed the capacity of the masses; leave a margin for them. (2) Tackle production and living simultaneously; walk with both legs; avoid one-sidedness. According to the spirit of Chairman Mao's instructions, the party committees of all levels adopted measures, readjusted the pace of production, combined labor and leisure, gave the commune members the required rest between two battles, vigorously handled collective welfare, taught the commune members to form budgets, be industrious and thrifty and carefully arrange their life, and solved the eating, sleeping, and childcare problems of the commune members. As shown by practice, only by developing production will the commune be able to gradually improve the life of its members, while improving the life of the members will inevitably promote a greater development of production. Failing to give attention to living or to feel concern for the problems of the members will make it difficult to succeed in production. The leaders of all levels of the people's commune must follow Chairman Mao's instructions, show sincere concern for the life of the commune members, and make them feel relaxed and vigorous and pursue production with a greater energy.

V

Chairman Mao gave serious attention to the rectification of the people's commune. In the past 20 years, in accordance with his proletarian revolutionary line, we launched in the rural areas such large-scale mass rectification work as conduct and commune rectification, "four-clean-ups" and basic line education, solved the problems appearing in the progress of the people's commune, and assured its consolidation and development.

As in the city, classes and class struggle exist in the rural villages throughout the entire socialist period. Therefore, in rectification we must grasp the key link of the class struggle and of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist paths. Currently we must firmly rely on the poor and lower-middle peasants, freely activate the masses, continue to expose and intensively criticize the "gang of four," and thoroughly purge their remnant poison and influence; we must firmly hit the class enemies sabotaging the socialist public ownership system and the commune collective economy, attack the corrupt and thieving elements and the speculators, and eliminate the social foundation of the "gang of four." In regard to the spontaneous capitalist tendency among the people, we must not resort to simple force but must solve it by means of persuasive education and the method of criticism and self-criticism. In conjunction with economic work, we must concretely and meticulously conduct ideological-political work and continuously instill the socialist ideology in the peasants. Only by so doing will we clarify the right and wrong of the lines and assure the continuous progress of the people's commune along the socialist path.

The crucial point of rectification is the leadership team. The people's commune must possess a firm leadership nucleus which can implement the party's lines and policies. This is what the success or failure of the commune hinges on. For many years Chairman Mao gave serious attention to the building and rectification of the commune and brigade leadership teams, asked that the county and local committees pay attention to reinforcing the leadership of the commune, and demanded that the politically strong comrades help guide the weak communes. The county and the commune must give attention to reinforcing the leadership backbone of the brigades and of the production teams serving as the basic accounting units. When rectifying the leadership ranks, we must first clarify the conditions, make distinctions in handling, and correctly distinguish and handle the contradictions of two different natures. We must commend and publicize the good men and good deeds. We must stress the ideological education of those making mistakes, adhere to the principle of "unite--criticize--unite" and the policy of "punishment as a deterrent; cure the ailment to save the patient," and be strict in criticism and lenient in handling. While criticizing mistakes we must protect the positivity of the cadres and the masses with maximum education and minimum punishment, so that we will finally rally 95 percent or more of the cadres and masses. Under the policy of education as the main factor, we must also undertake the necessary organization and rectification. Chairman Mao pointed out that, in regard to the leading cadres of the backward counties, communes and brigades which were really inefficient, we must resolutely replace them. We must not be lenient and indulgent, to the detriment of the overall situation. All the undesirables who infiltrated or who displayed a socialist sign but performed capitalist deeds must be purged from the leadership teams. All the bureaucrats who had no concern for the people and who, regardless of their subjective view, performed capitalist deeds must be eliminated

from the leadership ranks. Nevertheless, we must still educate them and reform the bureaucrats into nonbureaucrats, handling them as problems among the people. In regard to those whose lines are incorrect, whose energy is insufficient, or who have failed to work properly over a long period of time, we must replace them and promote those who have a high awareness, great energy, and a correct workstyle and who are fair in their dealings. In recent years, due to the "gang of four's" sabotage and influence, the leadership teams of some communes and brigades have been seriously impure. We must thoroughly criticize the "gang of four's" revisionist cadre line and successfully rectify and build the commune leadership teams of all levels according to Chairman Mao's teachings.

Rectifying the workstyle is an important content in rectifying the leadership team. In the communization movement, the party's mass line work method and the workstyle of seeking the truth through the facts, such as "cultivating experimental farms" by the cadres, "grasping the two ends to activate the middle," observing the evaluations and comparisons, and holding on-site meetings, achieved momentous development. Nevertheless, during the movement the commandism and exaggerating style of some cadres once spread seriously, causing damage to the party's superior tradition of the mass line and seeking the truth through the facts and to the relations between the party and the masses. Chairman Mao promptly uncovered the problems and asked the entire party to rectify them as a serious political issue. He repeatedly stressed the party's mass line, conscientiously solicited the opinions of the masses, felt concern for the interests of the masses every day and every hour, and strove to make his political measures compatible with the current level of awareness and urgent needs of the masses. He stressed the workstyle of seeking the truth through the facts, starting from reality in everything, and reporting conditions truthfully, with energy and without falsehood; he stressed that the cadres must regard themselves as ordinary laborers, treat others with equality, persistently participate in collective productive labor, and share the sweet and the bitter with the masses. Under the long-term guidance of Mao Tsetung Thought, the majority of our commune and brigade cadres possessed a good style and received the true support of the masses. However, due to the counterrevolutionary revisionist influence and poison of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and especially the "gang of four," some of them neglected investigation and study, refused to consult the masses, resorted to coercion, orders, and blind direction, ignored the problems of the masses, failed to participate in collective productive labor, and preferred pleasure to work; others made false reports, deceived the superior and hoodwinked the inferior, took arbitrary actions, suppressed dissenting views, and attacked and took revenge; still others violated law and discipline, beat and reviled others, or even dealt out private punishment, persecuting the masses. Such an evil workstyle seriously damaged the party's cause and the interest of the masses and required effective measures for its rectification. The very small minority of those committing serious mistakes must be handled according to party discipline and state law. We

must recover and develop the party's superior tradition and effect a great change in the cadre workstyle.

Chairman Mao repeatedly advocated that the cadres learn Marxist theories, study their professions, and raise their ideological level. He once suggested that the cadres of all levels, in conjunction with the reality of China's socialist revolution and construction, study such books as Stalin's "Problems of Socialist Economics in the Soviet Union," clarify socialism and communism and the meaning of "to each according to his labor" and exchange of equal value, and acquire a clear mind in order to direct our great socialist cause. He also proposed that our comrades undergo education in dialectical materialist epistemology in order to rectify their thinking, become skillful in investigation and study and summarizing experiences, perform their work successfully, overcome the difficulties, and make less mistakes. Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee demanded that, in addition to learning politics, the cadres must learn skills and concrete economic management and stubbornly master unfamiliar things, so that they would become Red and expert cadres understanding both politics and their own professions.

To rectify the people's commune, we must conscientiously implement the party's rural economic policies. Generally and correctly implementing the party's rural policies is a constant task of the party organization of the people's commune. In commune rectification, Chairman Mao stressed that the cadres must truly understand the policies, raise their policy level, and arm and activate the masses with the policies. Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee summarized the practical experiences of rural work and formulated a series of rural economic policies, such as "from each according to his ability, to each according to his labor," exchange of equal value, diversified economy, collective subsidiary production, encouragement for marketing agricultural and subsidiary products, permitting the commune members to work their small private plots and operate family subsidiary enterprises, permitting legitimate market trading, etc. As shown by practice, such policies were compatible with the current development of China's agricultural production and the degree of awareness of the peasants and favorable to the development of agricultural production, the improvement of the peasants' life, and the consolidation and growth of the commune collective economy. Due to the interference and sabotage of Lin Piao and the "gang of four," they were not implemented in many areas. To overcome the serious consequences of the "gang of four's" sabotage, the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua adopted a series of effective measures and carried out various rural policies. Recently the party Central Committee published the experiences of Hsiang-hsiang County, Hunan Province, in conscientiously implementing the party's policies and striving to lighten the irrational burden on the peasants, and it issued important instructions. It is a momentous measure to activate the peasants' socialist enthusiasm and develop agriculture at a high speed. Rural party organizations of all levels must fully understand the importance and urgency

of implementing the party's rural policies, conscientiously carry out the instructions of the party Central Committee in the struggle to expose and criticize the "gang of four," investigate the existing problems in their own areas by referring to the experiences of Hsiang-hsiang, and rectify them with effective measures, so that the party's rural policies are implemented item by item and concrete results gained. All areas and units must, in accordance with the spirit of the instructions of the party Central Committee, firmly implement the policy of taking agriculture as the foundation, concretely perform their work for the peasants, and contribute their own efforts in support of agricultural development.

When commemorating the 20th anniversary of the people's commune, we must, under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, conscientiously study Chairman Mao's theories on the people's commune, summarize experiences, strengthen the building of the people's commune, intensify our understanding of the great significance of learning from Tachai in agriculture, activate the broad masses, launch a new high tide in the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and build more Tachai-type counties, and vigorously struggle for the socialist modernization of our agriculture in this century.

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ON CHIH HENG

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[Article by RED FLAG editorial department]

[Text] In January 1974, when the "gang of four" were stepping up their conspiratorial activities to usurp party and state power, a so-called "publicist" by the name of Chih Heng appeared on the political scene in China.

Chih Heng became the leading critic and ran amuck for some time. In close coordination with each step taken by the "gang of four" to usurp party and state power, Chih Heng dished out one antiparty article after another in RED FLAG. These articles pointed the spearhead of attack at Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, Chairman Hua and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation and vigorously spread reactionary fallacies aimed at throwing the party, army and country into confusion. The articles were hard to beat in the poison they spread far and wide, the harm they did and the indignation they aroused among the masses.

Who was Chih Heng? What kind of role did he play in the "gang of four's" conspiratorial activities to usurp party and state power? What was his status? What harm did he cause? Let us lift the black curtain and make the truth known to the world.

I

The rise and fall of Chih Heng were closely linked with the 11th line struggle between our party and the "gang of four."

The notorious name Chih Heng was the pseudonym for a band of hack writers cultivated singlehandedly and strictly controlled by the alien class element Yao Wen-yuan and represented by his few followers in the editorial department of RED FLAG. To lay out a battle formation to attack the party, this band of writers also used other pseudonyms, such as Cheng Yueh, Fang Kang, Lu Chen, Tien Chun, Yen Chang, Li Chang, and so forth.

However, Chih Heng alone enjoyed a special status. Generally, the name Chih Heng was used only for major antiparty articles as designated by Yao Wen-yuan. Later on the pseudonym Cheng Yueh was also used alternately. Chih Heng also published a number of antiparty articles in the form of "short commentaries."

The emergence of Chih Heng was entirely for the purpose of meeting a special need of the "gang of four's" conspiracy to usurp party and state power. An important part of the gang's conspiratorial activities was to seize control of the mass media, create counterrevolutionary public opinion in a big way, throw the whole country into chaos and seize power amid the confusion. To create confusion in line, ideology and theory and to point the spearhead of attack at great leader Chairman Mao, esteemed and beloved Premier Chou, wise leader Chairman Hua, Vice Chairman Yeh, Vice Chairman Teng and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation, the "gang of four" needed an instrument that could both manufacture and control reactionary public opinion. The gang keenly felt that the hack writers Liang Hsiao, Lo Ssu-ting, Tang Hsiao-wen and Chu Lan alone could not fully meet their counterrevolutionary need. Hence the emergence of Chih Heng. Yao Wen-yuan once said: "All eyes look to RED FLAG." Obviously Yao Wen-yuan was keenly aware of the paramount importance of RED FLAG as a theoretical organ. His criminal purpose was to use this position to control public opinion nationwide. This was the origin of the emergence of Chih Heng.

How did Chih Heng fire the first shot at the party? After the 10th National CCP Congress, Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee decided to prepare for the Fourth National People's Congress. The gang felt this was their opportunity and plotted to "form a cabinet" and seize power. They plotted in secret and attempted to take the opportunity of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius to mount wild attacks on the party. In October 1973 Yao Wen-yuan began to incite the manufacture of reactionary public opinion which did not criticize Lin Piao, only pretended to criticize Confucius and took a different path. On 3 December that year he summoned his few followers in RED FLAG. The leaders of Chih Heng volunteered to write antiparty articles for him on a "trial basis." Yao Wen-yuan immediately expressed his approval and told them to concentrate on writing articles of a "political commentary type"; that is, to disseminate the reactionary theory and counterrevolutionary plan of the "gang of four" to usurp party and state power through Chih Heng with so-called "revolutionary" words and phrases and to set the tune for counterrevolutionary opinion. Yao Wen-yuan gave his followers the assignment. He alleged that "now there indeed are ideas negating the Great Cultural Revolution" and told them to write articles to counter such ideas. Chih Heng fully understood and worked painstakingly. In RED FLAG No. 1 of 1974, Chih Heng made its first appearance and opened fire on the party, dishing out a reactionary article entitled "Uphold the Proletarian World Outlook." The article energetically preached that after every major struggle there inevitably would be reversals,

retrogression and restoration; suggested that in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius it was necessary to criticize the so-called people who tried to "hold back the wheel of history"; and labeled the cadres and masses who opposed the "gang of four" as "opposing the Great Cultural Revolution," "clinging to the bourgeois world outlook," "retrogressive" and "restorationist," vainly attempting to overthrow a large number of veteran cadres. Look how sharply Chih Heng showed the factional nature of the "gang of four" as soon as it made its first appearance!

From its debut to its extinction, Chih Heng staged most hideous performances on the political scene, leaving behind a shameful record of troublemaking, failures and extinction.

It was this Chih Heng that actively danced to the tune set by Yao Wen-yuan and became an effective tool of the "gang of four." Without exception, the large numbers of antiparty articles written or organized by Chih Heng were all concocted carefully in accordance with the instructions of the gang, particularly Yao Wen-yuan. Available records show that between October 1973 and September 1976, Yao Wen-yuan summoned or telephoned instructions to his several followers in RED FLAG a total of 97 times. As soon as Yao Wen-yuan hatched a plan, his several followers would take action, organize a force and dish out poisonous weeds day and night. Yao Wen-yuan personally supervised and had a hand in these articles, from selecting a subject to deciding on the content, structure, method, the pseudonym to be used and repeated revisions, working with unsparing efforts. Chih Heng also displayed tremendous counterrevolutionary enthusiasm. Not only did it take great pains to raise the "gang of four's" nonsense to a "theoretical level," making it more deceptive, but a number of reactionary subjects, viewpoints and extra-large labels were either proposed or produced by Chih Heng.

It was this Chih Heng that with its special counterrevolutionary political sensitivity served as an anxious vanguard to create public opinion for the "gang of four" to usurp party and state power. From the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius to the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and from the criticism of the novel "Water Margin" to going a different way in 1976, Chih Heng dished out one reactionary article after another to set the tune, give orders and take the lead in making trouble and stirred up four antiparty upsurges. In fact, it became for a time the noisy "authoritative spokesman" for the "gang of four's" counterrevolutionary fallacies. All the strange antiparty absurdities, such as criticizing "the prime minister," "the big Confucian," "the theory of productive forces" and "empiricism," the theory of "the basis of rights" and the theory of "taking rights as the center," the allegations that "some changed from bourgeois democrats to capitalist roaders" and that "there was a bourgeois class" in the party, etc., were played up with Chih Heng in the lead.

It was this Chih Heng that closely collaborated with Liang Hsiao, Lo Ssu-ting, Tang Hsiao-wen and Chu Lan and formed a "holy alliance" to create counterrevolutionary public opinion. A chieftain of Chih Heng declared that these groups were "politically of one family." A big chieftain of Lo Ssu-ting said: "We are of the same front." The northern tyrant Chih Chun, upon seeing a chieftain of Chih Heng, lavished praise on him, saying: "RED FLAG is run by a few people, but run very well." The chieftain of Chih Heng said in return: "Liang Hsiao has also given great support to RED FLAG." While Chih Heng went to Liang Hsiao, Lo Ssu-ting, Tang Hsiao-wen and Chu Lan to pass on the instructions of the "gang of four," organize antiparty articles and provide the antiparty position, it was in turn visited at RED FLAG and supplied with information and antiparty ammunition by them. They ganged up and competed with each other to start trouble. In the 3 years from the party's 10th national congress to the downfall of the "gang of four," more than 100 antiparty articles were dished out through the theoretical journal RED FLAG. So far as antiparty articles published in RED FLAG were concerned, those by Chih Heng outstripped in number those by Liang Hsiao and Lo Ssu-ting combined and were no less if not more reactionary than the latter.

Chih Heng, making use of the position of RED FLAG, the theoretical journal of the party Central Committee, thus gained national status to manufacture and control counterrevolutionary public opinion. Although Chih Heng's standing was below that of Liang Hsiao, Chiang Ching's "northern gate scholar," in the days when the "gang of four" were running amuck, as soon as Yao Wen-yuan gave the order and as soon as Chih Heng's articles were dished out, newspapers and magazines throughout the country had to carry them prominently and sing the same tune. The "gang of four" were free to tamper with and oppose Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, but others were not allowed to disseminate and defend it. In view of this serious situation, in September 1975 Chairman Mao approved Vice Chairman Teng's proposal to put the Political Research Office of the State Council in charge of preparations for running the journal IDEOLOGICAL FRONT to disseminate and defend Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. The "gang of four" were scared out of their wits. They fiercely labeled others and did their best to attack this decision by the party Central Committee. In addition, they frenziedly vilified several veteran cadres who had long been engaged in party theoretical propaganda work and who were making preparations for the publication of IDEOLOGICAL FRONT. The chieftains of Chih Heng echoed their cries, saying: "This shows that they are going to counter RED FLAG!" "Whenever they publish an article we will also publish one criticizing it!" As a result, IDEOLOGICAL FRONT, which the masses of people had long desired, was finally aborted by the "gang of four." A chieftain of Chih Heng, although feeling a sense of shock at the sudden turn of events, nevertheless said gleefully: "If we had a competitor, people might become more enthusiastic and things might become more pretty to look at. Regrettably, we are not going to have competition!" This exposed his hideous aim of monopolizing the news media.

It was this Chih Heng that, relying on the awe-inspiring power of its masters, the "gang of four," blatantly acted as a hegemonist of the political forum. All articles contributed by people from various localities and departments had to be checked against Yao Wen-yuan's standards, and if they did not live up to those standards, the articles were edited beyond recognition. If anyone showed the slightest discontent, pressure was applied, and if the case against him was serious, he was attacked. Furthermore, Yao's followers sent the revolutionary masses' letters and articles criticizing the "gang of four" and Chih Heng to Yao Wen-yuan and, with Yao's approval, forwarded some of them to the public security departments in order to attack and persecute the revolutionary masses. How despotic and frenzied!

All this proves that Chih Heng was the "gang of four's" forceful trumpeter. It laboriously achieved distinction in serving the "gang of four" and won their favor. The Kuomintang special agent Chang Chung-chiao praised Chih Heng at a meeting, saying: There are only a few people in the RED FLAG office, but they write quickly; they have vigor. The renegade Chiang Ching showed Chih Heng documents containing her instructions and commended it. Once, Chiang Ching wrote on the margin of one manuscript submitted to her by Chih Heng: "I've added half a sentence. I think it is well written." On many occasions Yao Wen-yuan confided to his followers that Chih Heng was trustworthy, adding: "The RED FLAG staff has become a leading group" that has "grown in the course of struggle." "One-third" of the articles carried in each issue of RED FLAG were spared Yao Wen-yuan's editing, as Chih Heng took "responsibility" for them. Fully trusted by the "gang of four," these cohorts were elated and overwhelmed by the gang's favor.

The fundamental reason that Chih Heng could summon the wind and waves is that during the period the "gang of four" had part of the state power in their hands the leadership of RED FLAG was usurped by them.

RED FLAG under Yao Wen-yuan's control was the "gang of four's" independent kingdom which no one could enter. The caretakers of the kingdom were a few cohorts trained by Yao Wen-yuan. These cohorts were eager to curry the "gang of four's" favor. They had no Chairman Mao or the party Central Committee in mind, but rather Yao Wen-yuan and the gang's "central committee." To put it in their own jargon, they "falsely adhere to Chairman Mao's words while actually following Yao Wen-yuan's words." At that time many people both inside and outside the party asked: "After all, who owns RED FLAG?" "What Chih Heng sings is different from the documents of the central authorities. What is the reason?" The whole story is now clear to everyone. The antiparty articles dished out by Chih Heng were all written according to the "gang of four's" instructions. They could never represent the party's voice. Chih Heng's No. 1 chieftain clamored: "At most, all they can do is call the journal a factional journal." This was indeed an unsolicited confession! Excellent!

II

Chih Heng's counterrevolutionary political life and the counterrevolutionary public opinion it created and organized were all dedicated to serving the "gang of four's" scheme to usurp party and state power. This was the crux of all the crimes committed by Chih Heng.

A scrupulous study of RED FLAG when it was controlled by the "gang of four" and a careful analysis of the numerous poisonous articles concocted and organized by Chih Heng will enable us to see clearly that their counterrevolutionary spearhead was above all pointed at our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao. Whenever Chairman Mao made a strategic plan, the "gang of four," proceeding from their plot to usurp party and state power, would invariably divert its direction and do something else in a wild effort to undermine the plan. Whenever Chairman Mao issued an important instruction, the gang would either totally prevent it from being made known or distort and change and stubbornly oppose it according to their counterrevolutionary political needs. Loyally acting on the ideas of the "gang of four," Chih Heng concocted numerous poisonous articles to blatantly oppose Chairman Mao, Mao Tsetung Thought and Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.

After the 10th National CCP Congress, Chairman Mao issued an important instruction to counter the "gang of four's" destructive troublemaking. He said: "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has already gone on for 8 years; it is better to have stability now. The whole party and the whole army should be united." Chairman Mao's instruction represented the fundamental interests of the masses of party members, cadres and people, who had suffered from the evil deeds of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" for many years, and it was what was in the minds of everybody. But it frightened the "gang of four," and they did everything they could to oppose it. It was at this time that Yao Wen-yuan instructed Chih Heng to write a commentary on "one divides into two." Chih Heng's chief leader instantly submitted a plan to Yao Wen-yuan noting that the discussion on unity would be principally on the necessity of "being aware of one tendency covering another." Yao was highly pleased with the plan and took up his brush and changed the discussion on unity into "a question of struggle and unity." Please take note of the word "struggle," for it really tells something. So Chih Heng's leading article, "Grasp the Dialectical Method of Dividing One Into Two," was published in RED FLAG No. 11 of 1974. In that ridiculous article Chih Heng incessantly raved: "When we talk about unity we do not mean to negate struggle," and "we must be aware of one tendency covering another." It also went all out in criticizing the so-called "metaphysical one-sidedness" on the issue of unity and so forth. It was definitely not dialectics about "one divides into two." It was apparently an act of undermining stability and unity under the pretext of "propagating dialectics." Comrades may well pause to consider: In

the specific political situation in which Chairman Mao had just issued the call for stability and unity, is it not clear where Chih Heng's spearhead was directed when it raised a hue and cry about struggle?

Now let us take a look at the grave struggle surrounding the issue of literature and art. Due to prolonged sabotage by Lin Piao and the "gang of four," the socialist literary and art front in our country had been permeated by an oppressive atmosphere in which "a hundred flowers wither" and "ten thousand horses stand mute." In view of this situation, Chairman Mao repeatedly issued directives on the question of literature and art in the summer and fall of 1975. He penetratingly pointed out: "People are afraid to write articles or produce plays. There is nothing in the way of novels and poetry." "No longer are a hundred flowers blossoming." These undoubtedly were stern denunciations of the "gang of four" for monopolizing and trampling upon the literary and art front. Chih Heng's chieftain immediately asked Yao Wen-yuan for instructions and invited Chu Lan to write articles on the importance of implementing the policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" in an attempt to help his bosses disguise themselves. Yao Wen-yuan viciously said: "It takes time to create a situation." It suddenly dawned on his followers that they must bide their time and wait for an opportunity to launch a counterattack. As expected, at the beginning of 1976 the "gang of four" ran rampant in going their own way. A chieftain of Chih Heng immediately sprang forth and, in collaboration with Chu Lan, concocted the big poisonous weed "Persist in revolution in literature and art and beat back the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts." This time they needed no camouflage. They launched counterattacks by trumpeting that "past scenes have been transformed on the literary and art front in the past 10 years," that "there have been new leaps forward in literary and artistic writing both in quality and quantity" and that "a situation in which a hundred flowers are flourishing and blossoming has emerged" on the literary and art front. Was this not stubborn opposition to Chairman Mao's directives? Didn't they direct the spearhead at our great leader Chairman Mao?

Chih Heng's taking the lead in dishing out the "gang of four's" counter-revolutionary political program was a very serious crime in opposing Chairman Mao. In RED FLAG No. 3 of 1976, Chih Heng concocted the big poisonous weed "From Bourgeois Democrats to Capitalist Roaders," which systematized and raised to a theoretical level the counterrevolutionary political program that the "gang of four" dished up equating veteran cadres with "democrats" and "democrats" with "capitalist roaders." It became the heavy shell the "gang of four" used to usurp party and state power. This was the great contribution Chih Heng made to the "gang of four," its service of special merit. The chief leader of Chih Heng said gleefully: "If we had had more time, we could have done even better." They were indeed happy with what they had achieved and appeared to "speak" for their masters. As soon as this fallacy was concocted,

the "gang of four's" backbone factional elements in all places, new and old bourgeois elements, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad elements throughout the country, immediately were armed with a counterrevolutionary ideology. Running wild with joy, they flaunted the sinister banner of the counterrevolutionary political program and pounced upon the party, socialism and the proletariat, ferreting out the so-called "capitalist roaders" and "agents" throughout the nation. Evil storms abruptly arose across the land; dark clouds hovered in the once clear and blue sky. In this heavy counterrevolutionary atmosphere, a large number of party organizations were unable to function normally, and many fine cadres were brutally persecuted and attacked. The "gang of four's" counterrevolutionary political program, dished out by Chih Heng, basically reversed the relationship between the enemy and ourselves in the historical period of socialism and completely betrayed our party's basic theory and basic practice in this period. It was a reaction against Chairman Mao's great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the "gang of four's" repeated antiparty upsurges we can see a prominent characteristic: The "gang of four" would direct their counterrevolutionary spearhead at anyone Chairman Mao entrusted with the day-to-day work of the party Central Committee, the State Council and the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee. Numerous materials detailing how Chih Heng concocted and stirred up counterrevolutionary public opinion fully reflected this salient characteristic.

Our esteemed and beloved Premier Chou was Chairman Mao's long-tested close comrade-in-arms, a great Marxist, a great proletarian revolutionary and a great representative in the history of our party who implemented Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Loyal and dedicated, he enjoyed lofty prestige throughout the whole party, the whole army and the whole nation as well as among the revolutionary people of the world. The "gang of four" vainly attempted to form a cabinet to take power. Because Premier Chou was an insurmountable obstacle, they intrigued and conspired in a variety of ways to attack and oppose him. After the 10th party congress, crimes against Premier Chou were perpetrated and poison arrows were aimed at him from this dark kingdom of RED FLAG controlled by the "gang of four" and their followers.

Beginning in the winter of 1973, upon Chiang Ching's reactionary instruction on "Criticizing Lin Piao, Confucius and the Duke of Chou," Chih Heng conspired with Liang Hsiao, Lo Ssu-ting and Tang Hsiao-wen to concoct the so-called "Political Articles on Current Events" in the name of criticizing Confucianism and praising Legalism. They wrote in RED FLAG such articles as "Confucius--the Man," "Struggle Between Restoration and Counterrestoration in the Course of Founding the Chin Dynasty" and other big poisonous weeds, including "Commenting on 'The Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lu,'" "On Class Struggle in the Intervening Period

Between Chin and Han," "Reading 'Salt and Iron'" and "Study the Historical Experience of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle." They wantonly criticized so-called "Confucians who were prime ministers" and placed on Premier Chou such tags as "compromise," "concession," "transmitting without writing" and "restoration and regression." Subsequently, thinking that such insinuation by making use of the past was insufficient to "put the message across," they opened up "contemporary subjects" and kicked up a big fuss on the question of foreign trade by references to the oceangoing voyage of the steamship "Feng Ching" and to "untitled music," thereby accusing Premier Chou of practicing the "slavish compradore philosophy," "the doctrine of national betrayal," and so on and so forth. After the Fourth NPC and the bankruptcy of the "gang of four's" plot to "form a cabinet," Chih Heng again colluded with Liang Hsiao and put out in RED FLAG the big poisonous weed "Criticize Following the Beaten Track and Persevere in Continuing the Revolution." They attacked Premier Chou by innuendo and vented their counterrevolutionary spleen.

As the "gang of four" were escalating their scheme to usurp party and state power, Chih Heng's attempt to influence public opinion by slandering Premier Chou also went on a rampage. They knew very well that Premier Chou had issued a directive concerning enrollment of students from secondary schools for the science courses of universities, yet they deliberately organized Liang Hsiao to prepare articles criticizing this method of recruiting students. They knew that the principle "friendship first, competition second" was put forward by Premier Chou and approved by Chairman Mao, yet they raved that following this principle meant "forgetting class struggle as the key link" and "confusing the main aim with the secondary issues." Not long after the poisonous weed "Beat Back the Right Deviationist Wind To Reverse Verdicts in the Field of Science and Technology" was concocted, a reader telephoned to refute this sinister article and charged it with piping a tune contrary to Premier Chou's directive with regard to the assessment of the scientific and technological front in the 17-year period. However, that big chieftain of Chih Heng slandered the reader's protest as a "trend of class struggle" that merited attention. He was truly extremely wild and reactionary to the core!

When our esteemed and beloved Premier Chou passed away, the whole nation was stricken with sorrow. Men and women, old and young, all grieved deeply. But a series of events detested by the people of the whole country occurred in the RED FLAG office under the control of Yao Wen-yuan and his followers. They forbade the masses to hang Chou En-lai's portraits and forbade the working staff to go to Tienanmen Square to take part in the activities to commemorate Chou En-lai. This was followed by a succession of "orders" from Yao Wen-yuan, and leaders of Chih Heng intensified their investigation of so-called "hearsay" and "counterrevolutionary rumors." What was even more exasperating was that

upon Yao Wen-yuan's sinister instruction, Chih Heng's chieftains, under the watchful eyes of the people, went so far as to order RED FLAG to carry no portrait of Comrade Chou En-lai, vice chairman of our party and good premier of the people, no obituary notice, no memorial speech or other important document. The cover of the journal still bore its name in red. They thus despicably expressed their counterrevolutionary mood of taking pleasure in the calamity of others. Chih Heng's chieftains also spread reactionary words around, slandering the people's mourning of the premier. One said, "It is like people crying over the death of the mother of the Chias in the Grand View Mansion, each having his or her own sorrow." Another said, "The dead man is used to suppress the living people." They had simply gone mad. It was precisely through the issue of opposing the good premier of the people that their counterrevolutionary, hideous features were fully exposed to daylight, that public anger was aroused and that the conditions for their own downfall were created.

The great, heroic PLA is the mighty pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat. So far as the "gang of four," who schemed to usurp party and state power, were concerned, the question of the army always remained a big worry they could not share with others. A follower of the "gang of four" whom Yao Wen-yuan placed in a post with RED FLAG more than once consulted secretly with Yu Hui-yung and the like, saying: "What worries us most now is the army." In 1974 the "gang of four" went all out to "set fire to and burn everything" in order to direct the spearhead at Vice Chairman Yeh and other leading comrades of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee in a vain attempt to disrupt the army and usurp power amid chaos. In the spring of 1974 Chih Heng ordered the concoction of two big poisonous weeds in RED FLAG entitled "On Liu Tsung-yuan's 'On Feudalism'" and "What Played the Decisive Role in Chin's Unifying the Six States?" These two articles boldly attacked the army, and particularly the proletarian backbone leading cadres in the army, in an oblique way. On the pretext of discussing the "secession of vassals" in the Tang dynasty, the first article made a fuss about the theory that "there are only rebellious generals, no rebellious prefectures," thereby insinuating that there were still today "arrogant generals" who "claim independence from the central government." This was a willful attempt to defame the people's army and drive a wedge between the party and the army. The second article distorted history and compared the past with the present. By abusing Wang Chien, who "took the credit for himself" and "threatened Chin Shih Huang," it viciously maligned Vice Chairman Yeh and smeared a large group of leading comrades of the army who followed Chairman Mao in fighting south and north and, at the risk of their lives, performed great exploits for the Chinese revolution. In October 1975 the Central Committee and its Military Commission decided to ceremoniously mark the 40th anniversary of the Long March. Vice Chairman Yeh specifically instructed that Comrade Liu Po-cheng's important article on reminiscences of the Long March be published. Reactionary literary scoundrel Yao Wen-yuan obstinately refused to do so. A

chieftain of Chih Heng raved inside and outside the office that observing the Long March meant "stressing the meritorious service of the old marshals." He went everywhere to give vent to his bitter hatred against the people's army founded and commanded by Chairman Mao. On instructions from Yao Wen-yuan, Chih Heng colluded in August 1976 with that sworn follower of the "gang of four" in Liaoning to dish up in RED FLAG an antiarmy article entitled "Forever Follow Chairman Mao's Line in Army Building" in order to distort and oppose Chairman Mao's important instruction that "the army must be consolidated and be prepared for war." Chih Heng attacked the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee held in 1975 to implement the above-mentioned instruction of Chairman Mao; directed the spearhead of attack at Vice Chairman Yeh and Teng; and vigorously prepared counterrevolutionary public opinion in support of the "gang of four's" efforts to oppose the army and usurp party and state leadership. The crimes committed by the "gang of four" and their followers in opposing the army make one's hair stand on end. However, little did they realize that while it is easy to shake a mountain, it is difficult to shake the army!

At the beginning of 1975, when Premier Chou was seriously ill, Vice Chairman Teng, entrusted by great leader Chairman Mao, took charge of the day-to-day work of the central authorities. Firmly implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies, Vice Chairman Teng strengthened the party's leadership over work in politics, economics, military affairs and culture and waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the interference and sabotage of the "gang of four." The "gang of four" were filled with fear and hatred. They waged a vigorous last-ditch struggle, resisting strongly. When Vice Chairman Teng had just resumed work, as suggested by Chairman Mao, one of the chieftains of Chih Heng felt uneasy and smeared this as indicating "the rise of a conservative influence inside and outside of the party." Later, acting upon Chairman Mao's instructions, Vice Chairman Teng presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau and sternly criticized the "gang of four." This same chieftain then attacked Vice Chairman Teng as the "commander of another bourgeois headquarters." At the end of 1975 the "gang of four" began to launch a frenzied counterattack. Chih Heng came out into the open, saber rattling. It joined the "encirclement and suppression" campaign of counterrevolutionary public opinion, a campaign rarely seen in history and initiated by the "gang of four," and played an important role in this campaign.

Here are a few simple figures: During the period in which the "gang of four" established their own rule in 1976, there were 18 antiparty articles by Chih Heng published in 10 issues of RED FLAG, as compared with 9 articles by Liang Hsiao and 12 articles by Lo Ssu-ting. The number would be greater if poisonous articles organized separately by Chih Heng are counted. These antiparty articles created something out of thin air, confused black with white, abused and threatened. They framed and

attacked Vice Chairman Teng in quite a shocking way. When Vice Chairman Teng consolidated the party organization in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng said: "The party is transformed in the image of the capitalist roader." When Vice Chairman Teng consolidated the army in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng commented: "Our army, as a pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is 'consolidated' into a tool for the restoration of capitalism." When Vice Chairman Teng rectified the economy in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng said: "They want to restore the revisionist management system." On Vice Chairman Teng's rectification of education in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng had this to say: "This simply means 'reverting' to the revisionist line in education." On Vice Chairman Teng's rectification of science and technology in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng remarked: "This is to allow the bourgeoisie to control the scientific research front." And on Vice Chairman Teng's rectification of literature and art in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Chih Heng said: "This is a vain attempt to once again turn the literary and art departments into organizations like the Petofi Club of Hungary," ... and so on and so forth. They used both sticks and labels. In fact, they used everything at their disposal. What did it mean for the "gang of four" to set up "iron and steel factories" and "hat factories"? Wasn't Chih Heng a famous expert in running them?

Chih Heng premeditatedly opposed Vice Chairman Teng more than once. In late February 1976 several of the chieftains of Chih Heng, acting on instructions from Yao Wen-yuan, plotted behind closed doors and dished up a sinister report. They trumped up all kinds of false charges, viciously accusing Vice Chairman Teng of "restoring families that have lost their positions and calling to office those who have fallen into obscurity," of "regrouping forces to restore capitalism" and of "launching another frenzied attack at the proletariat with a theory and program guiding his organized activities." While dishing up this sinister report, the chieftains of Chih Heng also attacked many leading comrades of the party Central Committee and the State Council by name. Their counterrevolutionary arrogance was unbridled to the extreme! Then, in accordance with the gang's counterrevolutionary plans, Chih Heng worked hand in glove with Liang Hsiao, Lo Ssu-ting and others to vigorously develop the "encirclement and suppression" campaign in RED FLAG, to enthusiastically criticize the so-called "three poisonous weeds" and to extend to all spheres their conspiratorial activities of "going their own way." With the large number of poisonous weeds they themselves created, Chih Heng discredited all the important measures adopted by Vice Chairman Teng in implementing Chairman Mao's instructions after taking charge of the work of the central authorities as "continuation of the revisionist line promoted by Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao." All articles and documents written on instructions from leading comrades of the party Central Committee and the State Council for the propagation and implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary

line and policies were slanderously labeled as "a program to reverse correct verdicts and restore capitalism." In June 1976 one of the chieftains of Chih Heng personally wrote a commentator's article peddling the gang's reactionary principle of "maintaining close touch with reality." He incited the factionalist forces in various localities to "drag out the capitalist roaders at every level" and fanatically tried to seize power from the hands of the proletariat. Facts fully prove that Chih Heng, in trying so hard to closely follow the "gang of four" in going their own way, sought to overthrow not only Vice Chairman Teng but also the leading proletarian backbone cadres of our party.

In January and April 1976 Chairman Mao made several major strategic policy decisions and personally chose Chairman Hua as his successor. Chairman Mao's wise policy decisions concerned the future and destiny of the party and the state and laid the foundation for solving the problems related to the "gang of four" at some later date. The "gang of four" bitterly hated these policy decisions. The mass media under their control also vigorously prepared counterrevolutionary public opinion against Chairman Hua. Chih Heng again led the storm troopers in creating trouble.

As early as in 1975 Chih Heng had engaged in some ugly performances of opposing Chairman Hua. The First National Conference on Learning From Tachai in Agriculture was held between September and October that year. At that conference Comrade Hua Kuo-feng delivered a summing-up report: "Let the whole party mobilize for a vast effort to develop agriculture and build Tachai-type counties throughout the country." This report was discussed and adopted by the Political Bureau and approved by Chairman Mao. But Chiang Ching willfully slandered it, saying: "To put it lightly, this report is revisionist." Yao Wen-yuan also said viciously: "I have no intention of printing this report." The chieftains of Chih Heng quickly followed this order. In addition, Chih Heng, acting on Yao Wen-yuan's instructions, launched a series of poisonous articles in RED FLAG vigorously criticizing the way in which "the soft, lax and lazy" were dealt with and attacking Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and other leading comrades of the central authorities. After Comrade Hua Kuo-feng assumed the posts of first vice chairman of the party Central Committee and premier of the State Council, phrases such as "capitalist roaders like so-and-so" often appeared in RED FLAG, and articles claiming that "the struggle has not yet ended" even more blatantly opposed Chairman Hua.

In late July 1976 a strong earthquake hit the Tangshan area. Entrusted by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee, Comrade Hua Kuo-feng shouldered the arduous task of leading the work to combat the earthquake and organize relief activities. Precisely at this time Yao Wen-yuan went to the RED FLAG office and, with ulterior motives in mind, said: "Somebody wants to change the key link so that he can devote himself to production." It was necessary, he said, to view the meaning of the

remark. Chih Heng immediately dished up the antiparty article entitled "Persist in Taking Class Struggle as the Key Link" and ranted: "Wage a struggle against the bourgeoisie within the party, particularly the capitalist roaders within the party," pointing the spearhead of attack directly at Chairman Hua. Chih Heng also colluded with Lo Ssu-ting and others to dish up such poisonous weeds as "The More One Is Tempered, the More Determined One Becomes" and "The Struggle Between the Two Lines in the History of Earthquakes in Our Country," using natural earthquakes as a pretext to discuss "political earthquakes." While writing another poisonous weed, "Dialectics in the Study of Lu Hsun's Essays Written in His Late Years," one of Chih Heng's chieftains tried a thousand and one ways to drop a hint to writers by quoting, with ulterior motives in mind, Lu Hsun's words, "Although a man may step down from the stage, his ideas will live on." He enthusiastically created counterrevolutionary public opinion in support of the "gang of four" in opposing Chairman Hua.

After Chairman Mao passed away, the "gang of four" stepped up their conspiratorial activities to usurp party and state leadership. The No. 1 chieftains of Lo Ssu-ting came to Peking and said to the person whom Yao Wen-yuan had assigned to RED FLAG: "Chun-chiao is the one who is taking charge of the Political Bureau." This follower of Yao Wen-yuan hopefully expected that his master would soon ascend the throne. In line with Yao Wen-yuan's plans, Chih Heng's chieftains published the 10th issue of RED FLAG ahead of schedule. Yao Wen-yuan instructed Chih Heng's chieftains to print on the front page of this issue of RED FLAG and across the top of the journal the quotation "Act according to the principles laid down" fabricated by the "gang of four." This quotation appeared as many as seven times in an article in that issue. Like a group of desperate political gamblers, the "gang of four" and their followers, staking all their chips on a single throw, launched a counterrevolutionary signal aimed at overthrowing the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua. Even after the "gang of four" collapsed and after the documents of the central authorities on appointing Chairman Hua as chairman of the party Central Committee and chairman of its Military Commission were transmitted downward, the big chieftain of Chih Heng refused to address to Chairman Hua the "report to clarify his attitude to the central authorities" and instead submitted it to Yao Wen-yuan's office. They were loyal to the "gang of four" to the hilt!

While fanatically opposing Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, Chairman Hua, Vice Chairman Yeh and Vice Chairman Teng, Chih Heng spared no efforts in prettifying the "gang of four" antiparty clique, lavishly praising the clique and setting up monuments and creating public opinion exalting the clique. As soon as special agent Chang Chun-chiao's antiparty article entitled "On All-Round Dictatorship" was made public, one of Chih Heng's chieftains flatteringly praised it as "a perfect article which appears only once in several years." Chih Heng also praised renegade Chiang Ching as a "leftist," a "standard bearer" and a "Marxist." Chih Heng

and its followers prettified the newborn bourgeois element Wang Hung-wen in RED FLAG, ranting that "the children's corps can also manage to handle important affairs" and "the children's corps succeeded in overthrowing the homegoing legion." Chih Heng worshipped the reactionary writer Yao Wen-yuan even more, regarding him as a "god." Whenever new people were transferred to the editorial department, a "study class" was invariably held for them in accordance with Yao Wen-yuan's sinister instructions. His several followers would then lavishly praise Yao as a "representative of the correct line," spread the myth that Yao had "struggled against Chen Po-ta before" and trumpet the so-called "Yao Wen-yuan road." A chieftain of Chih Heng bragged: "We are especially blessed by heaven." "Heaven" means Yao, the "gang of four." Chih Heng's chieftains indeed praised the "gang of four" to the skies. In their dreams day and night they hoped that the "gang of four" would come to power and create a new dynasty--a hodgepodge of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism.

In the days when the "gang of four" were plotting to usurp party and state power, the vast number of cadres and the masses were greatly worried about the future and destiny of the party and the state. However, the "gang of four" and their followers were acting arrogantly! A chieftain of Chih Heng said everywhere he went: "The west wind prevailed over the east wind in July, August and September of 1975, while the east wind prevailed over the west wind in July, August and September of 1976." Unable to suppress their lunatic desire to usurp party and state power, they were preparing for the celebration of their "grand day." However, this band of wicked elements who traveled against the historical current did not at all understand the dialectics of historical development. When they observed things from the anticommunist, antipeople and counterrevolutionary viewpoint, they were naturally bound to miscalculate the situation and overestimate their own strength while underestimating the strength of the people. But they rejoiced too soon. The party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, carrying forward the will of great leader Chairman Mao, smashed the "gang of four" at one stroke, thereby making the real proletarian east wind sweep across the great land of the mother country and ushering in the doomsday of Chih Heng and his like!

III

Chih Heng's chieftains closely followed the "gang of four" in dishing up many antiparty articles and making use of RED FLAG to do evil things. They committed a series of crimes against the party, the people, and the revolution. Like black characters on a piece of white paper, these crimes stood out as irrefutable facts. Their antiparty criminal activities were serious in nature and reactionary in essence. The measures they adopted were despicable.

First, they were not blindly following others in carrying out antiparty activities. They did this entirely of their free will.

In terms of time, it was not just 1 or 2 days that they carried out anti-party activities. They did this for exactly 3 years, from the opening of the 10th party congress to the downfall of the "gang of four." As far as the number of articles was concerned, it was not one or two articles that they wrote. They wrote hundreds of articles with hundreds of thousands of words. The essence of these anti-party articles was to oppose Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, Chairman Hua and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation. Are these not ironclad facts? Could there be such "blind actions"?

Several of the chieftains of Chih Heng were good at following the instructions issued by the "gang of four." They profoundly understood the whole range of counterrevolutionary tactics in struggle. They adopted varied tactics in opposing Chairman Mao and other leading comrades of the central authorities. When they opposed Vice Chairman Teng, they adopted the despicable tricks of spreading rumors and framing others with false evidence, doing so openly. When they opposed Premier Chou, Chairman Hua and Vice Chairman Yeh, they adopted the tricks of making insinuations, of using ancient things to satirize the present and of using one pretext or another, raising a hue and cry against such things as "Confucians who were prime ministers," "acting prime ministers," "big Confucians within the army," "empiricism," "eclecticism," "slavish comprador philosophy," "the doctrine of crawling behind at a snail's pace," "the fake foreign devils," "the living Sung Chiang," "capitulationists" and "people of the type of so-and-so." They concocted all kinds of charges and would not feel happy until they put those they accused to death. When they opposed Chairman Mao, they adopted even more covert and crafty tactics. They mainly inherited the mantle of traitor Lin Piao by "waving Chairman Mao's banner to oppose Chairman Mao." While shouting loudly such phrases as "holding high" and "following closely," they actually deeply resented Chairman Mao and Mao Tsetung Thought. At times they secretly defied Chairman Mao's directives while pretending to obey them in public. For example, when Chairman Mao gave an important instruction regarding the fine film "Pioneers," Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan went all out to deny their responsibility for negating the film, while Chih Heng hurriedly removed from the typesetting plate a reserve article which condemned the film so as to destroy the criminal evidence. On other occasions they could not help "working in opposition to" Chairman Mao's directives. As an example of the evidence, Chih Heng teamed up with Chu Lan in desperately countering the severe criticism made by Chairman Mao of the "gang of four" for undermining the party's policy on literature and art. All of these crimes are substantiated by facts and records and cannot be denied. That they adopted various tactics against the party only serves to prove that they had carefully prepared their moves to oppose the party and Chairman Mao.

We must, with proletarian revolutionary indignation, openly expose one unforgivable crime committed by the few chieftains of Chih Heng. Two

days before Chairman Mao's death these few chieftains had already learned that Chairman Mao was seriously ill. Yet on the evening of 8 September they got together and held a so-called "midautumn small feast," drinking and having fun until late in the night. That same night our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao left us forever. This was not just a simple feast but a political incident of a very serious nature. It was not at all accidental that the incident took place at the RED FLAG office, which was controlled by the "gang of four." It inexorably exposed the hypocrisy of the few chieftains of Chih Heng in loudly chanting "hold high" and "closely follow." Since they had degenerated to such a shameful degree that they were closely linked with the "gang of four" politically, ideologically and emotionally, it was not at all surprising that they closely followed the gang and did all kinds of evil things against Chairman Mao.

Second, they displayed tremendous initiative in carrying out antiparty activities. This was a concentrated manifestation of their reactionary class stand and reactionary world outlook.

The reactionary hack writer Yao Wen-yuan was an alien class element who had wormed his way into the revolutionary ranks and wildly engaged in counterrevolutionary sabotage activities. Yet the few chieftains of Chih Heng followed Yao Wen-yuan's every step and clung to his legs in their attempt to climb up. They prostrated themselves in admiration before Yao Wen-yuan, followed his every beck and call and in time came to understand intimately even his counterrevolutionary "temper." Yao Wen-yuan's vicious intentions needed only the slightest hint to be fully understood and skillfully carried out by them. They displayed tremendous initiative in implementing Yao Wen-yuan's sinister instructions, wantonly tampering with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and creating labels and sticks for the "gang of four." They were not only highly "enthusiastic" but also immensely "creative." One of the chieftains unashamedly bragged: These techniques were "taught us by Wen-yuan personally." "When Yao Wen-yuan broke wind, Chih Heng received it as a signal to stage a drama"--this remark by the masses most vividly and penetratingly delineated the hideous features of Chih Heng as the able hatchetman of the "gang of four." Such examples can be found everywhere and are too numerous to cite. Just look at the following facts:

In early February 1976 Yao Wen-yuan summoned his several followers and told them: "We must continue to criticize Confucius." Accordingly, they immediately organized Liang Hsiao to concoct the big poisonous weed "In Opposing Revisionism It Is Necessary To Criticize Confucius." Even though the article failed to find anything Vice Chairman Teng had said about veneration of Confucius, it put the tag "Confucius worshipper" on him. In May of the same year Chih Heng learned from Liang Hsiao that Chiang Ching had, with an ulterior motive, reached the decision to "criticize the compradore bourgeoisie." Thereupon a chieftain shuttled

between Liang Hsiao and RED FLAG, and after 2 months of intense activities a big poisonous weed criticizing the so-called "economic thinking of the compradore bourgeoisie" was finally completed after 10 revisions. It laid false charges against Vice Chairman Teng by means of spreading rumors to deceive the masses. In April of the same year, when the cadres and the masses went to Tienanmen Square to commemorate respected and beloved Premier Chou, the "gang of four" deeply resented this. Thereupon Yao Wen-yuan ordered the big chieftain of Chih Heng to immediately concoct an antiparty article framing Vice Chairman Teng. He said: "The title of the article may be 'So-and-So Is...and the Incident....'" Yao Wen-yuan deliberately pretended to be unable to find an appropriate phrase, and that big chieftain chimed in at once: "The chief culprit." Yao praised him happily and said: "Right, the chief culprit." So, the poisonous article "So-and-So Is the Chief Culprit of ...Incident" was made public. Devoid of real stuff, the article made charges out of thin air, leaving no stone unturned in attacking and framing Vice Chairman Teng.

It is not difficult for people to see that such mad antiparty activities could be carried out only by people who had deep-seated hatred for the party, the people and the revolution. The chieftains of Chih Heng engaged in these activities and willingly fell into the arms of the "gang of four" entirely because they had merged with the "gang of four" from standpoint to emotions and, in opposing the party, sank deeper and deeper into the pit.

Third, their antiparty activities and their fabrication and control of counterrevolutionary public opinion were an important part of the "gang of four's" conspiracy to usurp party and state power.

RED FLAG is the theoretical publication of the party Central Committee. Naturally it should disseminate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and popularize the party's line, principles and policies. Naturally it should ask for instructions on work from the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, make progress reports to them and be responsible to them. But after the "gang of four" usurped the leadership of RED FLAG, Yao Wen-yuan became the sole leading person. He hoodwinked the public and altered the character and orientation of RED FLAG. With regard to the higher levels, he never asked for instructions from and never made reports to the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao on RED FLAG's policy and on major questions of theory and propaganda; everything was decided by his "gang central committee." With regard to the lower levels, he never encouraged running the journal by the whole party and did not take the mass line. Instead, a few hack writers groomed by the "gang of four" monopolized the public media and did everything possible to spread rumors and to slander, attack and label people. Behind the back of the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, and behind the back of the revolutionary masses of the RED FLAG establishment, Yao Wen-yuan privately appointed and fostered an illegal "leading group" as his watchdog body to

control the journal. He forbade the establishment of a collective leading organ to exercise the party's centralized leadership; there were no more regular organizational activities of the party; and the party's traditional political work was discarded. Yao Wen-yuan's actions turned RED FLAG into an independent kingdom above the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. Aren't these facts seen by one and all? The "gang of four" themselves were a conspiratorial clique guilty of unpardonable crimes. Controlling and using RED FLAG to spread counterrevolutionary opinion for usurping party and state power, opposing Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, Chairman Hua, Vice Chairman Yeh and Vice Chairman Teng and opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies--this was an important part of the criminal activities of this conspiratorial clique. This was why the "gang of four," Yao Wen-yuan in particular, regarded so highly and were so fond of these few followers. It is clear that the relationship between these few followers and Yao Wen-yuan, like that between jackals and a tiger, was by no means a normal "working relationship" but an out-and-out conspiratorial relationship.

To tightly control RED FLAG, Yao Wen-yuan handed out official posts and made lavish promises to the few chieftains of Chih Heng and tried his utmost to foster the factional force. Yao Wen-yuan told these few followers: "RED FLAG is going to set up a party core group. All of you will be included." He told the big chieftain: "Your work will not be a waste of effort." To be sure, the few chieftains became "delegates," were invited to banquets and began to show their faces in public on many occasions. They were therefore grateful to Yao Wen-yuan and became increasingly bold in antiparty activities. Furthermore, Yao Wen-yuan had a confidant of his transferred from Lo Ssu-ting to RED FLAG, where this confidant assumed the dual role of leader and spy. The "gang of four's" followers in Shanghai, fearing that they might show their cloven hoof, repeatedly instructed this spy, saying: "When you go to RED FLAG, don't talk about your relationship with Yao Wen-yuan. If you do, things will go very wrong." What a joke! Such a deceptive tactic of closing one's ears to the ringing bell merely serves as the self-confession of a conspiratorial relationship between them.

With the downfall of the "gang of four," Chih Heng, which had done all kinds of evil, had no other place to go but the garbage bin of history. Chairman Mao taught us: "He who belittles the role of teachers by negative example is not a thoroughgoing dialectical materialist." When we, with implacable hatred, expose Chih Heng's ugly performance with the mass media, we must not forget the serious lesson this rare teacher by negative example has provided to the proletariat and the revolutionary masses.

It shows us by negative example that it is of paramount importance for the proletariat to pay full attention to studying and grasping revolutionary theories. The "gang of four" were a bunch of ignorant political

swindlers. They were able to confuse some people with their revisionist fallacies simply because they took advantage of the weakness of some of our comrades who failed to conscientiously study Marxist-Leninist works and Chairman Mao's works and whose theoretical level was not high. Our comrades, those doing theoretical and propaganda work in particular, must bear firmly in mind this lesson, seriously read and study and raise their Marxist theoretical level. Only by so doing can they avoid being confused by all kinds of fallacies spread by anti-Marxist political swindlers. Only in this way can they adhere to the firm and correct political orientation.

It shows us by negative example that it is of paramount importance that the proletariat pay full attention to controlling the public media. The "gang of four" were not armed with truth, had no masses around them and were extremely isolated and weak. Yet they were able to deceive the public with lies and caused great confusion, because they usurped the power of public opinion and seized the public media. This is a very painful lesson. Public opinion must be controlled by the proletariat and placed under the party's absolute leadership. It must not be usurped by political swindlers who disguise themselves as revolutionaries but are in fact opposed to the revolution. Otherwise it will bring great harm to the party and the revolutionary cause of the people.

It shows us by negative example that it is of paramount importance that the proletariat pay full attention to building a contingent of staunch Marxist theoretical workers. Chairman Mao pointed out: "There are two ways of killing people: One is to kill with the gun and the other with the pen. The way which is most artfully disguised and draws no blood is to kill with the pen." ("Criticism of Liang Shu-ming's Reactionary Ideas") The few hack writers groomed by the "gang of four" killed with the pen, inflicting serious "internal wounds" on the minds of our cadres and the masses of people. This lesson poses a very pointed question to every one of our comrades engaged in theoretical work, that is, that we must thoroughly settle the question of whom our pen should be aimed at and whom we should serve. We must really make our pen a powerful weapon to unite and educate the people and deal blows at and wipe out the enemies.

During the third campaign to expose and criticize the "gang of four," we members on the staff of RED FLAG are resolved that, under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua and together with all the party members and the revolutionary masses, we shall vigorously and penetratingly expose and criticize the crimes of the gang in using RED FLAG to create counterrevolutionary public opinion. We must thoroughly settle accounts with those antiparty articles concocted by Yao Wen-yuan and his few followers, articles which fired the first shot and set the tune. We must eliminate their pernicious influence and effect, restore order, and run RED FLAG as a genuinely revolutionary and critical journal that integrates theory with reality, so that it may play its due fighting role in the great struggle to grasp the key link in running the country and to fulfill the general task for the new period.

THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DESIGN AS SEEN FROM THE ANTI-CHINA STAND OF THE
VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES

Peking RED FLAG in Chinese No 8, 1 Aug 78 pp 101-104

[Article by RED FLAG commentator]

[Text] The Vietnamese authorities are going farther and farther down the anti-China road. People naturally will ask: Why is that?

China and Vietnam are neighbors linked by mountains and rivers. In the process of long revolutionary struggles against imperialism the people of the two countries have been sharing weal and woe, supporting and encouraging each other, nurturing the close relations of brothers. In the prolonged wars against French and U.S. aggression all the Chinese people provided a powerful backing to the Vietnamese people, who regarded the vast expanse of China's territory as their reliable rear area. We have never stinted in our tremendous national sacrifice to aid Vietnam. Right after the founding of new China, when our wounds from the war were still serious, when imperialism was still imposing a prolonged embargo on us and Soviet revisionism was fanatically undermining us and forcing us to pay our debts, we still made strenuous efforts to aid Vietnam. After the end of the Vietnam war, when our nation was faced with great difficulties due to troubles caused by the "gang of four" and serious natural disasters, we continued to aid Vietnam. China is a developing socialist country, backward both economically and culturally. The Chinese people ignored their own difficulties and lived frugally so as to insure the supply of food, clothing and daily necessities to satisfy the needs of the Vietnamese army and people during the war and to help Vietnam with its capital construction. We took weapons and ammunition from our own troops to aid Vietnam. We even supplied the Vietnamese with weapons which we had not yet given to our own troops. Thousands of our comrades shed their blood together with our Vietnamese comrades-in-arms in the flames of war in Vietnam. We never attached any conditions to our aid. We never demanded anything from Vietnam, not even a blade of grass or a single tree. In our joint struggle against imperialism we have fulfilled our bounden proletarian internationalist duty to the Vietnamese people. We have a clear conscience in this regard and do not regret anything.

We have not done any disservice to Vietnam. For years the Vietnamese authorities have done a number of things to undermine relations between the two countries and have resorted to all kinds of measures to instigate anti-Chinese activities. For a long time we adopted an attitude of self-restraint and forbearance. Internally we patiently urged them to change their incorrect stand and waged the necessary struggles. We have always advocated a resolution of differences between the two countries through negotiations. It was only after their anti-China activities had become more and more flagrant and they deliberately created the incident of persecuting and expelling Chinese residents en masse--an incident rarely seen in the history of international relations--and only after they had seriously undermined friendly relations between the two countries, created extremely pitiful conditions and an unhappy atmosphere and acted in such a manner that China could not possibly continue its economic and technical aid and was compelled to adopt the necessary corresponding measures. It was only after they took their 11th step that we began to take our first.

In full view of the entire world the Vietnamese authorities have so fanatically opposed China. People cannot but ask: Why?

As far as people can see, behind every anti-China step taken by the Vietnamese authorities is the large shadow of Soviet social imperialism. Since extending its sinister hands into Vietnam, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has all along racked its brains to sow the seeds of discord in Vietnam-China relations. For many years, whenever the Soviet Union took a step to pull Vietnam closer to its side, the Vietnamese authorities would accordingly escalate their anti-China activities by one step. The Soviet Union left no stone unturned in inciting problems and supporting the Vietnamese authorities to stir up disputes against China in one way or another. The Soviet Union went all out to prepare public opinion for supporting and encouraging the Vietnamese authorities to persecute and expel the Chinese nationals and unscrupulously undermine Vietnam-China relations. In praising "the firm stand" of the Vietnamese authorities in their anti-China and anti-Chinese campaign, the Soviet Union has proclaimed its "firm support" for the continuation of this campaign. The Soviet Union has become more active in providing Vietnam with its ideas, daily moving further from the wings toward center stage. The social imperialists can hardly wait to swing their baton in broad daylight, as they have frequently done.

Why does the Soviet Union want to incite and support the Vietnamese in launching an anti-China campaign? The answer to this has also become clearer. In creating division and hostility between China and Vietnam, what the Soviet Union wants is to put Vietnam under the influence of its own hegemonism. Brezhnev long ago boasted that Vietnam is a so-called "strong outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia," and a so-called "important factor for peace and progress in Southeast Asia or in all of Asia."

Now the Soviet Union has confidently declared that "Vietnam today is a reliable bulwark of socialism in this region." At the height of the anti-China campaign, the SRV has officially become a "CEMA" member. The Soviet Union said this had "opened up a new stage in all-round cooperation," and that today "there is a new form and new depth in the friendship" between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Vietnamese paper NHAN DAN also stated that the Vietnamese authorities "are determined to play the role of an outpost of the socialist camp in Southeast Asia."

As everyone knows, the socialist camp long ago ceased to exist. The so-called "socialist community" is only a term standing for the colonial empire of Soviet social imperialism. In that case, what kind of "outpost" and "factor" does Moscow actually need in Southeast Asia?

What Moscow needs is an "outpost" to control this region through the device of "an Indochina federation." The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has always tried to disguise itself as a supporter of the anti-U.S. national liberation struggle in this region. However, history cannot be repudiated. When Khrushchev was in power, it openly opposed and refused to support the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. war. After Brezhnev took power and as the Vietnamese people won victory after victory in their anti-U.S. war, it changed its mind. The clique adopted a "ripe-plum" policy in order to put this region under its own sphere of influence. This is why it supports the SRV's attempt to rig up "an Indochina federation." It has done everything it can to oppose and undermine the Kampuchean national liberation war. It fraternized and maintained diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol traitor clique until the day that clique totally collapsed. As Kampuchea continued to win victories in the national liberation war, the Soviets once again introduced the SRV proposal to form "an Indochina federation" and directly applied pressure on Kampuchea to accept this "proposal" of national betrayal. Facing Kampuchea's resolute opposition to such hegemonism, the SRV authorities have mobilized their armed forces to invade Kampuchea in a war of aggression and have engaged in subversive acts against Kampuchea. Openly siding with the Vietnamese authorities, the Soviet Union stirred up and expanded the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. Isn't it as clear as daylight that Soviet social imperialism is conspiring to control this region through the SRV's founding of "an Indochina federation"?

What Moscow needs is a "forward post" to dominate Southeast Asia and Asia. Southeast Asia is on the strategic route connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans and is also a region rich in strategic resources. Therefore, Southeast Asia has long been a bone of contention between Soviet social imperialism and U.S. imperialism. In the past few years the Soviet Union has vigorously expanded its Pacific fleet and strengthened its fleet permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union urgently needs a reliable base for the long voyage from the continental base of its Pacific Fleet to the Indian Ocean. This is why the

Soviet Union has cast a covetous eye on the military bases in Vietnam, particularly the large U.S.-constructed naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet Union needs a "strong forward post" like Vietnam to further step up its contention with the United States in the Asian-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, to pose a direct threat to Southeast Asia and to control this important, strategically significant region.

Since the defeat of the United States in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union has wasted no time in worming its way into Asia. It has worked hard to form "an Asian collective security system" and uses it as a means of establishing its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia and Asia. However, despite its efforts, the Soviet Union has everywhere run into stone walls and failed to find any market for its "Asian collective security system." Meanwhile, it still needs agents to continuously peddle its camouflaged "Asian collective security system." The Vietnamese authorities at one time advocated "Southeast Asia for the Southeast Asians," and at other times they proposed to establish "genuinely independent regional cooperation in a new form" with the SRV taking the lead. Now they have again expressed their willingness to discuss the proposal for turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Highly pleased with such activities, which meet its own needs, the Soviet Union lauded the Vietnamese authorities for making "constructive contributions" to solving the problem of Southeast Asia. This two-man act has become all the more eye-catching since the Vietnamese authorities formally joined "CEMA." The Vietnamese authorities are circulating propaganda alleging that they still pursue a line of "independence and initiative" and are prepared to cooperate with ASEAN and negotiate with ASEAN member countries. At the same time the Soviet Union has also suddenly reversed its past hostile and offensive attitude toward ASEAN and indicates that it will take "an attitude of good will" toward the ASEAN reality. It now stresses that ASEAN should be expanded to include such countries as Vietnam. Haven't such frantic activities as peddling the "Asian security system" in a new guise fully exposed the Soviet Union's claims of "good will" and the Vietnamese authorities claims of "independence and initiative"?

It is very clear that what Soviet social imperialism is fostering in Southeast Asia is by no means a so-called "socialist outpost" and a so-called "factor of peace and progress," but an out-and-out hegemonist "outpost," a "factor" that creates war and unrest and threatens the independence and security of various Southeast Asian countries. Socialist China firmly supports the just struggle of Southeast Asian countries against hegemonist control and interference and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty and supports the ASEAN countries' firm and positive stand for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. In pushing its superpower hegemonism, the Soviet Union regards China as a big obstacle. The Soviet Union has always viciously maligned China to pave the way for its expansion. The Vietnamese authorities are pursuing a regional

hegemonism, trying first to rig up an "Indochina federation" and then to expand further in Southeast Asia, and they, too, regard China as a big obstacle. The Soviet Union is sowing dissension and stirring up trouble, and the Vietnamese authorities, following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, have become rabidly anti-China. The Vietnamese regional hegemomists regard the Soviet superpower hegemonists as their protectors, and the latter regard the former as their tools. This is the essence of their "all-round cooperation."

The activities of Soviet social imperialism in Southeast Asia are a component of its global strategic plan. The focus of its contention with U.S. imperialism for world hegemony is Europe. To outflank and encircle Europe and isolate the United States, it is now engaged in very intense competition to grab areas producing strategic materials and important strategic spots in the Middle East and Africa and to seize the strategic routes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and from the Soviet Union to the Indian Ocean. Recently a series of hot spots of contention have emerged, where a series of local wars, conflicts and subversive activities have occurred. From the raging flames of war in the Horn of Africa to the second armed invasion of Zaire, from the subversive and insurrectionary incidents that have occurred one after another in West Asian and South Asian countries to the bloody assassination case on the Arabian Peninsula, and from the Vietnamese authorities' war of aggression against Kampuchea to their blatant anti-China activities--all these are links in the same chain, and all can be traced to the behind-the-scenes manipulations of the same evil boss. Why is the Soviet Union so impetuous, ferocious and reckless? All this only shows that the Soviet Union is stepping up its efforts to carry out its global strategic plan in preparation for a new world war and that the danger of war obviously is increasing. This is what the people of the world need to watch closely, vigilantly guard against and deal with seriously.

In carrying out aggression and expansion, Soviet social imperialism tries its utmost to use agents to spearhead the attack, and this is an unusually strange international phenomenon. Cuba is the kind of agent it has fostered. Wherever its tentacles are extended, it often sends Cuban mercenary troops there to serve its strategic deployment. It has instigated Cuba to wave the banner of "support for the national liberation movement" while fomenting splits and conflicts among Third World countries and carrying out infiltration, control and subversion of these countries from within. It uses Cuba, which is flaunting the banner of "nonalignment," to peddle its sinister stuff in the Third World and especially to sneak into the nonaligned movement to split and sabotage the movement. Perhaps because it has tasted success with regard to Cuba, the Soviet Union is now fostering similar agents in Southeast Asia and other places. But the people of the world have already been alerted to these expansionist Soviet tactics. The public media in more and more